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Thesis Summary 
The extent to which motivational mechanisms contribute to reward seeking processes is 
crucial to our understanding of certain abnormal behaviours, including addiction. 
Pavlovian conditioning endows reward-associated stimuli with the ability to modulate 
goal-directed actions for that same reward (Pavlovian-to-Instrumental transfer; PIT). 
Learning and motivational theories attempt to describe the processes by which stimuli 
in the environment acquire incentive properties, attract attention and drive reward-
seeking behaviours and bear many resemblances, but there are also important 
differences. This thesis uses a general PIT model in humans to further our 
understanding of these discrepancies and investigates the effect mood has on these 
processes. 
Firstly, altering the value of the reward affected the rigor of instrumental performance, 
but the same changes in outcome value did not affect the expectancy of, attention to, or 
emotional reactivity to the cues suggesting that in Pavlovian learning, apart from the 
nature of outcomes, the value of outcomes is encoded such that changes in outcome 
value prevent transfer of a Pavlovian cue’s incentive properties to alter goal-directed 
action. Secondly, the further papers assess the extent to which mood modulates this 
same action. When under negative mood a general reduction in motivation, driven by an 
attenuated sensitivity to the reward was observed, as well as a dissociation between 
aversive and appetitive outcomes. The remaining study explored whether mood altered 
Pavlovian learning and revealed that those under state negative mood take longer to 
express their knowledge explicitly and that those under positive mood showed altered 
attention and emotional responses towards the same stimuli. 
The approach used in this thesis shows the merits of both motivational and learning 
theories, and further demonstrates the link between mood and motivation. Additionally, 
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a dissociation between punishment and reward prediction when under negative mood 
was demonstrated and builds upon this important distinction. 
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Chapter 1 
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General Introduction 
Depressive disorders, drug addiction and classical conditioning 
Depressive disorders are often co-morbid with anxiety disorders, which represent the 
most common type of mental disorder across a range of countries (Demyttenaere et al., 
2004), but patients do not always receive the appropriate attention for their condition 
when compared to other mental illnesses (Kroenke, Spitzer, Williams, Monahan, & 
Lowe, 2007). Anxiety and depression often present with heavy alcohol use, addiction 
issues and smoking (Martin-Merino, Ruigomez, Johansson, Wallander, & Garcia-
Rodriguez, 2010) and the main focus of this thesis will surround the relationship 
between depressive mood and addiction; in particular the impact current mood has on 
motivation. This link is important as a key symptom of depression is anhedonia 
(Huprich, 2013). Anhedonia is associated with decreased sensitivity to pleasurable 
events (Der-Avakian & Markou, 2012), which may be modelled experimentally using 
reward outcomes in a Pavlovian design. As such, mood may therefore modulate the 
motivated responses to rewards, and this will be discussed in more detail later. 
Furthermore, animal studies have demonstrated the presence of anhedonia by adopting 
the use of procedures that are sensitive to experimental manipulations in reward value. 
Accordingly, subjects with negative mood should not be sensitive to the effects of 
increased or decreased reward value in the expression of conditioning and investigating 
this is important in furthering our understanding of the link between depression and 
reward which is another focus of this thesis. It is also important in supporting the 
development of therapeutic interventions for addiction. 
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Main model of classical conditioning 
Classical conditioning processes can render cues signalling reward and aversive 
outcomes with the ability to initiate affective responses. A neutral stimulus can be 
repeatedly and reliably paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US) such that eventually 
the neutral stimulus becomes conditioned (conditioned stimulus; CS) and able to 
generate a response that sometimes mimics the response generated by the US 
(unconditioned response; UR). The mimicked response is known as the conditioned 
response (CR) and is the outcome of successful classical conditioning (Rescorla, 1967). 
Classical conditioning is dependent upon several key principles, such as expectation and 
contingency. It is extremely important that the US is more likely to occur after 
presentation of the CS than in the absence of the CS, i.e. they are contingent upon each 
other (Rescorla, 1968). A further requirement is that an element of surprise must be 
associated with the US to elicit successful conditioning (Rescorla, 1976). 
 
Conditioned appetitive responses and activation of an appetitive motivational system 
Stimuli associated with a reward outcome may eventually come to drive the same 
response generated by the reward itself and this is known as a conditioned appetitive 
response. Animal and human drug addiction literature is abundant with examples of 
how stimuli paired with a reward can elicit an appetitive response. In animals this has 
been demonstrated using drugs such as opiates (Hand, Stinus, & Le Moal, 1989) in a 
conditioned place preference (CPP) paradigm, and in humans a stimulus previously 
associated with cocaine is more often chosen than a stimulus associated with placebo by 
cocaine abusers (Foltin & Haney, 2000). It is, however, harder to elicit such CRs by 
humans for non-drug rewards unless the stimuli are particularly arousing, as 
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demonstrated by the ability of a geometric figure paired with an erotic image to bring 
about increased ratings of pleasantness when compared to a pairing with a non-erotic 
image (Klucken et al., 2009). In another example, extreme images (i.e. erotica and 
violent death) have been shown to bring about responses such as increased skin 
conductance; as such conditioned emotional responses are also indicative of cue-elicited 
motivated behaviour (Bindra, 1969), the link between emotion and motivation is an 
important one. In addition, as highly emotive images are successfully used to induce 
state mood (Gilet, 2008), as well as induce other behavioural and physiological 
responses (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993; Smith, Bradley, & Lang, 2005), 
this demonstrates the link between state mood, motivation and reward related 
behaviour. Such physiological responses (i.e. skin conductance as well as increases in 
heart rate) have also been shown to be brought about by cues such as smoking (Tiffany 
& Drobes, 1990) and alcohol (Glautier, Drummond, & Remington, 1994). 
Furthermore, during conditioning through associative learning mechanisms, links can be 
formed between representations of stimuli in the environment and reward outcome 
(Everitt, Cardinal, Parkinson, & Robbins, 2003; Everitt & Robbins, 2005); this is often 
preceded by an instrumental response (Hogarth, Dickinson, & Duka, 2005; Hogarth, 
Dickinson, Hutton, Elbers, & Duka, 2006). The action of instrumental responding in the 
presence of such stimuli associated with reward indicates activation of an appetitive 
motivational system. Once a predictive associative relationship is established the stimuli 
become able to control the instrumental response (Hogarth, et al., 2005) acquiring the 
ability to lead to impulsive reward seeking, (Dalley et al., 2009; Pelloux, Everitt, & 
Dickinson, 2007; Vanderschuren & Everitt, 2004) sometimes despite negative outcomes 
(Everitt et al., 2007). As such the stimuli in the environment acquire incentive 
properties (Everitt & Robbins, 2005), attract attention and drive the reward seeking 
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behaviour (Hogarth, et al., 2005; Hogarth & Duka, 2006a). In periods of abstinence 
stimuli can reinstate reward seeking behaviour as demonstrated in animals (e.g. 
Economidou, Pelloux, Robbins, Dalley, & Everitt, 2009; Pelloux, et al., 2007; 
Vanderschuren & Everitt, 2004, etc.) and the role of environmental stimuli under such 
circumstances has also been investigated (Everitt, et al., 2007). The ability of an altered 
value of rewarded outcome to maintain control of the instrumental response and the 
effect mood may play on the acquisition of such predictive associative relationships is 
investigated in this thesis. I will argue that state mood is an important factor in reward 
seeking, and that this may be utilised in therapeutic interventions for drug addiction. 
 
Main mechanisms underlying reward seeking behaviour 
Both learning and motivational theories attempt to describe the underlying effect of the 
stimuli on reward seeking behaviour. Learning theories suggest that the presence of the 
stimuli activates mental representations of the outcome and thus drives the behaviour 
(Hogarth, Dickinson, Austin, Brown, & Duka, 2008; Hogarth, et al., 2005; Hogarth, 
Dickinson, Hutton, Bamborough, & Duka, 2006; Hogarth, Dickinson, Hutton, Elbers, et 
al., 2006); in contrast motivational theories suggest the presence of the stimuli increases 
motivation more generally and thus drives the behaviour to obtain the reward (Everitt et 
al., 2008). Common causal factors that contribute to the effect of the stimulus as 
described in both theories include reward value, such that increased reinforcer value 
increases salience for the stimulus, and deprivation from reward for a period of time 
increases the behavioural output to seek reward such that deprivation increases the value 
of the reward (Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Hogarth & Duka, 2006a). This thesis also aims 
to investigate these differences, and the impact state mood may have. The general link 
between negative mood and reward has previously been demonstrated (Rogers et al., 
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2003), and negative mood has been shown to be involved in many facets involved in 
learning and motivated behaviour, and this is discussed in detail later. 
 
Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer 
As touched upon earlier, increased performance of an instrumental response in the 
presence of a CS is indicative of the activation of an appetitive motivational system by 
the CS. It is thought that a central appetitive motivational system could become 
activated and be responsible for driving the instrumental responding. Alternatively, the 
response could be related to a specific representation of the reward driving the 
responding through specific outcome expectancy. One method by which outcome-
specific and general motivational systems have been separated is Pavlovian-to-
Instrumental transfer (PIT). In summary, however, classical conditioning and 
instrumental responding are trained independently in PIT, and if as a result of the 
combination of both training sessions the Pavlovian cue elicits selective responding for 
the specific reward it was paired with, then an outcome-specific theory is supported. 
However, if responding is increased more generally, i.e. for different rewards, then a 
more general motivational system has been activated which can be dissociated from a 
specific CS-US representation; whilst both have been demonstrated experimentally, the 
former using monetary and cigarette rewards (Hogarth, Dickinson, Wright, Kouvaraki, 
& Duka, 2007), the general model is associated with certain drug rewards and has also 
been carried out successfully in animals utilising cues associated with alcohol which 
also enhanced responding for non-alcohol reward (Corbit & Janak, 2007). 
PIT is a form of associative learning in which conditioned Pavlovian cues enhance 
instrumental responding for rewards previously associated with those cues and for 
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others. This occurs even when those rewards are no longer available and in the absence 
of any explicit training between the Pavlovian and instrumental contingencies (Bray, 
Rangel, Shimojo, Balleine, & O'Doherty, 2008; Talmi, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 
2008). In other words, PIT represents the capacity of conditioned stimuli to augment 
instrumental behaviour. Since Estes (Gutman & Estes, 1949) first demonstrated the PIT 
effect in rats, the phenomenon has been reproduced in several animal studies (Colwill & 
Rescorla, 1990; Lovibond, 1983; Rescorla, 1994a) and more recently with humans 
(Bray, et al., 2008; Hogarth, et al., 2007; Talmi, et al., 2008). Investigation is now 
focused upon identifying underlying mechanisms and exploring variations within the 
PIT paradigm. For example, Trick et al. (Trick, Hogarth, & Duka, 2011) developed the 
PIT technique to include probabilities of reward; providing a method for quantifying 
mental representations of outcome-expectancies. 
Many behaviours may be influenced by conditioned stimuli associated with certain 
outcomes (a type of PIT), one of the most significant (in terms of its impact on society, 
crime, and (mental) health) is drug abuse (Everitt, Dickinson, & Robbins, 2001). 
Certain contextual cues (e.g. drug paraphernalia, location of consumption, etc.) are 
thought to become associated with drug taking. When these cues are re-encountered, 
they motivate drug-seeking and hence drug taking. This can maintain drug-taking and 
has been documented as a major form of relapse within drug addiction, often after years 
of abstinence (Glautier, et al., 1994). However, the underlying mechanisms are still 
subject to debate. Tiffany (Tiffany, 1990; Tiffany & Drobes, 1990) propose this form of 
drug taking reflects habitual stimulus-response (S-R) links, whereby once the stimulus-
response association has been established (by initial pairing with the outcome) the 
stimulus alone is enough to elicit the CR (drug-seeking), independent of outcome 
expectancy. Alternatively, the rival hypothesis states that cue-elicited drug taking is a 
21 
 
manifestation of goal-directed behaviour, driven by a mental-representation of the 
contingency between response and outcome (Holland, 2007; Olmstead, Lafond, Everitt, 
& Dickinson, 2001). If an S-R habit is formed, devaluation of the outcome should not 
change the increased response elicited by CSs, because the outcome is irrelevant to the 
S-R link and the vital S-R association has not been altered. Conversely, goal-directed 
behaviour would decrease/discontinue with reinforcer devaluation because presumably 
the diminished goal would not be adequate to motivate behaviour. The PIT paradigm 
offers the best procedure to study the mechanisms by which stimuli can control 
reinforcer seeking behaviour (Bray, et al., 2008; Declercq & De Houwer, 2009; 
Hogarth, et al., 2007; Paredes-Olay, Abad, Gamez, & Rosas, 2002; Talmi, et al., 2008). 
From the animal literature it becomes apparent that reinforcer transfer is resistant to 
devaluation (e.g. Holland, 2004; Rescorla, 1994a, etc.) and therefore the behavioural 
response cannot be driven by the expected incentive value of the outcome. According to 
Rescorla (1994a) the conditioned stimulus signals sensory aspects of the outcome (S-O 
associations) learned during Pavlovian training which in turn activates the response (O-
R associations) irrespective of the current value of the outcome (i.e. R-O current 
relationship is of no importance); thus lack of an effect of current devaluation of the 
reinforcer is consistent with this view (Holland, 2004; Rescorla, 1994b). These 
observations hold true for reinforcer specific transfer, which differs from transfer in a 
general paradigm. In the former, specific CSs associated with particular outcomes will 
come to activate response associated with the outcome they predict but not responses 
associated with a different outcome. In the general PIT, conditioned stimuli enhance an 
instrumental response via their emotional significance without directly influencing 
responding based on the sensory characteristics of the reinforcer as occurs in the 
outcome specific PIT (Dawson & Dickinson, 1990).  Although the strength of the 
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response in the outcome specific transfer is not affected by the current value of the 
reinforcer, it appears to be modulated by the strength of the stimulus outcome 
contingency in training both in animal and humans. 
In conclusion PIT is a useful model for investigating many aspects of learning and 
reward seeking, and also presents a tool whereby effects of altered reinforcer value may 
be observed. As negative mood is associated with anhedonia and altered perception of 
reward, PIT is an ideal model for studying associated effects of manipulated state mood 
that may include, but are not limited to, altered behaviour and response to reward. 
 
General Materials for Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer 
The stimuli used will be visual abstract stimuli, which have previously been 
successfully conditioned to both aversive (Hogarth, Dickinson, et al., 2008) and 
appetitive outcomes (Hogarth, Dickinson, Janowski, Nikitina, & Duka, 2008). These 
stimuli will be presented in neutral grey-scale rather than bright colours, as certain 
colours have been shown to affect mood (Hamid & Newport, 1989) which would 
hamper future investigations into mood and are shown in the appendix (appendix 1). 
Additionally, individual differences in current mood state and the presence of emotional 
pathological disorders may influence attentional allocation and conditioning rates, 
therefore certain questionnaires are employed to ensure participants are matched in 
experimental groups. This is important for studies whereby participants will undergo 
different experimental manipulations dependent upon which experimental group they 
are assigned to. Questionnaires used are shown in the appendix (appendix 2 to 7). 
A monetary reward will be used as the appetitive reward, as money has been shown to 
be a useful substitute reinforcer in the absence of drugs, alcohol, cigarettes, etc, in 
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circumstances where it may not be appropriate to use these outcomes (Hogarth, 
Dickinson, et al., 2008). Money elicits many of the same responses as the other 
aforementioned reinforcers, and has the benefit of not being associated with some of the 
aversive properties linked with these other outcomes. In addition, during conditioning 
deprivation from nicotine can endow cigarettes with conditioned aversive properties 
(Hutchison, Niaura, & Swift, 1999), which may render them useless for measuring 
reward driven attention. Humans are also motivated to work for monetary rewards 
(Comer, Collins, & Fischman, 1997) and despite being traditionally viewed as a 
secondary reinforcer its ability to drive motivated behaviours is well documented as 
well as being able to mirror activation of brain areas associated with primary rewards 
(Elliott, Newman, Longe, & Deakin, 2003). 
A blast of white noise is the chosen aversive reinforcer, as previous studies have 
demonstrated the ability of a white noise to give conditioned stimuli associated with the 
same noise the ability to generate CRs (Hogarth, Dickinson, Janowski, et al., 2008; 
Knight, Nguyen, & Bandettini, 2003). In addition, a blast of white noise has been shown 
to potentiate a motivated avoidance response in animals (Hughes & Bardo, 1981) and 
also in humans (Loeber & Duka, 2009). 
Transfer will be conducted under nominal extinction, such that the outcome 
contingencies established during Pavlovian conditioning will no longer be in force and 
all stimuli will represent equal chance of the outcome. The outcome will, however, not 
be removed completely and will be scheduled to occur on a limited percentage of trials 
(equal for all stimuli) to encourage participants to continue to respond and prevent the 
instrumental responding from extinguishing entirely. 
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Negative mood 
Decrease in reward sensitivity and depressive mood 
Anhedonia is an important symptom of depression and is associated with decreased 
sensitivity to pleasurable events, and therefore reward, as described earlier. In example, 
one study (Rogers, et al., 2003) utilised acute tryptophan depletion to bring about 
negative mood and demonstrated the ability of state mood to manipulate processing of 
reward, but not punishment, cues. Volunteers who had undergone acute tryptophan 
depletion were seemingly less able to discriminate between expected gains in a 
gambling decision making task. The task involved several experimental gambles in 
which the participants had to select one of the two presented gambles in each trial. The 
participants were presented with both losses only, and gains only, trials, as well as 
experimental trials. One example of an experimental trial offered was a choice between 
a 25% chance of winning 80 points with a 75% chance of losing 20 points, versus a 
50% chance of winning or losing 10 points. Despite an impact of mood on reward 
discrimination being shown, the results in this study did not demonstrate a link between 
negative mood and altered discrimination for expected losses. Furthermore, additional 
studies discussed below actually demonstrate a link between negative mood and 
increased punishment prediction (e.g. Blair et al., 2008). In contrast to the study 
discussed above (Rogers, et al., 2003), it has also been demonstrated that when faced 
with a choice between a likely smaller win and a less likely larger win participants 
experienced with successful tryptophan depletion do not significantly differ in their 
selection from those under control conditions (Anderson, Richell, & Bradshaw, 2003). 
This finding is unexpected because reduced serotonin is often linked to increased 
impulsivity so it would be anticipated that those under acute tryptophan depletion would 
make the riskier choice, and it is also interesting with regard to the impact of negative 
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mood (as brought about by reduced serotonin) on impulsive behaviours and 
instrumental responding. 
Subjects under negative mood could therefore respond in differential ways during the 
crucial transfer stage of PIT in an appetitive paradigm. Firstly, they could be insensitive 
to the effects of reward value in the expression of conditioning and thus differential 
probabilities about reward become irrelevant and a reduced instrumental responding for 
that same reward may be seen generally as if the outcome had been devalued. 
Alternatively, a second hypothesis supports the possibility that those under negative 
mood may show an attenuated sensitivity to reward, and reduce instrumental responding 
for reward but maintain a differential level of responding in the presence of 
differentially predictive cues. Finally, it is also possible that subjects who were 
experiencing a negative mood state may not pay attention to the stimuli and such altered 
attention may interact with expression of the PIT effect. It is not clear that induction of 
negative mood will model anhedonia, however, it is generally accepted that by adopting 
certain procedures (i.e. manipulating serotonin and/or mood induction procedures), the 
effects of mood on several behaviours can be seen (e.g. Cools et al., 2005). It is also less 
clear how those under induced negative mood will respond in an aversive PIT model. 
 
The main effects of mood manipulations 
There is an abundance of studies investigating the effects of mood. One of the main 
methods used to induce state mood is serotonin manipulation, often coupled with mood 
induction, and these state mood manipulations have been shown to affect decision-
making (Rogers, et al., 2003), motivation (Cools, et al., 2005), impulsivity (Clark et al., 
2005), instrumental learning and information processing (Finger et al., 2007; Merens, 
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Willem Van der Does, & Spinhoven, 2007) as well as emotional and behavioural 
processing (Cools, Roberts, & Robbins, 2008). A selection of these studies will be 
discussed below and are summarised in Table 1 (see appendix 8). It is interesting to 
note that serotonin manipulation has been less extensively studied in currently 
depressed patients compared to healthy individuals but completed studies suggest 
results are not comparable between the two populations and different effects of 
serotonin reduction are observed (Harmer, 2008; Merens, et al., 2007). Furthermore, the 
use of lactose capsules as a placebo in some acute tryptophan depletion studies (Blair, et 
al., 2008; Finger, et al., 2007) coupled with consumption of low-tryptophan meals 
induced a lower tryptophan state in the controls than would normally be expected. 
Despite wide acceptance of serotonin’s role in many behavioural and emotional 
processes the exact contribution to these processes is not entirely understood (Cools, 
Robinson, & Sahakian, 2008; Harmer, 2008; Merens, et al., 2007). Manipulating 
serotonin has provided a method for studying its wide effects, and, more broadly, the 
effects of negative mood (e.g. Cardinal, Winstanley, Robbins, & Everitt, 2004). The 
production of serotonin in the brain is dependent on the precursor amino acid 
tryptophan, from plasma (Cools, Roberts, et al., 2008; Harmer, 2008). By providing 
participants with a mixture containing an amino acid load deficient in tryptophan this 
effectively results in a decrease in serotonin production (Harmer, 2008; Robinson, 
Cools, Crockett, & Sahakian, 2009). Another aspect to be taken into account is that 
similar reductions in serotonin have been observed in certain genetic polymorphisms as 
discussed below. 
The impact of genetics and trait predispositions 
Although not the purpose of this thesis, it is worth to note that certain individuals carry 
a polymorphism on the promoter region of the gene that encodes for the serotonin 
27 
 
transporter. It is possible for this to be mimicked in experimental animals both naturally, 
and brought about artificially though transgenic processes. This polymorphism controls 
the efficacy of the transporter and the promoter region affected was thought to contain 
both long and short allelic variants, but is now increasingly thought to be more 
complex; the short allele is associated with reduced expression while the long with 
increased, and interestingly the short allele has been linked to reduced serotonin 
function possibly brought about by developmental adaptations to the polymorphism 
(Cools, Roberts, et al., 2008). Studies involving investigation into volunteers with one 
or two copies of the short allele have demonstrated a link to anxiety and depression 
(Cools, Roberts, et al., 2008). As trait predispositions can impact upon the effects of 
mood certain questionnaires will be utilised, see appendix, to match participants in 
experimental groups for impulsivity and Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). It is 
important to match participants for BDI scores as the aim of this thesis is to investigate 
the effect of state mood, as opposed to trait mood. 
The effect of mood manipulation on motivation 
One study (Cools, et al., 2005) demonstrated the ability of tryptophan depletion to affect 
motivation on goal directed behaviour using a cued-reinforcement reaction-time task. In 
the task participants were shown three pictures and asked to select the “odd one out” 
and reinforcement of the outcome given on 10%, 50% and 90% of trials (dependent on 
the colour of the stimulus window). Those participants who had undergone tryptophan 
depletion showed reduced response speeds, related to increased reinforcement, but 
increased accuracy that correlated highly with their innate impulsivity as determined 
using the Barratt Impulsivity Scale. However, in the same study, tryptophan depletion 
did not alter response inhibition or mood as ascertained using the stop-signal task and 
visual analogue scales respectively. This demonstrates the ability of serotonin depletion 
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to impair response to incentive motivational cues that signal certainty of reinforcement 
primarily in participants who had greater innate impulsivity. Thus serotonin depletion 
may have a complex effect on behaviour. 
Further to this, another study (Wogar, Bradshaw, & Szabadi, 1991) utilised naïve 
female Wistar rats that were trained in a standard operant conditioning chamber to lever 
press for sucrose solution as a positive reinforcer. The rats received specific lesions 
either as controls or targeted to damage the central serotonergic pathways, and were 
food deprived prior to experimental testing. The results gave evidence to the possibility 
of the involvement of serotonin pathways in controlling the value of reinforcers, such 
that damage to the serotonergic system increased the value of the reinforcer but did not 
impact upon overall responding. It is difficult to extrapolate these data directly to 
humans and as the data are in some conflict with other studies performed in humans 
(Robinson, et al., 2009; Robinson & Sahakian, 2009b) it enhances the complexity of the 
impact of serotonin and the serotonergic system on behaviour and, more specifically, 
motivation. 
The effect of mood manipulation on positive bias 
Similar to the aforementioned study, an additional study also utilised the cued-
reinforcement reaction-time task (Robinson, et al., 2009), however this study 
implemented a mood induction procedure after successful acute tryptophan depletion. 
The mood induction procedure involved provocative sentences being displayed on a 
carefully selected coloured background whilst mood-inducing music was played 
through headphones. A further task was also completed, in the same study, monitoring 
the recall of self-referent words. In both tasks a positive cognitive bias was seen in 
subjects who had undergone positive mood induction that could be reversed using acute 
tryptophan depletion. However, under negative mood induction, tryptophan depletion 
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was able to induce a positive cognitive bias. These results indicate that mood plays a 
crucial role in modifying the effects of serotonin on emotion-related processes. Another 
study was able to further differentiate between serotonin and state self-reported mood 
(Robinson & Sahakian, 2009b). The study utilised acute tryptophan depletion and the 
mood induction procedure described above, followed by two tasks: A “hot” cognitive 
task involving processing of affective stimuli, affective go/no go, performance on which 
was affected by tryptophan depletion but not mood and a “cold” task, one touch Tower 
of London, that was affected by mood but not serotonin. 
The effect of mood manipulation on behaviour 
A study conducted in both Sprague Dawley and Brown Norway rats, (Jans, Korte-
Bouws, Korte, & Blokland, 2008) monitored the effect of acute tryptophan depletion on 
behaviour (anxiety related behaviour tests [open-field test, home cage emergence test 
and social interaction test], depression related behaviour test [forced swim test] and 
cognition test [object recognition test]) and at the neurochemical level, showed strain 
differences in the effect of acute tryptophan depletion. The Sprague Dawley rats showed 
increased anxiety and depression related behaviour as well as reduced plasma serotonin, 
whereas the behavioural effects were not seen in the Brown Norway rats but they did 
show reduced plasma serotonin as well as reduced hippocampal serotonin, which was 
not observed in the other strain. This suggests that, like humans, certain innate traits 
observed across strains are required for the effects of serotonin depletion to be seen. 
The effect of mood manipulation on inhibition and impulsivity 
Whilst serotonin is thought to be involved in impulsive decision making (Clark, et al., 
2005; Cools, Roberts, et al., 2008; Cools, Robinson, et al., 2008), its role in inhibition 
was investigated in a study (Clark, et al., 2005) reported in 2005, hence investigating 
the link between negative mood and impulsive decision making. In addition to utilising 
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acute tryptophan depletion, the study investigated the effect of the serotonin transporter 
polymorphism and how subjects with this polymorphism (subjects with both one and 
two copies of the short allele) respond differently to tryptophan depletion. It was 
proposed that this polymorphism leads to inter-subject variation may account for the 
variation in reported results in previous acute tryptophan depletion studies. The study 
consisted of 41 subjects comprising of the three possible serotonin transporter 
genotypes (15 long-long, 19 short-short and 7 short-long participants) but no effect of 
treatment (placebo/acute tryptophan depletion) or genotype was observed with regard to 
inhibitory performance on the stop-signal task. Additionally the effect of acute 
tryptophan depletion on the task was not modulated by trait impulsivity or gender, but 
with placebo treatment the results measured by the Barratt Impulsivity Scale correlated 
with the stop signal response task times. The results of this study therefore do not show 
a direct correlation between increased impulsive behaviour and reduced serotonin 
transmission, but as only one task was utilised the theory cannot be fully refuted, and as 
no effect of genotype was observed this further dissociates impulsivity and serotonin 
neurotransmission. It is important to note that the task utilised does not incorporate 
feedback, reward or punishment and these may be important features in the role of 
serotonin and mood in impulsivity as described in other studies. 
In contrast, (Mobini, Chiang, Ho, Bradshaw, & Szabadi, 2000) demonstrated that when 
challenged with the choice between a smaller immediate reward (selection of lever A 
for one food pellet) and a larger delayed reward (selection of lever B for delayed 
delivery of two food pellets), rats who had undergone destruction of their serotonergic 
pathways showed an increased tendency toward responding on lever A linking 
serotonergic system disruptions and increased impulsivity. Mobini et al (2000) also 
presented an additional experiment in which rats selected between lever A (as described 
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above) and lever B, which now represented the delivery of two pellets but with a lower 
probability than reward from lever A. A difference between control and experimental 
conditions in the second experiment was not observed, indicating no impact of serotonin 
depletion on sensitivity to probabilistic reinforcement in rats. 
The interaction of mood on reward and punishment sensitivity 
There are a variety of studies utilising acute tryptophan depletion to manipulate 
serotonin and study the effects of mood, however there are other methods by which it is 
possible to investigate these effects (Cools, Roberts, et al., 2008; Merens, et al., 2007). 
These include the use of a selective neurotoxin for serotonin in animal studies, the use 
of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors and by studying the genetic polymorphisms 
that affect the serotonergic system. It is generally accepted that mood, via serotonin, 
mediates behavioural inhibition (Cools, Roberts, et al., 2008; Merens, et al., 2007) and 
is involved in aversive learning and punishment such that a reduction in serotonin 
enhances aversive processing, and neural activity in the amygdala is potentiated by this 
reduction (Cools, Roberts, et al., 2008). It is possible that this process might be in 
opposition to the appetitive dopaminergic activity involved in motivational processes. 
Further to this, Pavlovian conditioned inhibition, as well as other forms of inhibition, 
may be modulated by serotonin (Cools, Roberts, et al., 2008) and therefore be linked to 
mood. These results may not be detectable by the mild reduction in serotonin caused by 
acute tryptophan depletion. 
One study (Finger, et al., 2007) investigated the effects of serotonin transporter 
genotype and tryptophan depletion on reward and punishment using response reversal 
and passive avoidance tasks respectively. Participants consumed either placebo or 
capsules inducing acute tryptophan depletion and also underwent genotyping for the 
serotonin transporter. The passive avoidance task involved 12 possible stimuli of which 
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six led to reward (increased points) and six lead to loss of points (punishment). The 
participants learnt by trial and error to respond (press the mouse button) to positive 
stimuli and not respond to punished stimuli (feedback was provided after each 
selection). The successful avoidance of punished stimuli did not correlate to treatment 
but improved throughout blocks and there was no correlation between treatment and 
genotype; however on analysing genotype alone long/long carriers learnt slower and for 
longer compared to the short allele carriers, whose learning was quicker and plateaued 
after the fifth block. There was an effect of treatment on the total number of non-
responses to rewarded stimuli, such that those participants who had undergone acute 
tryptophan depletion missed more positive stimuli than those who had taken placebo, 
but no effect of genotype was seen here. The probabilistic response reversal task 
involved selection of a stimulus from a displayed pair (pairs were displayed together 
throughout the task) and after selection participants were given feedback as to whether 
they had lost or gained one hundred points dependent on their selection. The rewarded 
stimuli remained constant in four out the six pairs of stimuli, however in the other two 
pairs the contingency reversed after forty of the eighty trials had been completed; 
additionally in these “reversing pairs” the contingency was not 100% such that on 20% 
of trials the positive stimulus was punished and the negative stimulus was rewarded. No 
effect of treatment alone was observed, however, long-long allele carriers who had 
undergone tryptophan depletion committed more errors than both long-long carriers on 
placebo and short allele carriers. In addition long-long carriers were also less likely to 
return to selection of the positive stimuli in the reversing pairs once it had been 
punished. The results suggest that although tryptophan depletion has the ability to affect 
aspects of tasks utilised in this study, the interaction with genotype proved more 
significant and this may account for inconclusive results found in previous studies. One 
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possible explanation for the increased effects of tryptophan depletion in long-long allele 
carriers could be increased serotonin reuptake by these genotypes and thus enhancing 
the effect of acute tryptophan depletion (Finger, et al., 2007). 
Another study (Blair, et al., 2008) found serotonin to be particularly involved in 
sensitivity to punishment rather than to reward and that sensitivity to tryptophan 
depletion was, in some circumstances, modulated by serotonin transporter genotype. In 
the task selected for this study (differential reward/punishment task), pictures of objects 
were randomly assigned a points value (100, 300, 500, 700, 900, -100, -300, -500, -700 
or -900) and pairs were presented to the participant. Participants were asked to select 
one of the two objects presented. Feedback as to the value of the object they had 
selected was immediately presented, but they were not told the value of the other object 
or if the object they had chosen was the more advantageous. There were trials on which 
both objects were associated with points losses (“punpun”) or points gains (“rewrew”) 
and also combination trials (“rewpun”). Additionally, the trials were further sub-divided 
into close, medium and far in which the points values of the two objects were similar, 
fairly different and very dissimilar respectively. Genotype was shown to have no effect 
on levels of tryptophan after intentional depletion or placebo. Overall, participants were 
more accurate on the far trials and most accurate on “rewpun” followed by “rewrew” 
and made most errors on “punpun” trials. Acute tryptophan depletion did not affect the 
errors produced by the short allele carriers but increased the errors produced by long-
long carriers when compared to placebo. The results of the task demonstrate that 
serotonin is involved in punishment processing, rather than that for reward and that 
serotonin transporter genotype is involved in sensitivity to acute tryptophan depletion 
and the ability to process punishment and make related decisions. This provides an 
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important link between mood and reward/punishment outcome processing, which I will 
aim to build upon. 
Summary of the effects of mood manipulations 
Interestingly, in addition to the important distinctions discussed above it is important to 
note that mood induction procedures are seemingly required for the effects of induced 
state mood to be examined and that acute tryptophan depletion alone may not be 
sufficient for participants to express altered state mood (Robinson, et al., 2009). Due to 
this distinction, a mood induction procedure (MIP) will be utilised to induce a state 
mood that can then be examined using the general PIT model. A recent renewed interest 
in the link between emotion and cognition has lead to the development of many MIPs 
(Gilet, 2008). Of the currently adopted techniques, the earliest involves reading aloud 
self-referent sentences and is known as the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (Velten, 
1968). Other methods involve the use of music, film clips (Gouaux, 1971) and 
combinations of different methods are also utilized (Robinson, et al., 2009). It has been 
proposed that one of the most effective combination techniques involves imagery and 
music (Gilet, 2008), and a similar combination will therefore be used to induce state 
mood in this thesis. Another reason for this selection is that some methods, in particular 
those utilizing self-referent techniques such as the Velten procedure, have been 
criticized for bringing about induced mood as a result of demand effects, although it is 
difficult to provide conclusive evidence regarding this impact (Gilet, 2008). 
It is possible that those in a negative mood state may be more analytical of their 
situation and choices available to them such that they demonstrate increased 
consideration of decisions leading to reduced speed but better accuracy in tasks 
undertaken; contradictory findings may be accounted for by the lack of either 
genotyping of participants, mood induction, analysis of innate impulsivity and/or 
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successful placebo control groups. It is also possible that studies demonstrating a link 
between serotonin and response to negative consequences of reward seeking, as well as 
impulsivity, may be explained by innate impulsivity. The argument as to whether 
negative mood affects punishment and/or reward (gains) information processing still 
appears undecided and clarification is imperative if the affects of anhedonia are to be 
successfully studied. Finally, it is therefore possible that negative mood in isolation may 
interact more with changes in reward value than negative consequences of reward 
seeking. 
In summary, the effects of mood (mediated by serotonin) are vast, but the processes that 
mediate these effects do not appear to be fully understood. In order to gain a fuller 
picture of the true effects of acute tryptophan depletion, innate impulsivity should be 
considered and genotyping of participants may be required. Mood induction procedures 
may therefore offer a simpler tool to modify mood as it represents a more naturalistic 
method of inducing a state mood, and will be utilised in the studies described in this 
thesis. 
 
General Materials for the Mood Induction Procedure 
A musical and visual Mood Induction Procedure (MIP) will be utilised to induce 
positive and negative state mood (as well as a neutral version as a control condition), 
adapted from a previously described method (Robinson, et al., 2009). 
Participants will be presented with 44 images (Lang, et al., 1993; Smith, et al., 2005) 
whilst music is played through Sennheiser PX200 headphones and instructed to get as 
deeply as possible into any mood evoked. Firstly, a blank screen will be presented and 
participants instructed to press the space bar to view the first picture, and to look at it 
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for as long as it is displayed. The picture will be displayed in the centre of the screen for 
12 seconds, immediately followed by a blank screen. When the blank screen is 
displayed again participants will press the space bar to view the next picture. For images 
please see appendix 9, appendix 10, appendix 11 and appendix 12. The music played 
will be Adagio in G Minor by Thomas Albinoni for the negative version of the MIP, 
Serenade No.13 KV 525 G Major: I. Serenade. Allegro by Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart 
for the Positive version of the MIP and for the neutral MIP The Planets, Po. 32: VII. 
Neptune, the Mystic by Gustav Holst. 
Prior to and after the MIP, a set of Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) will be administered 
(see appendix 7), to determine self reported mood. Comparison between initial- and 
post- MIP self reported mood, using VAS, will be used to determine the mood effects of 
the MIP and therefore assess the effectiveness of the procedure. 
 
Paper 1 Summary 
The MIP described above will be introduced in paper 1, which presents a series of two 
experiments designed to build upon the previous research suggesting that negative 
mood differentially interacts with aversive and appetitive outcomes, and to address 
some of the uncertainties surrounding the effects of negative mood on motivation. 
Specifically, we set out to determine the effect of induced state negative mood on PIT 
by stimuli associated with reward (study 1) to further understand the role of anhedonia 
on motivated behaviour, and by stimuli associated with aversive outcomes (study 2) to 
increase our knowledge on the impact of mood on punishment prediction. In addition, 
since paper 2 will utilise a reward devaluation technique in the same PIT design as for 
study 1, it will allow us to investigate more deeply the mechanisms by which negative 
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mood affects goal-directed behaviour. The set of experiments in paper 1 allows us to 
draw direct comparisons between not only state neutral and negative mood, but also 
between our ability to respond to aversive and rewarded stimuli. The motivation to 
avoid punishment/gain reward when under negative mood can also be observed. 
This will then be built upon in paper 3, which aims to investigate the effect of positive 
mood on PIT. 
 
Value of reward as a mediator of goal directed behaviours 
Expectancy and attentional bias 
Both the Mackintosh (Mackintosh, 1975) and Pearce Hall (Pearce & Hall, 1980) 
theories of learning outline the requirement of attention as important in acquiring 
knowledge of a stimulus/reward association albeit differing in their theory of attentional 
bias once some knowledge of the association has been formed (discussed in detail later). 
The resulting expectancy of a certain outcome is important for learned behaviour in 
both theories, and it is thought that reward seeking behaviour is controlled by the 
expectancy of a reward, which may be cognitively mediated, and also linked to CRs and 
physiological responses (e.g. skin conductance response) (Hogarth, et al., 2005; 
Hogarth, Dickinson, Hutton, Bamborough, et al., 2006; Hogarth, Dickinson, Hutton, 
Elbers, et al., 2006; Hogarth, Dickinson, Janowski, et al., 2008). Expectancy is formed 
on the expected probability that an action will produce the reward but also on the 
expected biological value of the reward (Hogarth, Dickinson, Hutton, Elbers, et al., 
2006; Wertz & Sayette, 2001). In example, in one study smoking cues only elicited 
craving (an important response associated with addiction) for the same reward if 
participants felt they would be able to smoke after the experimental session in which 
38 
 
they experienced the cue; in contrast the same study demonstrated that those who 
thought they could not smoke after the session did not show enhanced craving 
(Droungas, Ehrman, Childress, & O'Brien, 1995). Taken together these studies 
demonstrate that conscious expectancy of the US is related to cue-elicited behaviour, 
and therefore that awareness is required for successful conditioning in many paradigms. 
However, under some conditions evaluative conditioning may occur in which explicit 
expectancy, or outcome awareness, is not required and CRs occur seemingly 
independently. This form of evaluative learning is often observed when using food or 
drink as the rewarding stimuli. In example, when a novel flavoured drink (CS) was 
paired with caffeine (US) liking for the drink was enhanced compared to when the drink 
was not paired with caffeine (Yeomans, Spetch, & Rogers, 1998). None of the 
participants who had consumed the caffeine paired drink reported awareness of the 
caffeine, thus this form of learning refers to changes in the liking of a stimulus as a 
result of pairing with another stimulus and outside of contingency knowledge. 
In parallel to the role of expectancy in cue-elicited behaviour for reward, conscious 
expectancy of a US has been shown to influence conditioned aversive responding in the 
presence of CS. In example, high expectancy ratings were indicative of high skin 
conductance responses in the presence of CS when using images of snakes and spiders 
(Ohman, Eriksson, Fredriksson, Hugdahl, & Olofsson, 1974). 
Additionally, emotional learning has been hypothesised to occur prior to, and 
independently from, conscious stimulus contingency awareness in the somatic marker 
hypothesis (Damasio, 1996), and has been further demonstrated when a tone paired with 
an aversive white noise elicited a skin conductance response academic of expectancy of 
the US (Knight, et al., 2003). Whilst the somatic marker hypothesis pertains to 
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reasoning and decision-making processes, these are also important factors in addiction 
processes and can be related to conditioning and thus should not be ignored. 
Attention to cues is important in the classical conditioning process and is concurrent 
with addiction to alcohol (Townshend & Duka, 2001) as well as drugs of abuse 
(Lubman, Peters, Mogg, Bradley, & Deakin, 2000) and food. Increased attention is also 
linked to increased chance of relapse and craving (Cousijn et al., 2013; Garland, 
Froeliger, Passik, & Howard, 2013; Werthmann, Field, Roefs, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 
2014). The core tenet of attention to drug cues is that it is enhanced by the incentive or 
pleasurable properties of the drug (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). It is widely accepted 
that attention is automatically allocated to such cues, whilst one theory also proposes 
attention is maintained facilitating craving and relapse (Franken, 2003), and another 
describes the process whereby cues are pre-evaluated and if deemed suitable (i.e. a drug 
cue) selective attention is apportioned to them (Ryan, 2002). Therefore, according to the 
latter, if a cue is not deemed relevant a reduction of attentional resources would be 
apportioned to the stimulus and thus diminish the chance of craving. When the stimuli 
do attract attention this may induce drug seeking by inducing expectancy of the 
rewarding properties of the drug (Robinson & Berridge, 1993) or by activating a more 
general motivational pathway (Tiffany, 1990). Indeed, understanding how attention is 
apportioned to predictive stimuli is important to teasing apart the attentional 
mechanisms involved in undesirable behaviours and pathological disorders. 
Furthermore, it is hypothesised that a central motivational state is activated in response 
to both rewarded and punished stimuli (Bindra, 1969) underpinned by a union of 
motivation and emotion; by studying the process of Pavlovian learning using 
participants who have undergone mood manipulations the effect of state mood on these 
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mechanisms can be investigated. As mood is strongly linked with motivation this 
interaction will be an interesting process to observe. 
Various studies in which attentional bias for both certain and uncertain stimuli has been 
monitored show that contingency knowledge is required for the stimuli/reward 
association to be learned (Hogarth, et al., 2005). Indeed, expectancy should also be 
coupled with an appetitive emotional response that is indicative of the positive 
biological value of the reward (Hogarth & Duka, 2006a). However, it has also been 
demonstrated that a positive attentional bias for the stimulus is not essential for 
establishment of an instrumental response (Hogarth, Dickinson, Janowski, et al., 2008) 
and thus an impulsive aspect may be considered. The afore mentioned studies 
demonstrate a level of uncertainty in the way in which attentional bias is affected by 
increasing knowledge of the outcome of the predictor (Hogarth, Dickinson, et al., 2008;  
Hogarth, Dickinson, Janowski, et al., 2008). However, the role of expectancy appears 
more defined and it seems risk and ambiguity may also play a role in learning (Schultz 
et al., 2008b). It seems possible that expectancy and attentional bias may not be directly 
linked (Hogarth, Dickinson, et al., 2008). It does, however, seem clear that it is the 
expected reward, rather than a mental representation of the reward that drives the 
behaviour. Under certain conditions, when dependence has progressed sufficiently, 
altering the value of the reward has limited effect on the behaviour to obtain the reward 
and despite negative outcomes of this behaviour compulsive seeking occurs 
(Economidou, et al., 2009; Everitt & Robbins, 2005). 
In paper 2 the impact of a change in the expected value of the reward on reward seeking 
will be examined using a reward devaluation procedure, to advance our knowledge of 
the processes involved in goal-directed behaviours. The attention to the stimuli will be 
assessed using observing times, which will allow an insight into separating salience and 
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attention from prediction error, and thus investigate the link between learning and 
attention in a human PIT model. 
 
Decrease in reward sensitivity and addiction 
Addictive behaviours of a compulsive nature are suggested to be insensitive to the 
negative consequences of rewarded behaviour (Economidou, et al., 2009; Everitt & 
Robbins, 2005). Individuals with certain addictive behaviours show an inability to 
modulate established rewarded behaviour following a reduction in the value of the 
outcome of that behaviour, instituted by either non-reward (extinction) or punishment 
(Belin, Mar, Dalley, Robbins, & Everitt, 2008; Economidou, et al., 2009; Pelloux, et al., 
2007; Vanderschuren & Everitt, 2004). 
 
Reward devaluation 
Findings from recent human studies on PIT trying to address the question of the role of 
the current reinforcer value in the instrumental reinforcer-seeking response are 
contradictory. Whereas Allman et al, 2010 (Allman, Deleon, Cataldo, Holland, & 
Johnson, 2010) showed that outcome specific transfer can be modulated by the current 
value of the reinforcer, Hogarth and Chase, 2011 and Hogarth 2012 (Hogarth, 2012; 
Hogarth & Chase, 2011) showed no effect of devaluation in a reinforcer specific 
transfer paradigm. The studies differed in the way they ran the PIT procedure: Allman 
et al induced devaluation by instruction (Allman, et al., 2010). Participants learned in 
the Pavlovian phase that companies (presented by their logos) were using Hong Kong or 
USA dollars as their currencies. Before the transfer phase participants were informed 
that one of the currencies used was worthless (devalued). This information modulated 
42 
 
the choice response when the company logos were presented in the transfer phase: cues 
that predicted the devalued currency lost their capacity to strengthen the choice response 
for this outcome. Hogarth (2012) and Hogarth and Chase (2011) used as conditioned 
stimuli pictorial representations of the reinforcers (cigarette or chocolate), to which 
participants had been exposed several times pre experimentally. Devaluation of 
cigarette reinforcer (nicotine treatment) and chocolate reinforcer (offered chocolate to 
eat) did not change the reinforcer choice responses. 
Suppression of drug-seeking by punishment or conditioned suppression has also been 
reported in animal studies (Stephens et al., 2005; Vanderschuren & Everitt, 2004), 
however it would appear that an extended drug-taking history appears to render the 
ability of aversive stimuli or outcomes unable to reverse instrumental seeking 
responses. This was assessed in various studies, including (Vanderschuren & Everitt, 
2004) where a footshock-paired conditioned stimulus was unable to significantly reduce 
cocaine seeking after prolonged exposure in rats; this was further investigated in the 
same study to assess whether the incentive value of cocaine was the causal factor in this 
inability to reduce seeking but it was found that there was no difference in the 
prolonged and limited exposure groups in regard to the value of cocaine. 
An additional study conducted in rats (Pelloux, et al., 2007) demonstrated that both food 
(sucrose) and drug (cocaine) seeking were reduced by punishment following moderate 
lengths of exposure, but that following extended exposure of cocaine there was an 
observed inability of the punishment schedule to reduce the seeking response. It was 
highlighted in this study that a sub-population of rats were particularly susceptible to 
persistent drug-taking despite punishment. This was assessed in a further study 
(Economidou, et al., 2009) in which rats were initially assessed for innate impulsivity 
and then relapse to cocaine through punishment was tested. The effect seen was that 
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highly impulsive animals demonstrated a greater likelihood to relapse than their low-
impulsive counterparts. These studies outline that both a pre-existing innate impulsivity 
as well as length of exposure are factors involved in leading to impulsive drug seeking 
despite negative consequences. It appears that this has yet to be extensively studied in 
humans (Belin, et al., 2008), however, in animals it has been shown that certain innate 
traits associated with low concentrations of dopamine D2/3 receptors may make for a 
pre-disposition for vulnerability to drug use and addiction (Dalley, et al., 2009). 
Moreover, changes in the same receptors in the nucleus accumbens may be associated 
with impulsivity while the dorsal striatum was also hypothesised to be implicated in 
development of such behaviour (Dalley, et al., 2009). 
 
Regions of the brain associated with addiction 
Although not the scope of this thesis, PIT is anatomically dissociable from certain 
similar processes, and therefore associated anatomy will now be discussed. Addictive 
behaviour has often been linked to the nucleus accumbens and dopamine inputs from 
the ventral tegmental area into the nucleus accumbens play an important role in 
addictive processes (Dalley, et al., 2009). However, frontal brain areas that include the 
orbital prefrontal cortex and other limbic regions are susceptible to addictive drugs and 
may play a role in compulsion and impulsivity (Dalley, et al., 2009; Everitt, et al., 
2007). Lesions to the orbital prefrontal cortex impair drug-seeking behaviour both pre- 
and post- Pavlovian association formation and it is possible that impaired orbital 
prefrontal cortex function may be linked to impulsivity and impaired decision making 
(Everitt, et al., 2007; Everitt & Robbins, 2005). Lesions to the basolateral amygdala and 
the nucleus accumbens core render rats unable to perform a drug-seeking task (Cardinal, 
et al., 2004; Everitt, et al., 2007). 
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It has been shown experimentally through specific lesions that the basolateral amygdala 
is involved in conditioned reinforcement, second-order conditioning and second-order 
instrumental responses during appetitive conditioning as these processes are sensitive to 
lesions in this area. However lesions in the central nucleus affect PIT and therefore the 
association of the stimulus to the response in both aversive and appetitive conditioning 
(Everitt, et al., 2003). During aversive conditioning behaviour is insensitive to lesions in 
the central nucleus but affected by lesions to the basolateral amygdala; both types of 
lesions affect the startle and freezing response (Everitt, et al., 2003). 
As discussed above several regions within the brain are involved in the development of 
learning and addiction, leading to habit and compulsion. More specifically these include 
the amygdala, the nucleus accumbens core, the orbital prefrontal cortex and also the 
hippocampus; it has been shown that inactivation of the dorsal hippocampus can 
prevent reinstatement of an extinguished response to certain drugs. Additionally, 
mesolimbic dopamine modulates interactions of projections into the nucleus accumbens 
from the amygdala, prefrontal cortex and the hippocampus (Everitt, et al., 2008; Everitt 
& Robbins, 2005). 
Drug taking is associated with dopaminergic innervation of the ventral striatum and the 
nucleus accumbens shell and is shifted to drug-seeking with the accompaniment of the 
integrity of the nucleus accumbens core and its afferents from the basolateral amygdala. 
The development of impulsive drug seeking may be marked by innate impulsivity 
perhaps, but also correlates with low numbers of available dopamine receptors in the 
ventral striatum and the nucleus accumbens. Established impulsive behaviour is 
characterised by reduced numbers of dopamine D2/3 receptors in the ventral striatum and 
dysfunction of the orbito-prefrontal cortex, perhaps innate but potentially caused by 
even limited drug exposure (Everitt, et al., 2008). 
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The impact of a change in the actual value of the reward on reward seeking will be 
examined in paper 2 as previously mentioned. 
 
Paper 2 Summary 
Paper 2 presents a study demonstrating a devaluation technique used in combination 
with appetitive PIT, designed to further our understanding of the conditions under 
which current reinforcer value can modify responding to a conditioned stimulus 
associated with that reinforcer. The PIT procedure utilised appetitive probability based 
conditioning and although in such a procedure stimuli acquire different strength 
associations with the reinforcer and they are therefore able to activate response 
accordingly by signalling the probability by which the reinforcer can occur, they do not 
have any capacity in signalling perceptual characteristics of reinforcer that are remote 
from its value (reinforcer retains for each of the stimuli the same perceptual 
characteristics). Additional measures were taken of attention and emotional reactivity to 
clarify the involvement of attentional orientation to the stimuli and emotional 
conditioning response in contributing to the transfer effects. 
As negative mood is associated with an attenuated sensitivity to pleasurable events it is 
possible that the results observed in paper 1 when under negative mood may mimic the 
effects of reward devaluation in relation to response to altered reward (or perceived 
reward) value. 
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The impact of positive mood on instrumental behaviours 
Affective disorders have traditionally been studied using either healthy volunteers who 
have undergone mood state manipulation/induction, or patient populations. Whilst it is 
generally accepted that inducing a negative mood state mimics mild depression (Clark, 
1985) the effects of positive mood, and the effectiveness of positive mood induction, is 
not as well established. Studies into the effects of induced state positive mood is 
particularly interesting with regard to the PIT model, as one of the symptoms of mania 
is abnormal decision making (Clark, Iversen, & Goodwin, 2001). Certain lesions in the 
ventral pre-frontal cortex render patients with mania like symptoms of impulsive 
decision-making, often despite negative (or punishment) outcomes (Drevets et al., 
1997). This region is also believed to be involved in mood disorders (Goodwin et al., 
1997), as well as mood more generally (Baker, Frith, & Dolan, 1997). 
If the ventral pre-frontal cortex and impulsive decision-making are implicated in mania, 
and extreme positive mood, it would be reasonable to assume that positive (as 
characterised by increased impulsive decisions) and negative [as characterised by 
reduced sensitivity to pleasurable events (Henriques, Glowacki, & Davidson, 1994) as 
discussed earlier] mood would have opposing effects on certain gambling tasks [i.e. 
such as the tasks presented in (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; 
Steingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann, Neumann, & Wagenmakers, 2013)]. However, this 
was not found to be the case when tested in a study reported in 2001 (Clark, et al., 2001) 
that utilised “the Gambling Game” in which participants had to select from four decks 
of cards where two of the decks were associated with high wins but high losses, and the 
other two lower wins but also lower losses as no difference was observed between 
positive and negative state induced mood. This finding could perhaps indicate that 
induced positive and negative mood states influence decision-making in the same way, 
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but this was refuted by the authors, who instead suggested that trait positive mood was 
responsible for the impulsiveness seen in mania. This hypothesis was supported by a 
correlation between choices on the Gambling Game and questionnaire scores, however 
with an absence of a neutral mood condition it could not be confirmed. Indeed, the link 
between certain abnormal disorders and mood is well established (Hartley & Phelps, 
2012) and makes for an interesting and important focus of study, especially with regard 
to future interventions. Further clarification of the impact of positive mood is required 
to develop our understanding of its affects on motivated actions and undesirable 
behaviours and this is investigated in paper 3. 
 
Paper 3 Summary 
In an attempt to increase our awareness of the effects of positive mood, paper 3 presents 
an experiment in which a mood induction procedure designed to induce positive (and 
neutral as a control condition) mood is employed prior to the transfer stage of the PIT 
design used throughout this thesis. 
Specifically, we were keen to determine the effect of positive mood on motivation to 
perform an avoidance response to further our understanding on impulsiveness 
associated with positive mood, and the mechanisms that drive motivated behaviour in 
humans. The data will also provide a useful comparison to the previous experiments, 
presented in paper 1, which analyse the effect of negative mood in the same paradigm. 
As mania is often associated with impulsive decision-making (Bentall, 1992; Clark, et 
al., 2001) the ability of positive mood to interact with acquiring S-O contingencies is 
also interesting and will be addressed in paper 4, along with the impact negative mood 
may have on these processes. 
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The effect of mood on learning S-O contingencies and attention to the CS 
As discussed earlier negative mood impacts a wide variety of factors and is involved in 
abnormal behaviours, in particular drug addiction. Instrumental responding in the 
presence of CS, as in successful PIT, demonstrates a motivational aspect and this 
interaction with mood is investigated in papers 2 and 3. The exact mechanism by which 
this interaction occurs is a major focus of this thesis and is further discussed later in 
chapter 2. 
Before an instrumental action can be associated with a stimulus and/or outcome, 
Pavlovian learning must have occurred. Classical conditioning is important in drug 
addiction processes, and the expectancy of the reward, as well as the biological 
expectancy coupled with appropriate attention, is also important to drive this process, as 
discussed earlier. Therefore, cognitive expectancy is often considered vital in Pavlovian 
reward learning and is well documented; for example, it has been demonstrated that 
only participants who become aware of outcome-contingencies (assessed using self 
reported expectancy ratings) elicit CRs in a CS-cigarette designed study (Hogarth, 
Dickinson, Hutton, Elbers, et al., 2006). 
General emotional theories of attention aside, learning processes may also mediate 
attention and it can be conceptualised that attention, in turn, plays a key role in learning. 
Indeed, one model of learning describes that learning occurs by the number of times a 
stimulus and outcome are paired, such that learning is driven by increasing the salience 
of the stimulus thus attracting more attention (Mackintosh, 1975). Therefore, in 
isolation, this theory would assume that attention to a CS would be maintained even 
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after the outcomes are fully learnt and maintain their predictability. In contradiction, 
other (“prediction-error”) models describe that once such predictability is reached 
attention to the stimuli will diminish (Pearce & Hall, 1980). According to this model of 
prediction-error the discrepancy between the occurrence of the outcome and expectancy 
attracts attention, such that the greater the error the more attention is apportioned in an 
attempt to facilitate learning. Therefore this model also assumes that attention will be 
modified throughout the learning process as outcome contingencies are learnt, and 
eventually attention will become automatic so that processing of the CS is just sufficient 
to maintain existing associations. However, should the CS cease to accurately and 
consistently predict the outcome then attention will increase and a switch from 
automatic to controlled processing of attention would occur. In summary, one theory 
predicts attention is biased towards uncertain predictors (Pearce & Hall, 1980), whilst 
the other hypothesises attention favours predictive salience (Mackintosh, 1975). 
As discussed earlier dopamine neurones are responsive to reward (Fiorillo, Tobler, & 
Schultz, 2003; Schultz, et al., 2008b), but there is evidence to suggest they do not 
respond to aversive outcomes (Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1994, 1996; Robinson & 
Berridge, 2003). In contradiction to this, negative mood, and serotonin, are thought to 
be involved in learning regarding aversive outcomes (Cools, Robinson, et al., 2008; 
Dayan & Huys, 2008; Rogers, et al., 2003), and, are also linked to prediction error 
(Dunsmoor, Bandettini, & Knight, 2008). 
Serotonin is also critical in mood, and negative mood has been associated with the 
concept of depressive realism (Robinson, et al., 2009; Robinson & Sahakian, 2009a, 
2009b) and has also been implicated in changes in learning in both humans (Chase et 
al., 2010; Ruhe, Mason, & Schene, 2007) and animals (Wilkinson, Humby, Robbins, & 
Everitt, 1995). Chase and colleagues (Chase, et al., 2010) demonstrated that despite 
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acute tryptophan depletion generating no effect on their contingency learning task, a 
sub-group of participants with low BDI scores showed such an effect. Therefore, in 
paper 4 (and throughout) we match experimental groups for BDI score and manipulate 
mood in order to observe the effects of state mood. 
 
General Materials for Eye-Tracking 
Eye-tracking is a useful tool for measuring selective attention, as it is not confounded by 
the length of stimulus duration, as in other designs such as dot-probe tasks. Dot-probe 
measures attention during specific set time points, whereas eye-tracking follows 
movements throughout the whole stimulus duration and has been reported to provide 
more robust results (Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006). In our design 
stimulus pairs are presented on each trial and therefore the amount of attention allocated 
to one stimulus over another is important to measure, and this measure is defined as 
selective attention for that stimulus (Posner, 2012). 
The dwell time allocated to one stimulus over another presented concurrently is also an 
important measure of learning (Hogarth, Dickinson, et al., 2008), and conscious 
attention is also measured in our study by allowing the participant to view the stimulus 
pair for as long as they desired (Hogarth, Dickinson, & Duka 2009). 
 
Paper 4 Summary 
Following on from the investigations into the effects of mood on PIT in papers 1 and 3, 
paper 4 aims to build upon our knowledge in this area, whereby the effect of induced 
state negative and positive mood is investigated in a Pavlovian learning design. Paper 4 
presents a combined study designed to further our understanding on the impact state 
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mood plays on learning and more specifically acquiring Pavlovian contingencies 
predictive of reward. The speed of learning outcome contingencies, and emotional 
responses to the cues are assessed, as well as attention to cues using eye-tracking. 
Attention is an important factor in learning (Hogarth, Dickinson, et al., 2008; Hogarth, 
et al., 2005; Hogarth, Dickinson, Janowski, et al., 2008) as well as enhanced attention 
being linked to pleasurable cues (Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Stewart, de Wit, & 
Eikelboom, 1984) which is interesting with regard to the link between mood and 
sensitivity to reward (as discussed above). 
We used a Pavlovian conditioning design as described in papers 1, 2 and 3, but with an 
extended learning phase to enable all participants with the opportunity to successfully 
acquire Pavlovian contingencies. Slower learning was associated with induced negative 
mood and it is argued that this could be as a result of reduced motivation or reduced 
confidence linked to reduced impulsivity. 
The aim is therefore to build upon the previous research suggesting that negative and 
positive mood differentially interact with learning processes, and to address some of the 
uncertainties surrounding the effects of state mood on sensitivity to reward and 
motivation. Specifically, we set out to determine the effect of induced state negative, 
and positive mood on Pavlovian learning when stimuli are associated with a rewarded 
outcome. 
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Chapter 2 
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General Discussion 
Summary of findings 
In chapter one, I reviewed the literature on the effects of manipulated mood on aspects 
of cognition and, also, described the mechanisms underlying reward seeking behaviour. 
I suggested that motivation to perform an instrumental response would be mediated by 
state mood. I proposed to investigate this hypothesis by adopting a classical 
conditioning procedure in which visual stimuli predicted a reward (or aversive) outcome 
with varying probabilities incorporated into a PIT design in combination with a mood 
induction procedure. I predicted that negative mood would be implicated in 
motivational processes, and participants induced with negative mood would be 
insensitive to the value of reward despite successful learning of the contingencies 
having occurred. Furthermore, in chapter one, I also described the phenomenon by 
which mood is implicated differently in punishment and reward prediction. 
In paper 1, described in chapter 3, I set out to investigate the effects of induced state 
negative mood on mechanisms of motivation to gain reward and avoid adverse 
outcomes. Initially, participants underwent a Pavlovian learning procedure in which 
three visual compound stimuli (AX, BX and CX) predicted a monetary reward of 10p 
(study 1), or an aversive outcome of white noise (study 2), on 90%, 50% and 10% of 
presentations respectively. This was followed by a mood induction procedure (inducing 
state negative or neutral mood), a short phase of instrumental training and finally, 
transfer performed under nominal extinction. Each trial encompassed an expectancy 
question in which participants were required to express how likely they felt they were to 
receive the outcome on that particular trial, and the session was concluded with 
participants providing subjective ratings of emotional properties of the stimuli. Results 
of expectancy ratings did not differ between induced mood conditions in any stage of 
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the experiment, and were maintained into the transfer test by participants who were 
deemed aware of the contingencies by reporting an appropriate discrimination between 
the stimuli during Pavlovian learning. Attention to the stimuli was also not impacted by 
the mood induction procedure, but did demonstrate a shift between the learning and 
transfer stages of the experiment such that during Pavlovian learning observing times 
were greatest for the BX (uncertain 50% predictor) and reversed during the transfer test, 
supporting the prediction error hypothesis of attention. The same pattern for expectancy 
and attention was observed in both study 1 and study 2. The number of instrumental 
responses performed by participants in the neutral mood condition for each trial type 
(AX, BX or CX) increased linearly in accordance with the expectancies/probabilities 
learned (AX>BX>CX), in both studies, indicating the transfer effect is related to 
explicit prediction of the outcome. Interestingly, the transfer effect was altered in both 
studies by induced negative mood, such that the linear nature of the effect was abolished 
in study 1 (but not study 2), and a reduced number of responses observed compared to 
the neutral mood condition. The data therefore demonstrate a dissociation between 
attention (uncertainty) and behaviour (prediction) with regard to the effect of induced 
negative mood state on PIT. The differential impact of negative mood on the linear 
nature of the transfer effect in the two studies also highlights a difference between the 
impact induced negative mood may have on punishment and reward prediction, 
however the effect on PIT observed in study 1 (reward outcomes) may be confounded 
by mood reducing sensitivity to the expected gains and thus devaluing the reward. 
In paper 2, described in chapter 4, I set out to investigate confounds from paper 1 and 
investigate if reward devaluation would impact on the PIT effect in the rewarded PIT 
design used in paper 1 (study 1). Participants again underwent a Pavlovian conditioning 
procedure in which three compound stimuli, AX, BX and CX, predicted a reward 
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outcome of 10p on 10%, 50% and 90% of presentations respectively, followed by 
instrumental training and a transfer test as for paper 1. Contrary to the previous study, a 
mood induction procedure was not adopted, but the value of the outcome was 
manipulated such that it was, either devalued, revalued or remained unchanged (as 
described in Chapter 4). Expectancy of the outcome was in accordance with the 
contingencies (AX>BX>CX) and maintained into the transfer test by aware participants 
across all experimental conditions. Additionally, there was no effect of mood 
manipulation on observing times, and as for paper 1 observing times were greatest for 
BX (over AX and CX) during training and lowest for BX during transfer, again 
supporting the prediction error hypothesis of attention. Interestingly, even participants 
deemed unaware of the contingencies because they did not successfully discriminate 
between the outcomes during Pavlovian learning showed an attentional bias to the 
stimuli in the same direction as aware subjects indicting these processes may occur 
outside of the conscious awareness. Emotional responses to the stimuli, recorded at the 
end of the experiment, also varied as a function of how well the cue predicted the 
outcome. Thus pleasantness was greatest for AX, then BX, and rated lowest for CX, and 
the opposite pattern observed for anxiety towards the stimuli. More critically, in the 
condition in which the reward value was not manipulated the number of instrumental 
responses performed increased linearly in accordance with the expectancies of the 
outcome (AX>BX>CX), thus driven by the explicit knowledge/prediction of the 
outcome, but this effect was abolished in both devaluation and revaluation experimental 
conditions despite expectancy responses remaining intact. When participants were 
experienced with the revalued condition, instrumental responding was elevated across 
all stimuli, but when the reward was devalued the instrumental performance was 
markedly reduced. Taking together the intact expectancy ratings and altered 
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instrumental responding, I concluded that the instrumental performance effect relies on 
the current reward value to drive motivated seeking behaviour and that this can be 
dissociated from the knowledge of the outcome. It is important to note that the effect on 
instrumental performance was observed in the first half of transfer trials, and in the 
second half the effect was abolished even in the control condition, most likely driven by 
participants acquiring the new contingencies as the transfer test was performed under 
nominal extinction. 
The purpose of paper 3, described in chapter 5, was to investigate the interaction 
between positive mood and incentive salience of conditioned stimuli. As the effect of 
negative mood on instrumental responding could be likened to that of reward 
devaluation, bringing about a reduced instrumental responding despite intact attention 
and expectancy, it was proposed that positive mood may bring about similar effects to 
that of the revalued condition in paper 2. The experimental design utilised in paper 3 
was the same procedure adopted in paper 1 (study 2) whereby the stimuli predicted an 
aversive outcome. A mood induction procedure was also carried out as per the design of 
paper 1 (study 2) but inducing state positive or neutral mood. As found in the previous 
experiments, responses produced by aware participants for both expectancy ratings and 
observing times for each stimuli were matched for both experimental groups during 
Pavlovian learning and transfer. Expectancy ratings were also again maintained into the 
transfer test by aware participants and the prediction error hypothesis of attention was 
again supported with observing times for BX being greatest during Pavlovian learning 
and lowest during transfer when compared to AX and CX. Furthermore, explicit 
knowledge/prediction of the outcome drove the transfer effect, such that in the neutral 
mood condition the instrumental performance to avoid the outcome increased linearly in 
accordance with the expectancies of the outcome (i.e. AX>BX>CX). However, in 
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contradiction to our hypothesis, positive mood did not increase instrumental responding 
above that seen in the neutral mood condition, nor did it eliminate the transfer effect. A 
suppression in the transfer effect was observed when participants were experienced with 
induced positive mood, driven mainly by an overall increase in behavioural output for 
stimulus CX. As observed with induced negative mood the impact of state positive 
mood on instrumental responding was dissociated from attention and expectancy. 
Although it is possible that positive mood manipulated instrumental responding for 
stimulus CX by driving motivation to avoid the aversive outcome under any 
circumstance (i.e. even in the presence of stimulus CX associated with absence of the 
outcome), it is also possible that the reduced instrumental discrimination between 
stimuli is a result of acquiring the new contingencies more quickly than those in the 
neutral mood condition. It is unclear by which mechanism the positive mood acted and 
in order to determine if the new contingencies had been acquired more quickly by those 
under induced positive mood state, a study investigating the effect of state mood on 
learning was required. 
The results from paper 3 indicated that positive mood may have facilitated quicker 
acquisition of novel contingencies (as transfer was performed under nominal 
extinction), thus, it is plausible that certain state moods may accelerate learning and this 
may also occur during Pavlovian conditioning. The purpose of paper 4, described in 
chapter 6, was to test this hypothesis by adding additional trials to a Pavlovian 
discriminative learning procedure whereby three compound stimuli were predictive of a 
reward with a 90%, 50% and 10% probability as per the other designs used in earlier 
experiments (described in chapters 3, 4 and 5). Prior to the Pavlovian learning task the 
mood induction procedure was completed to induce state positive, negative or neutral 
mood. By adding additional trials to the Pavlovian design this would increase the 
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likelihood that all participants able to acquire the contingencies would become aware. 
Results indicated that those participants experienced with negative mood took longer 
than those under induced positive mood to become aware of the outcome contingencies 
and successfully discriminate between the stimuli using the expectancy response. The 
use of an eye-tracker was also adopted in this study to improve the depth of information 
gained regarding attention to the stimuli under different mood conditions during 
learning. Papers 1 and 3 (described in chapters 3 and 5) demonstrated no difference in 
observation times toward the stimuli between mood conditions, albeit in these 
experiments mood was only altered for the transfer stage, but as discussed for paper 3 
during this stage learning may occur differentiating the experimental groups. Paper 2 
(described in chapter 4) also demonstrated acquisition of the extinguished outcome 
contingencies by all participants during the second half of the transfer stage of the 
experiment. Mood state disrupted observational patterns to the stimuli such that induced 
positive and negative mood states reduced overall observation time in BX and CX trials, 
as well those in a induced negative mood state only showing an increased bias for 
stimulus C over X; interestingly, those under neutral and positive induced mood showed 
an attentional bias for stimulus A over X, but not C over X. Average pupil size in all 
trial types was increased by positive mood. I concluded that induced positive and 
negative mood states differentially affected emotional and observational responses to 
Pavlovian stimuli predictive of reward, and also impacted on the rate of acquiring 
contingency knowledge of the same predictive stimuli. However, I also acknowledged 
that as a stand-alone study, in the absence of further similar work, the precise 
mechanisms driving these changes remained unclear. 
In summary, the conditioned incentive properties of the stimuli were mediated by state 
mood for both appetitive and aversive outcomes. However, the effect observed was 
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different for aversive and appetitive outcomes, and also dependent upon the type of 
state mood induced (positive or negative state mood). Under conditions when Pavlovian 
predictive contingencies were first learnt, and then a mood state induced, the motivation 
to perform an instrumental response for the outcome was altered and so was the 
discriminative instrumental responding during PIT. When the outcome was a reward, 
induced negative mood reduced the motivation to perform the response, despite 
expectancy of the outcome remaining, and abolished the PIT effect, in much the same 
way as when the reward outcome was devalued. Therefore negative mood may have 
served to alter the perceived value of the reward. In contrast, when the outcome was 
aversive, the PIT effect remained intact but negative mood did reduce the number of 
responses, indicating a reduction in motivation, but not loss of discriminative value of 
the outcome. These effects on motivation (altered PIT response) were dissociated from 
attention and expectancy of the outcome, which remained intact. The results also 
demonstrated a difference between reward and punishment prediction when under 
induced negative mood. When motivation was challenged under induced positive mood 
again dissociation between expectancy and attention versus motivation was observed. 
Whilst attention and expectancy remained intact into the transfer test, the PIT effect was 
altered, but not abolished. Expedited learning of the extinguished contingencies may be 
the cause but this is unclear. It was only when an induced mood state was challenged in 
a learning paradigm that reduced and increased speeds of acquiring novel contingencies 
regarding stimuli and predicted outcomes by state negative and positive mood 
respectively could be more clearly observed. The discussion will begin with an attempt 
to clarify the mechanisms underlying attention in PIT, and also the motivational 
mechanisms underlying the ability of stimuli to drive reward-seeking behaviour in the 
same model. The impact of positive and negative state mood on motivation and learning 
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will then be discussed and the possibility of differences in aversive and reward 
outcomes will be addressed. Potential concerns regarding the methodologies in the 
experiments will be reported, followed by implications of this research and suggestions 
for future research, which will end the discussion. 
 
Mechanisms of attention involved in PIT 
 
An overview of the findings indicated that in our general PIT design attention was 
driven by the prediction error theory of attention (Pearce & Hall, 1980), as opposed to 
the incentive theory of attention (Bindra, 1969). In papers 1, 2 and 3, attention, as 
indexed by observing times (time spent viewing the stimuli), was driven by uncertainty 
and this was unaffected by the manipulations of mood or reward value in these studies. 
Furthermore, this could be linked to expectancy of the outcome as this was also 
unchanged by experimental manipulations of mood or reward value. By contrast, 
motivation was driven by expectation of the outcome, but this is discussed later. In 
Pavlovian training, observing times were greatest for the uncertain predictor compound 
BX compared to the reliable predictor (AX) and non-predictor (CX) compounds, 
supporting previous human (Hogarth, Dickinson, et al., 2008; Trick, et al., 2011) and 
animal data (Collins & Pearce, 1985; Kaye & Pearce, 1984) which reported decreased 
attention for certain consistent predictors whilst maintaining attention for partial 
predictors, and also demonstrating that the observing response can be used to index the 
uncertainty associated with a CS (Hogarth, Dickinson, & Duka, 2009). In further 
support, when the Pavlovian contingencies were altered from training to transfer, 
observing times reversed their relative magnitude, becoming smaller for stimulus BX 
compared to AX and CX. This effect might be attributed to differential discrepancies 
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between the expected probability of the outcome in each stimulus, as learnt in Pavlovian 
training, relative to the actual probability in the transfer test which was carried out under 
nominal extinction, i.e., prediction error. Specifically, over-expectation of the outcome 
in stimulus AX may have generated a large negative prediction error, whereas under-
expectation of the outcome in stimulus CX may have generated a large positive 
prediction, compared to BX, which retained its original partial contingency and so was 
associated with the same moderate prediction error as was seen in Pavlovian training. 
The finding in paper 2 (described in chapter 4) that even participants who were unaware 
of the contingencies, based on expectancy ratings, showed a significant modulation of 
observing time in the transfer test in the same direction as aware subjects, accords with 
the view that observing time is associated with the early stages of learning. Our criterion 
for distinguishing aware and unaware participants indicated that the unaware group 
were quantitatively less knowledgeable of the predictive contingencies as opposed to 
being completely unaware, and formed the basis of our decision to include extended 
Pavlovian learning trials in paper 4 (described in chapter 6) as mentioned earlier. The 
finding that observing time increased for AX and CX relative to BX when the 
contingencies changed in transfer suggests that this reallocation of attentional resources 
is the first response domain to reflect the early formation of predictive knowledge; this 
is also interesting with regard to paper 3 (described in chapter 5) where it was suggested 
that the modulation of instrumental responding by those under induced state positive 
mood could be apportioned to acquisition of the novel contingencies, however their 
observing times in the transfer stage were not significantly different to that of 
participants in the neutral mood condition. It is, however, not possible to discount this 
theory as those under neutral mood may also have started to gain new predictive 
knowledge. To address this issue, the data from paper 4 (described in chapter 6) 
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demonstrated how those under induced neutral and positive state mood showed 
expedited learning when compared to participants in the negative mood condition, and 
they also showed the same patterns of attention (whereby observing times were in 
accordance with the theory of prediction error) which again differed to the negative 
mood condition. This provides support for the proposition that induced positive mood 
facilitates learning, when compared to negative mood, but is by no means conclusive, 
and is discussed in more detail later. To conclude, attention in the general PIT model 
used here was driven by prediction error and can be dissociated from motivation, but 
can, to some extent, be utilised to index learning. 
 
Mechanisms facilitating the ability of stimuli to drive reward seeking behaviour 
As discussed earlier instrumental responding in the presence of conditioned stimuli is 
indicative of activation of an appetitive motivational system by the stimulus and can be 
modelled experimentally using PIT. Such motivated instrumental responding can be 
brought about by a specific representation of the reward and drive the responding 
through specific outcome expectancy, or it could reflect activation of a central 
motivational system and drive the instrumental responding more generally. PIT is one 
method by which outcome-specific and general motivational systems have been 
separated. The PIT design utilised in papers 1, 2 and 3 (described in chapters 3, 4 and 5) 
was shown to be susceptible to an outcome devaluation procedure in paper 2 (described 
in chapter 3), indicating performance to be goal-directed and most likely allowed for 
devaluation because the reduction in goal-value rendered it inadequate to motivate the 
instrumental behaviour. Traditionally, it was thought that PIT was not mediated by the 
expected incentive value of the outcome (Rescorla, 1994a), however, other recent 
advances have also demonstrated devaluation in certain PIT models (Allman, et al., 
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2010). In the PIT procedure utilised in this thesis, the cues predicted the outcome with 
different levels of uncertainty (90%, 50% or 10%) and performance was activated based 
in accordance with the expectancy of the outcome. Therefore, it may be that such 
predictive uncertainty during Pavlovian conditioning is a key determinant of the 
behavioural consequences of associative learning, and that the PIT effect is related to 
explicit knowledge of the outcome. Thus the discrepancies in the literature regarding the 
ability of devaluation techniques to modulate PIT, as discussed in chapter 1, could be 
explained by the method in which the PIT procedure was run and the reinforcers 
selected. 
In paper 2 (described in chapter 4) expectancies of the reward remained unchanged after 
devaluation/revaluation manipulations and attention remained intact, despite 
suppression of instrumental responding, it therefore seems that the current value of the 
reward modulates instrumental performance for the outcome. Therefore, taken 
alongside the results of study 1 (described in chapter 3) it may indicate that an induced 
negative mood state interacts with motivational processes by rendering the outcome less 
valuable to the agent and thus reducing the motivated behaviour to obtain that outcome, 
and this is discussed in more detail below. As appetitive and aversive outcomes are 
dissociable with regard to the impact of induced negative mood it is difficult to 
determine if this theory would also be valid when the outcome is aversive. 
 
The implications of state mood on learning and underlying mechanisms 
In paper 4 (described in chapter 6) the results demonstrated that those under induced 
negative mood took longer to demonstrate successful discrimination of the predictive 
nature of the stimuli. The three Pavlovian stimuli (AX, BX and CX) predicted reward 
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on 90%, 50% and 10% of trials respectively, and an extended number of trials were 
administered. Interestingly, the same percentage of participants assigned to each mood 
condition ultimately became aware. The pattern of learning (indexed using expectancy 
ratings) and attention (indexed using observing times) was similar for participants 
experienced with neutral and positive mood, which differed from those under induced 
negative mood. This finding is important, because attention has been shown to 
correspond to learning as observing times adapt to the evolving contingencies 
associated with stimuli, both in the data in this thesis whereby observing times switch 
between Pavlovian learning and transfer when outcome contingencies were altered and 
also previously (Trick, et al., 2011) where the same results were found. Indeed, this 
supports the claim that positive mood facilitates learning, when stimuli are predictive of 
either aversive (paper 3 – chapter 5) or appetitive (paper 4 – chapter 6) outcomes. In 
contrast, those under induced negative mood state demonstrated slower learning, and 
this is an interesting finding since the concept of depressive realism describes the theory 
whereby participants in depressive states have more accurate judgements of contingency 
outcomes (Alloy & Abramson, 1979), which would perhaps indicate a higher rate of 
learning should be experienced. However, the same theory also describes that those in a 
non-depressive state (i.e. positive and/or neutral induced state mood conditions in the 
experiments in this thesis) would overestimate the degree of contingency between their 
responses and outcomes thus facilitating correct expectancy responses as they may 
overestimate the 90% stimuli to 100%, and the 10% to 0%; this mechanism would also 
explain the attentional processes seen as these same participants would apportion 
minimal attention to the 90% and 10% stimuli as they might deem them “certain” which 
accords with the data collected in this thesis. One important caveat to this is that 
depressive realism may rely on trait mood, as opposed to state, which is what was 
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challenged in the experiments detailed in this thesis. As previously mentioned the 
impact of BDI, which is commonly used to assess trait depressive mood (Allan, Siegel, 
& Hannah, 2007) will be addressed later. 
There are several possible explanations for the reduced rate of learning seen in the 
individuals in the negative mood condition in paper 4 (described in chapter 6). Firstly, 
as the data for the neutral and positive mood conditions showed a gaze bias for the 
informative stimulus A, over the common X stimulus, which was larger than the bias 
towards B over the concurrently presented X but this effect was abolished in the 
negative mood condition, and replaced by a gaze preference towards the non-predictive 
stimulus C, over the concurrently presented X stimulus, in CX trials. This indicates a 
bias in the negative mood condition for the aversive stimulus (stimulus C - which may 
be viewed as a punishment stimulus), supporting previous data associating negative 
mood with increased punishment prediction but not reward prediction (Cools, 
Robinson, et al., 2008; Rogers, et al., 2003) as paper 4 utilised a reward outcome. A 
reduced discrimination between expected gains has also been demonstrated previously 
(Rogers, et al., 2003) which may also account for the delayed learning in the negative 
mood condition in the study presented in this thesis. With regard to the finding that 
those under induced negative mood took longer to acquire the contingency knowledge, 
this does correlate with some previous findings that those in a negative mood state show 
reduced learning (Chase, et al., 2010). It is worthwhile to note, however, that the 
negative mood group in the aforementioned study was confounded by high BDI scores, 
but this was not the case in our study whereby the conditions were matched for BDI 
scores and this is addressed later. Additionally, a suppressed motivation is the most 
commonly proposed explanation for reduced learning under negative mood, and it is 
possible that attenuated learning reflects decreased confidence. This is particularly 
66 
 
likely as our study required the participants to make explicit responses indicative of 
learning, thus the reduced speed of learning may be driven by a reduction in confidence 
to provide the correct response to the expectancy-rating question, which may be linked 
to attenuated impulsivity in the negative mood condition. This link to reduced 
impulsivity is unlikely, however, when taking into account result(s) in certain previous 
literature (Mobini, et al., 2000) as described earlier. 
Negative mood and reduced motivation (Cools, et al., 2005) have long been linked and 
therefore it seems this is a likely explanation and is discussed in detail in a separate 
section. In further support, recent advances in the study of attention have demonstrated 
a link between action control and attentional processes (Bekkering & Neggers, 2002; 
Wykowska, Schubo, & Hommel, 2009). More specifically, it has been shown that 
sensitisation of the perceptual system to information about guiding a certain action is 
elicited by the preparation to perform that same action (Wykowska, et al., 2009). Recent 
expansions in this field also propose motivation as a driver for visual attention and have 
introduced pupil size as an indirect measure of motivation/effort (Wykowska, Anderl, 
Schubo, & Hommel, 2013). This is interesting with regard to the data presented in paper 
4 (described in chapter 6) as an increased average pupil size in the positive mood 
condition across all trial types compared to the negative and neutral mood conditions 
was observed. The increased pupil size in the positive mood condition was accompanied 
by an increased attentional and behavioural preference for AX trials at an early stage of 
the experimental procedure and may have also driven the faster learning in the positive 
mood group, as those under induced positive mood also acquired contingency 
knowledge earlier in the same study. Hence the data support the suggestion that those 
under induced negative mood are less motivated than those under positive mood, which 
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would impact learning in a Pavlovian contingency design such as that used 
experimentally in this thesis. 
 
The implications of state mood on motivation and underlying mechanisms 
Induced state positive mood appeared to facilitate expedited learning encompassing the 
results on attention and expectancy in this thesis, and this potentiated learning was 
seemingly responsible for the changes observed on the PIT effect by those experienced 
with positive mood. However, data from negative mood manipulations appeared to 
indicate the impact on the PIT effect observed (by those in the negative mood 
condition) was driven by motivational influences, and was less clearly defined. In 
particular, when under induced negative mood, the mechanisms underlying the effects 
on Pavlovian discrimination learning and instrumental transfer are not isolated to one 
particular effect, however the results seen using a induced positive mood state seem 
more defined and appear to be predominantly modulated by increased speed of learning. 
One point that does require clarification regarding positive mood, is the effect of 
induced positive mood on the transfer effect in paper 3 (described in chapter 5) which 
utilised aversive outcomes. It was anticipated that positive mood would increase 
instrumental responding, but this was only observed in the presence of compound 
stimulus CX and the PIT effect remained intact (such that responding corresponded to 
the predictive nature of the stimuli: AX>BX>CX). One possible explanation is that as 
the outcome was aversive, and as mood in general has been shown to be linked to 
punishment prediction (which will be discussed in more detail below), the PIT effect 
remained intact as extreme mood has been related to enhanced punishment prediction. 
In opposition to this, it is possible that given further trials in which the outcomes were 
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continually extinguished, the instrumental responses for stimulus AX would be reduced, 
and for CX would be increased further still, to abolish the PIT effect and demonstrate 
learning of the new contingencies (as all stimuli had become 50% contingent with the 
outcome). This is a speculative explanation and would require further study to clarify, 
but it seems possible given the observed effects of induced positive mood on learning. 
In any case, the results demonstrated, for those under induced positive mood, a reduced 
PIT effect driven by an increased number of instrumental responses being made during 
CX trials; this is either a demonstration of novel learning or increased motivation to 
avoid the response under any circumstance (i.e. even in the presence of the non-
predictive CX stimulus). In contrast, the effects of induced negative mood can be more 
strongly linked to motivation. 
It is important to try to dissect the processes by which motivation is modulated by 
negative mood in the PIT studies utilised in this thesis, in particular the experiments in 
paper 1 (described in chapter 3). The results demonstrated a dissociation between 
attention (driven by uncertainty) and expectancy (knowledge of stimulus contingencies) 
versus behaviour (driven by prediction), when the outcomes were either appetitive or 
aversive. Although the PIT effect was modulated by induced negative mood for both 
outcomes the impact was different. For both outcomes the number of instrumental 
responses made was reduced, but when the outcome was punishment the PIT effect 
remained, and when the outcome was reward the PIT effect was abolished. Taken 
independently, the effect observed when the outcome was reward is in accordance with 
data from the devaluation study in paper 2 (described in chapter 4), indicating that the 
perceived reward may have been devalued by the induced state mood thus reducing the 
motivation to perform the instrumental response. As a reduction in responses to all three 
compound stimuli in the appetitive design was observed this indicates that novel 
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learning has not taken place, and that an impact on the reward value is likely. Previous 
data (Rogers, et al., 2003) suggests that those under a state of negative mood, albeit 
induced by acute tryptophan depletion, do show a reduced discrimination between 
expected gains, which would accord with the reward becoming devalued. The same 
study also demonstrated little support for an impact on discrimination between expected 
losses, which again accords with the data in paper 1 (described in chapter 3), as the PIT 
effect was not abolished when the outcome was aversive and the reduced responses 
could be accounted for by general motivational mechanisms. It is also possible that the 
impact of an induced negative mood state on expected reward may be driven by 
depressive realism mechanisms, as discussed earlier, which could account for the 
altered perception of the reward driving a reduction in motivation. Anhedonia could 
also account for the modulation in reward perception, as it is associated with diminished 
interest in pleasurable events, such as reward (Der-Avakian & Markou, 2012; Huprich, 
2013) and therefore could conceivably lead to a reduced motivation to perform an 
instrumental response to obtain that reward or avoid aversive outcomes. 
The reduction in motivation to perform the instrumental response could also be driven 
by a general reduction in impulsivity. Negative mood, as modulated by serotonin, has 
consistently been linked to impulsive behaviours (e.g. Cools, Roberts, et al., 2008; 
Cools, Robinson, et al., 2008; Roiser et al., 2006, etc), but the exact contribution is often 
unclear (Anderson, et al., 2003; Ho, Al-Zahrani, Al-Ruwaitea, Bradshaw, & Szabadi, 
1998). It is therefore possible that negative mood is linked to a decrease in motivation 
more generally. Thus, motivation is reduced when the outcome is to avoid punishment 
and also to gain reward in the natural environment, but is dissociated from the 
expectancy knowledge of that same reward, and also prediction error. The results in 
paper 1, study 1, (described in chapter 3) indicate that the observed reduction in 
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motivation is driven by an attenuated sensitivity to the reward itself, such that the 
reward is devalued by the induced negative mood state, and not a reduction of the 
impact of the conditioned signals as knowledge of the S-O contingencies were 
maintained (Rogers, et al., 2003). The reduction in motivation to gain reward therefore 
provides an insight into treating drug addiction (Koob, Sanna, & Bloom, 1998) and is 
also relevant for the link between depression and cognitive impairment. The data may 
also demonstrate a possible link between current mood state and reward value. 
In addition, the results in paper 1 (described in chapter 3) are in accordance with one 
conclusion drawn in previous studies (Dayan & Huys, 2008; Rogers, et al., 2003) that 
negative mood does not affect discrimination between expected outcomes when they are 
aversive but may drive a reduction in general motivation to seek reward/avoid 
punishment by altering the way in which reward cues are processed. It has also been 
demonstrated previously that an enhancement in punishment prediction is associated 
with negative mood, but not reward prediction (Cools, Robinson, et al., 2008). This 
dissociation is interesting with regard to the data in paper 1, as in study 1, where a 
reward outcome was utilised, the number of instrumental responses performed for each 
set of stimuli to gain the reward was reduced and the PIT effect (responses 
AX>BX>CX) was abolished. However, in study 2 when the stimuli were predictive of 
an aversive outcome the response to avoid this outcome was reduced but the PIT effect 
was maintained. This is also in agreement with certain theories that hypothesise 
serotonin (reduced under tryptophan depletion procedures) is involved in punishment 
prediction, but not reward (Daw, Kakade, & Dayan, 2002). Further to this link between 
aversive motivational processes with serotonin and negative mood, dopaminergic 
systems have been shown to work in an opposing model and be linked with appetitive 
motivational processes. 
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In summary, taking into account the evidence available I conclude that the effects 
observed in this thesis of positive mood are driven by enhanced learning in both 
aversive and appetitive experimental designs. In contrast, utilising the data in this thesis 
and previous literature, I conclude that the effects observed of induced negative mood 
are more likely driven by motivational mechanisms and the effects seen in aversive and 
appetitive models are distinct from one another. 
 
General limitations and methodological concerns 
One major methodological concern is that the model used may not have reflected a 
naturalistic setting. In particular, the expectancy question may have directed attention, 
biased goal-directed behaviour and driven motivation. Likewise, it is also possible that 
emotional questions regarding the stimuli may have influenced behaviour and attention 
towards the stimuli. However, the emotional questions were limited to the end of the 
experimental session and therefore would not have been able to impact upon the results. 
In addition, as the results of the expectancy question we were required to determine 
awareness of the outcome contingencies they formed a vital section of the studies and 
could not be eliminated. Indeed, the motivational responding in some circumstances 
was dissociated from the results of the expectancy questions thus it seems they did not 
influence the behaviour. 
Another issue related to the impact of state mood versus trait mood in papers 1, 3 and 4 
(chapters 3, 5 and 6). This thesis aimed at investigating the impact of state mood. 
Previous data (H. W. Chase, et al., 2010) has implicated BDI in manipulating 
behavioural responses, and BDI scores are indicative of trait depressive mood. 
However, all experimental groups (in all studies presented in this thesis) were matched 
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for BDI scores in an effort to eliminate any potential impact of trait depressive mood. 
Further to this, a VAS was used to index the outcome of the MIP and indicated state 
moods were successfully induced. However, it may be beneficial in future studies to 
attempt to derive a biological marker for this same purpose. The impact of this may be 
negated to some extent as previous studies have adopted the use of certain biological 
markers, which have then been dissociated from the behavioural effects observed. For 
example, salivary cortisol has been tested as a potential marker but has produced mixed 
and potentially misleading results (L. Clark, et al., 2001; Vielhaber et al., 2005). In 
addition, the data presented in this thesis are in contradiction with certain examples 
demonstrating a role of damaged serotonergic pathways in increasing reinforcer value 
(i.e. (Wogar, et al., 1991)), however this may be due to a distinction between an induced 
negative mood state and alteration of serotonin pathways, as well a difference in human 
and animal models. 
Furthermore, reduced serotonin, which can be brought about by acute tryptophan 
depletion, is involved in the development of negative mood and has also been linked to 
increased impulsivity (Anderson, et al., 2003; Ho, et al., 1998). Although we did not 
directly measure impulsivity, the data presented in this thesis demonstrate a general 
reduction in motivation when under induced negative mood, which may imply a 
reduction in impulsive behaviours and a potential contradiction to the aforementioned 
study. However, serotonin manipulations and induced negative mood may bring about 
differential behavioural changes which could account for these differences. In addition, 
the data presented in this thesis also highlighted a dissociation between expectancy and 
the motivational influences of negative mood. Expectancy may therefore be associated 
with impulsive actions but not the motivational affects. This separation is difficult to 
dissect in the model utilised. 
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Finally, although I have claimed that the switch in observing times in the learning stage 
versus the transfer stage of the PIT model (AX and CX < BX during learning, versus, 
AX and CX > BX during transfer) is due to prediction error it may also be due to 
stimulus redundancy. Therefore, attention as supported by the prediction error theory 
may be impacted by the partial predictor (stimulus compound “BX”) not being a truly 
uncertain stimulus and may have been deemed redundant by the experimental 
participants. However, in some instances during the studies presented in this thesis 
participants preferentially attended to the BX stimulus and certain learning theories state 
that redundant stimuli will become ignored (Kruschke & Blair, 2000). It is not possible 
to fully distinguish between stimulus redundancy and prediction error using the studies 
presented in this thesis, and further study is required to clarify this distinction. 
 
Implications 
The strongest implication of the series of studies in this thesis is that induced negative 
mood reduces the general motivation to perform an instrumental response to gain 
reward and to avoid punishment, and that this process can be dissociated from explicit 
knowledge about, and attention to, stimuli predictive of the outcome. In the context of 
addiction this may provide a possible pathway for intervention in accordance with 
motivation theories (Robinson & Berridge, 2003) of addiction and relapse. Furthermore, 
within the context of negative mood the effects on punishment and reward prediction 
differ in the presented studies, in support of previous literature (Cools, Robinson, et al., 
2008; Rogers, et al., 2003). These data therefore provide additional support for the 
motivational and neurobiological interactions between negative mood and instrumental 
responding; such as, the opposing effects of dopaminergic and serotonergic mechanisms 
of motivation (Cools, Roberts, et al., 2008) and the link between negative mood and 
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punishment, but not reward, prediction (Cools, Robinson, et al., 2008). In a similar vein, 
induced negative mood was also dissociated from positive mood with regard to the 
impact on learning, such that positive mood facilitates potentiated learning. The 
different contexts under which induced state negative and positive mood are able to 
manipulate learning and the PIT effect may guide interventions in a more precise way. 
 
Future directions 
While the present findings indicate that levels of motivated behavior may reflect the 
current state mood of an individual, and may therefore be implicated in abnormal and 
undesirable behaviors, further investigations are required in order to establish this 
connection. A major problem with making inferences from the current data is that 
learning and motivation may not be mediated in the same way for individuals with drug 
addictions or other relevant clinical disorders. Indeed, the majority of other studies 
investigating the impact of negative mood utilized acute tryptophan depletion in healthy 
subjects to bring about a biological state of reduced serotonin, however this may also 
not provide a full picture and often required the use of MIPs to successfully induce a 
state mood (Robinson & Sahakian, 2009b). The exact mechanisms by which state mood 
interacts with learning and motivation in clinical populations requires further 
investigation and this clearly has implications for the use of induced mood in 
interventions for addictive behaviors, among other conditions. For example, the 
application of mood interventions to populations of drug users requires exploration. 
A second direction, equally relevant, is the impact of positive and negative mood on 
acquisition of contingency knowledge, when the outcome is aversive, over a period of 
extended Pavlovian learning. The data presented in this thesis, taken together with 
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additional literature (Cools, Robinson, et al., 2008; Rogers, et al., 2003) indicate a state 
of negative mood enhances punishment prediction and therefore it would be pertinent to 
investigate this effect further in order to link these findings to clinical populations and 
intervention strategies. Results indicated induced negative mood reduced speeds of 
learning in comparison to induced positive mood when the outcome was appetitive, but 
it is not clear if this would be the case if the outcomes were aversive. In a similar vein, 
the impact of positive mood on motivation to perform an instrumental response when 
the outcome is appetitive is also an interesting direction of future study. The findings in 
this thesis indicated induced positive mood facilitates learning and acquisition of novel 
contingencies, but this was limited to aversive outcomes in the PIT design. 
The data presented in paper 4 (described in chapter 6) showed an increased average 
pupil size in the positive mood condition across all trial types when compared to the 
negative and neutral mood conditions. In addition, previous studies have also 
demonstrated a difference in pupil size when under certain conditions between anxious 
patients and controls (Bakes, Bradshaw, & Szabadi, 1990) and also a correlation 
between state anxiety ratings associated with punishment and pupillary light reflexes 
(Bitsios, Szabadi, & Bradshaw, 2002). Albeit these results link anxiety to pupil size, 
there are recognised similarities between anxiety and negative mood and further study 
into the impact of negative mood on pupillary reflexes may well be a fruitful avenue of 
investigation. Pupil size may also provide a useful physiological marker for future mood 
induction studies. 
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Concluding remarks 
In this thesis, the mechanisms underlying the impact of state mood on learning, and 
more specifically motivation to perform an instrumental response were considered. I 
suggested that negative mood was an important factor in reward seeking, and would be 
implicated in the perception of outcome value, although it was acknowledged that the 
response to reward and aversive outcomes might differ. 
Using classical conditioning procedures I demonstrated that induced positive mood 
facilitated learning, whist induced negative mood induced attenuated speeds of 
acquisition of predictive contingencies. Further to this finding, this effect of increased 
learning when under positive mood was also observed into the transfer stage of PIT. 
Additionally, I established that motivational mechanisms were at the forefront of the 
impact of induced negative mood on the PIT effect, and that the response to aversive 
and appetitive outcomes was modulated by independent mechanisms when under an 
induced negative mood state. Reward outcomes were devalued by negative mood, and 
thus the motivation to respond in the presence of such predictive stimuli reduced, and 
the PIT effect abolished; whereas, the responses to avoid punishment were reduced 
most likely by attenuated motivation, but the presence of enhanced punishment 
prediction rendered the PIT effect more stable. Finally, there was also a clear indication 
that attention, driven by uncertainty in this paradigm, and knowledge of S-O 
contingencies, were not affected by state mood and were therefore separated from 
instrumental responding. These results demonstrate that whilst attention and 
contingency knowledge are important in modulating learning and motivated behavior, 
the impact of state mood is also a key factor in facilitating these processes and may, 
under appropriate circumstance, influence learning and motivation.  
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Chapter 3 
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Paper 1: Motivational mechanisms underlying the effect of negative mood on 
Pavlovian-to-Instrumental transfer. 
 
Abstract 
Mood states have been suggested to affect a range of cognitive and other behavioural 
processes. To study the effects of negative mood on a motivated response to gain 
reward or avoided punishment, a Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) model was 
used. This model has been extensively studied in animals and has, more recently, been 
adapted for use in humans. It has been demonstrated that humans are able to transfer 
predictive Pavlovian stimulus-outcome relationships to independently learned 
instrumental responding for that same outcome and it is believed that such a transfer 
effect is modulated by the predictive strength of the stimulus, which, in turn, exerts a 
motivational influence driving the instrumental responding. The effect of negative mood 
on the likelihood and vigour of this instrumental response, in humans, is examined in 
two general PIT studies in the presence of positive or aversive outcomes. A Pavlovian 
training schedule was used in which three compound stimuli AX, BX, CX predicted an 
outcome of reward (10p) or an aversive noise on 90%, 50% and 10% of presentations 
respectively. This was followed by a mood induction procedure, a short phase of 
instrumental training and finally, transfer performed under nominal extinction. During 
transfer, contingency awareness and emotional ratings were unaffected by the mood 
induction procedure. However, instrumental responding was reduced in the negative 
mood condition. These findings suggest that the motivation to perform an instrumental 
response to obtain reward, or to avoid punishment, in the presence of predictive stimuli 
is reduced under conditions of negative mood which could help our understanding of 
the effects of mood state on cognitive performance in patients suffering from mood 
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disorders, and may also highlight a role that negative mood plays on addictive 
processes. 
Key words: learning, human, motivation, negative mood, addiction, attention. 
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Introduction 
The functional role(s) of mood in learned and motivational behaviours is the subject of 
much debate; indeed previous studies investigating these effects have shown there to be 
an implication of mood on factors believed to be involved in Pavlovian-to-instrumental 
transfer (PIT) including impulsivity (Clark, et al., 2005), instrumental learning and 
information processing (Finger, et al., 2007; Merens, et al., 2007), motivation (Cools, et 
al., 2005) as well as emotional and behavioural processing (Cools, Roberts, et al., 
2008). Addiction is also linked to these factors and mood may, therefore, also have a 
link with addictive processes (Cools, et al., 2005) and PIT is a model that has often been 
used to study addiction (Everitt & Robbins, 2005). It has been widely accepted that 
humans are able to transfer the predictive Pavlovian stimulus-outcome relationships to 
independently learned instrumental responding for that same outcome (e.g. Balleine & 
O'Doherty, 2009; Hogarth, Dickinson, Hutton, Bamborough, et al., 2006, etc) [for a 
review, see Lovibond & Shanks (2002)] and it is believed that such a transfer effect is 
modulated by the predictive strength of the stimulus, which, in turn, exerts a 
motivational influence driving the instrumental responding (Everitt & Robbins, 2005). 
Motivation is an important response to stimuli, and reward, required for many normal 
processes (Robinson & Berridge, 2003) but is also implicated in abnormal processing 
and driving of certain behaviours, so it will be interesting to observe the motivational 
response to gain reward, or avoid punishment, exerted by those under negative mood. It 
is interesting to note that in our hands devaluing the rewarded outcome can disrupt the 
transfer effect and may support the claim that the transfer effect (perhaps by decreasing 
motivation to gain, or influence, that outcome) relies on the current value of the reward 
as well as the ability to predict the outcome. This disruption may be replicated under 
conditions of negative mood, but the causal factor may be different. 
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Negative mood, e.g., in depressive disorders or under conditions of drug withdrawal, is 
often associated with anhedonia, characterised by decreased sensitivity to pleasurable 
events (Rogers, et al., 2003), which in turn may affect cognitive performance due to a 
change in the predictive strength of a stimulus and hence contribute to cognitive deficits 
associated with these disorders. PIT is mediated by the prediction of an outcome (which 
may be viewed as a pleasurable event when the outcome is a reward, or cessation of an 
aversive outcome) such that the magnitude of the transfer effect observed in PIT 
accords with the associative (or predictive) strength of the stimulus (Balleine & 
Ostlund, 2007). In the present study we were therefore particularly interested in the 
extent to which induced negative mood might reduce instrumental responding in a PIT 
paradigm and whether this reduction would accord with the predictive strength of the 
stimulus or eliminate responding entirely. It is also not clear that negative mood will 
model anhedonia, however, it is generally accepted that by manipulating serotonin 
and/or by carrying out mood induction procedures that the effects of mood may be 
studied (Cools, et al., 2005). Therefore, we predicted that negative mood would reduce 
the value of the outcome by inducing anhedonia, which would in turn lead to a 
reduction in instrumental responding. Two complementary studies were carried out 
aiming to investigate the transfer effect under conditions of negative and neutral 
induced mood, using positive (study 1) and aversive (study 2) outcomes. 
The objective of the current experiments was, therefore, to study under which 
circumstances the motivation to seek reward may be challenged and to determine 
whether state negative mood may manipulate motivation, and if a dissociation between 
avoiding punishment and obtaining reward would be seen. Additionally, we were 
interested in investigating the methods by which motivation might be affected by 
negative mood as it has been previously demonstrated that serotonergic manipulation 
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together with negative mood, affects the motivational properties of stimuli predictive of 
rewards (Cools, et al., 2005) and whether state mood could be utilised in potential 
treatments for addiction. A Pavlovian training schedule was used in which three 
compound stimuli AX, BX, CX predicted an appetitive reward (study 1) of 10p or a 
aversive noise (study 2), on 90%, 50% and 10% of presentations respectively (Hogarth, 
Dickinson, et al., 2008). After Pavlovian training had been completed a visual (Smith, et 
al., 2005) and musical mood induction procedure, adapted from one previously 
described in Robinson, et al., (2009) was carried out. In the transfer stage that followed, 
under nominal extinction, the ability of the stimuli to elicit the instrumental response 
was determined to study the PIT effect. In addition, participants were able on each trial, 
throughout all stages, to view the stimuli for an infinite duration as determined by 
holding down a key; this observation time was used as a measure of attention towards 
each set of compound stimuli. It is important to note that predictive uncertainty is also 
able to attract attention under certain conditions (Trick, et al., 2011). It is anticipated 
that observation time will be proportional to the uncertainty of the stimuli, such that 
greatest attention will be paid to BX compared to the certain compounds AX and CX. In 
contrast, it is believed that the transfer effect will be AX>BX>CX and that instrumental 
responding will be reduced under conditions of negative mood. 
Procedures were approved by the University of Sussex Ethics Committee. Participants 
were informed they were allowed to withdraw at any time. 
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Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Healthy subjects who were taking no medication, as determined by a medical health 
questionnaire, were recruited. Ethical approval was obtained from the University of 
Sussex ethics committee and all subjects gave written informed consent prior to 
participation; all participants were fully debriefed at the end of the session and 
compensated for their time with £15. 
 Study 1 
Fifty-three subjects (29 males) took part in the study, 8 females and 13 males were 
excluded due to failure to successfully learn stimulus-outcome contingencies. The 
remaining thirty-two subjects, deemed “aware”, were divided into neutral mood (n = 16; 
8 females) and negative mood (n = 16; 8 females) conditions. The mean age of subjects 
was [years] 22.5. 
 Study 2 
Forty-four (19 males) took part in the study, 8 females and 4 males were excluded due 
to failure to successfully learn stimulus-outcome contingencies. The remaining thirty-
two subjects, deemed “aware”, were divided into neutral mood (n = 16; 8 females) and 
negative mood (n = 16; 9 females) as for study 1. The mean age of subjects was [years] 
21.4. 
Experimental procedure 
Subjects were asked to attend the laboratory on one occasion. They were instructed to 
abstain from alcohol for twelve hours prior to the testing session. In addition they were 
asked to avoid consuming anything high in caffeine immediately before the test session. 
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Participants were informed they would be compensated for their time as well as 
receiving any money they won on the task. 
Materials 
The task was presented on a 20” Dell P1130 monitor (Dell Inc, Berkshire, UK) and 
programmed using E-prime v1.1 software (Psychology Software Tools Inc.; Pittsburgh, 
PA). The 4 visual stimuli used (see figure 1) were black patterns displayed on a grey 
background, 10.2cm squared at a resolution of 1280 x 1024.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Materials used during the computerised task throughout the PIT procedure - 
the four visual stimuli assigned to A, B, C and X in a counterbalanced fashion 
 
Text font and size was Times New Roman 25pt. The auditory music (for the mood 
induction procedure and aversive noise) was played through Sennheiser PX200 
headphones. Participant responses were collected via a Cherry (Pleasant Prairie, WI) 
mini keyboard throughout with the top row of number keys labelled in green from 1 – 9, 
and the shift and space keys also labelled. 
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Procedure 
The procedure was adapted from one previously described in Trick, et al. (2011). 
Pavlovian Training: During initial Pavlovian training four visual stimuli (A, B, C and X; 
figure 1) were combined into three stimulus pairs, which constituted the trials (AX, BX, 
CX) and which predicted the occurrence of a reward (study 1)/aversive noise (study 2) 
with a 90%, 50% or 10% probability, respectively, approximating the design of 
(Hogarth, Dickinson, et al., 2008). The stimuli were presented in compound with the 
common stimulus X (Wagner, 1969) in order to assess selective attention for the 
concurrently presented stimuli A, B and C, which were informative of the trial outcome. 
The four visual stimuli shown in figure 1 were assigned to the role of A, B, C and X in 
counterbalanced order across participants.  
Each trial started with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen. Once the participant 
pressed the space bar the fixation cross turned yellow. At this point participants pressed 
and held the shift key, which terminated the cross and presented a stimulus pair, with 
the cues 10.5cm either side of the location previously occupied by the fixation cross. 
The stimulus-pair remained on screen as long as the shift key was held and this 
represented the observing time. Once the shift key was released the stimulus-pair 
vanished, and the expectancy question “How likely is the 10p/loud noise 1 = unlikely 5 
= don't know 9 = likely”, was shown in the centre of the screen. Participants answered 
this question by pressing a green number key between 1 and 9 providing outcome 
expectancy ratings and the question disappeared. Following this, the screen displayed 
only the grey background for 5 sec and during the last 4 sec of this time the reward 
outcome (“You gain 10p” was displayed and the participant transferred 10p to their 
“My Money” tin) or aversive noise (40msec 97dB) could occur at any randomly 
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selected millisecond. The training phase consisted of 120 trials, arranged in 2 blocks of 
60 trials1.   
Mood Induction: The procedure was adapted from one previously described (Robinson, 
et al., 2009). Participants were presented with 44 (negative or neutral) pictures (Smith, 
et al., 2005), whilst music was played through Sennheiser PX200 headphones. 
Participants were instructed to get as deeply as possible into any mood evoked. Firstly, 
a blank screen was presented and participants were instructed to press the space bar to 
view the first picture. The picture was displayed in the centre of the screen for 12 
seconds, immediately followed by a blank screen, and participants were asked to look at 
the picture for as long as it was displayed. When the blank screen was displayed again 
participants pressed the space bar to view the next picture. The music played was 
Adagio in G Minor by Thomas Albinoni for the negative version of the MIP and for the 
neutral MIP The Planets, Po. 32: VII. Neptune, the Mystic by Gustav Holst. Prior to and 
after the MIP, a set of Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) were administered, to determine 
self reported mood. Comparison between initial- and post- MIP self reported mood, 
using VAS, was used to determine the mood effects of the MIP and therefore assess 
the effectiveness of the procedure. 
Instrumental training: Participants were then trained to acquire an instrumental response 
(spacebar pressing) in a procedure identical to Pavlovian training apart from the 
following modifications. First, holding down the shift key presented two blank grey 
                                                
1 Trials within the block were randomised for type (AX, BX, CX) and stimulus location 
(left, right) Critically, the rewarded outcome occurred in 90% of AX trials (18/20), in 
50% of BX trials (10/20) and 10% of CX trials (2/20). Stimulus location was balanced 
within trials with and without the outcome. 
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squares in place of the compounds used in Pavlovian training. Participants were 
instructed that repeatedly pressing the spacebar during the interval following the 
expectancy question would sometimes lead to the reward/prevent the noise. The reward 
outcome/noise was scheduled to occur on 25% of trials, and a further 25% were 
possible by a key press made within the 1-sec window leading up to the scheduled time 
of the outcome (thus, participant’s best strategy was to respond at least once per second 
across the period following the expectancy question). Consequently, 25% of trials were 
rewarded (either with the 10p or prevention of the noise) automatically. There were 8 
trials of this simple instrumental training. Pavlovian to Instrumental Transfer: The 
transfer phase followed the design of the instrumental phase except that compounds 
established in Pavlovian training (AX, BX, CX) were presented randomly, intermixed 
with blank trials of instrumental training, with equal proportions (16 trials each), over 
64 trials. The reward outcome/noise was scheduled for 25% of all trials, with a further 
25% possible if instrumental responding was performed effectively (as for instrumental 
training). Thus the Pavlovian contingencies established in training were not in force in 
the transfer phase. The number of instrumental responses (space bar presses) made 
during the variable time window prior to the scheduled time of the reward/noise were 
recorded to determine the transfer effect. This variable time window was matched for 
trials in which the outcome (reward/noise) was and was not scheduled. 
Evaluative conditioning 
At the end of the task, the affective evaluation of stimuli was recorded to provide an 
alternative measure of conditioning. Participants were presented with the individual 
stimuli A, B, C, and X, in random order, and answered the questions “How anxious 
does this picture make you?” and “How pleasant do you find this picture?” in random 
order, on a scale from 1-9 where 1 = not at all, and 9 = extremely. The affective 
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responses were examined in relation to the impact of cues on attention and instrumental 
performance. 
Statistical analysis 
Data were analysed independently for each study and separately for Pavlovian training 
and transfer sections within each study, and also for aware and unaware participants. 
Initial analysis was performed using a 2x3x2 mixed ANOVA with the between factor 
Condition (2 levels – Negative Mood, Neutral Mood), and within factors Trial (3 levels 
- AX, BX, CX) and Block (2 levels – block 1, block 2) for the variables Expectancy 
ratings and Observing times. The Block variable was eventually collapsed because it 
showed no interesting effects or interactions, to simplify reporting of the key findings. 
This was followed by post-hoc Bonferroni tests where appropriate, unless otherwise 
stated. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used where required. 
Analysis of the PIT effect (number of instrumental responses) was carried out as above 
with the exception of the factor Trial, which now had four levels (4 levels - AX, BX, 
CX, Blank) by inclusion of the blank. Other analysis was performed using mixed 
ANOVA followed by Bonferroni post-hoc testing where appropriate, unless otherwise 
stated. 
 
Results 
Biographical data were collected from both aware and unaware participants and 
demonstrated no differences between conditions. 
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Awareness of training contingencies  
In the final half of Pavlovian training (60 trials) each participant produced 20 
expectancy ratings for each of the three trial types; AX, BX and CX.  For each 
participant the three trial types were compared in the second block of trials using a one-
way, within-subjects ANOVA. If there was a significant main effect of trial type, and 
the direction of effect was veridical with the scheduled Pavlovian contingencies (i.e., 
AX>BX>CX) the participant was labelled ‘aware’, otherwise the participant was 
labelled ‘unaware’. The awareness criteria bisected participants who ranged on a 
continuum of predictive knowledge, rather than participants falling on a step function of 
predictive knowledge (Lieberman, Sunnucks, & Kirk, 1998a). The awareness criteria 
therefore isolate participants who achieved the greatest predictive knowledge in the 
training provided. The aware group was analysed independently to confirm the co-
occurrence of predictive knowledge and conditioned responding (Hogarth & Duka, 
2006a; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002a), data for unaware participants are shown tabulated 
where appropriate (table 1). 
Table 1 
    	   	  Data from unaware participants         
(Conditions collapsed) Mean Standard Deviation 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 1 Study 2 
Pavlovian Training Phase       
Training Expectancy (1-9) - AX 5.21 6.51 0.71 1.00 
Training Expectancy (1-9) - BX 5.37 6.33 0.88 0.89 
Training Expectancy (1-9) - CX 5.11 4.44 0.54 1.27 
Training Observing times (ms) - AX 2605.44 2683.95 908.83 1491.82 
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Training Observing times (ms) - BX 2969.64 2553.95 1009.79 1317.75 
Training Observing times (ms) - CX 3096.74 2525.63 901.04 1226.57 
Transfer Phase       
Transfer Expectancy (1-9) - AX 5.23 5.88 1.02 1.70 
Transfer Expectancy (1-9) - BX 5.30 6.23 1.16 2.31 
Transfer Expectancy (1-9) - CX 5.47 5.38 1.10 1.55 
Transfer Observing times (ms) - AX 2084.50 1814.43 1027.43 1292.81 
Transfer Observing times (ms) - BX 1561.73 1295.11 635.15 942.50 
Transfer Observing times (ms) - CX 2222.11 1738.71 938.37 1062.20 
Transfer number of responses - AX 6.97 8.94 7.67 5.97 
Transfer number of responses - BX 8.01 10.21 8.35 6.83 
Transfer number of responses - CX 7.79 8.45 8.24 5.94 
Transfer number of responses - Blank 8.62 12.03 8.24 5.86 
Evaluative conditioning       
Anxiety rating (1-9) – A 3.67 4.50 2.58 2.61 
Anxiety rating (1-9) – B 3.95 3.50 2.42 2.71 
Anxiety rating (1-9) – C 4.38 3.83 2.89 2.59 
Anxiety rating (1-9) – Blank 3.52 4.75 2.60 2.67 
Pleasantness rating (1-9) – A 5.62 4.75 2.40 2.45 
Pleasantness rating (1-9) – B 5.14 5.67 1.74 2.87 
Pleasantness rating (1-9) – C 4.95 5.58 2.38 2.75 
Pleasantness rating (1-9) - Blank 5.24 3.08 2.68 1.68 
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Expectancy ratings  
Figure 2 shows the expectancy ratings for AX, BX and CX trials during training for 
aware participants. In both studies aware participants recorded significantly different 
ratings for each stimulus, study 1: F(2, 60) = 153.30, p < .001 and study 2: F(2, 60) = 
314.69, p < .001, but the unaware group did not. These effects were determined by the 
pre-selection of aware and unaware groups.  These differential expectancies were 
maintained into transfer (shown in figure 2), such that in the aware group, there was a 
significant main effect of trial type; study 1: F(2, 60) = 44.54, p < .001 and also in study 
2:  F(2, 60) = 46.66, p < .001. The unaware group showed no main effect of trial type. 
These results were consistent for all experimental groups and the data for aware 
participants were therefore collapsed. 
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Figure 2: Mean expectancy ratings following the presentation of trials AX, BX, CX 
during Pavlovian training and Transfer phase for aware participants for study 1 (a) and 
study 2 (b). No differences were observed between the conditions and the data were 
therefore collapsed generating n=32 per bar graphically represented. Error bars 
represent standard error (SE) of mean. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. 
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Observing time 
Figure 3a and 3b show observing times (ms) during Pavlovian training and transfer for 
study 1 and study 2 respectively. In aware participants, there was a significant main 
effect of trial type, study 1: F(2, 60) = 9.39, p < .001; study 2: F(1.38, 41.41) = 15.72, p 
< .001, with observing times being overall longest in BX trials compared to AX and CX 
trials. There was no significant trial effect for unaware participants. By contrast, during 
transfer, BX observing times were shorter compared to AX and CX and there was a 
significant main effect of trial type, study 1: F(1.57, 47.13) = 12.94, p < .001; study 2: 
F(1.62, 48.72) = 16.23, p < .001. This result is consistent with the results of (Hogarth, 
Dickinson, et al., 2008) and further demonstrates that observing time can be used to 
index the predictive uncertainty of stimuli; this pattern was consistent for all 
experimental groups and the data for aware participants were therefore collapsed. 
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Figure 3: Mean observing times (ms) for trials AX, BX, CX during the Pavlovian 
training and the transfer phase for aware participants for study 1 (a) and study 2 (b). 
No differences were observed between the conditions and the data were therefore 
collapsed generating n=32 per bar graphically represented. Error bars represent SE of 
mean. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. 
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The effects of the MIP on self-reported mood 
The change in self-reported mood, calculated by determining the difference in response 
to VAS before and after the MIP, for aware participants was analysed. There was a 
significant overall change by condition interaction in study 1 (F(1, 30) = 30.43, 
p<0.001), as well as a main effect of mood type (change in happiness/sadness: F(1, 30) 
= 56.30, p<0.001). For aware participants who took part in study 2 there was also a 
significant overall mood change by condition interaction (F(1, 30) = 8.47, p=0.007), as 
well as a main effect of mood type (change in happiness/sadness: F(1, 30) = 47.39, 
p<0.001). These effects are explained by participants in the negative condition (study 1 
– mean: 3.75; SEM: 0.50 & study 2 – mean: 3.81; SEM: 0.52) reporting a greater 
increase in sadness after the MIP than those in the neutral condition (study 1 – mean: 
0.16; SEM: 0.54 & study 2 – mean: 1.64; SEM: 0.70) in both study 1 (p<0.001) and 
study 2 (p<0.05); those in study 1 also reported a greater decrease in happiness after 
negative MIP (study 1 – mean: -3.38; SEM: 0.39 & study 2 – mean: -2.81; SEM: 0.57) 
than those in the neutral condition (study 1 – mean: -0.93; SEM: 0.32 & study 2 – mean: 
-1.06; SEM: 0.52; p<0.001). It is possible that the effects of the MIP may have been 
reduced in study 2 as the stimuli used in the PIT procedure predicted an auditory 
outcome and may have limited the auditory effect of the MIP. 
Transfer effect 
Figure 4 shows the number of key press responses produced in AX, BX, CX and blank 
trials for aware participants for each condition. In study 1, there was a significant 
stimulus effect (F(1.72, 51.45) = 5.53, p = .009),  and also in study 2 (F(3, 90) = 14.77, 
p < .001), indicating a PIT effect. Additionally, in study 2 there was also a significant 
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stimulus by condition interaction (F(3, 90) = 3.32, p = .024), explained by a higher 
number of responses being made in the neutral condition. 
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(b) 
Figure 4: Mean instrumental responses following presentation of AX, BX, CX and blank 
trials in study 1 (a) and study 2 (b) during the Transfer phase made by aware 
participants for each condition (n=16 per condition). Error bars represent SE of mean. 
* = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. 
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Evaluative conditioning 
Table 2 shows the pleasantness and anxiety ratings to stimulus reported at the end of the 
task for aware participants. Within study 1, there was a main effect of stimuli for both 
anxiety (F(3, 90) = 4.28, p = .007) and pleasantness (F(3, 90) = 4.51, p = .005) for 
aware participants; which was absent in unaware participants (anxiety: F(3, 57) = 0.70, 
p = .56; pleasantness: F(3, 57) = 0.38, p = .768). For study 2, there was also a main 
effect of stimulus for anxiety rating for the aware group (F(3, 90) = 5.43, p = .02), but 
not in the unaware (F(3, 30) = 0.57, p = .64). Also within study 2, for pleasantness 
ratings there was a significant stimulus by condition effect (F(3, 90) = 3.7, p = .015), 
but there was not a main effect of stimulus for either the aware (F(3, 90) = 1.85, p = .14) 
or unaware (F(3, 30) = 1.67, p = .19) groups. 
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Table 2 
Mean emotional ratings (SEM) made by aware 
participants 
Measurement                 Study/Condition                Stimuli  
A B C X 
Study 1 
Anxiety ratings 
    
Negative mood condition mean 
 
2.50 
(0.30) 
3.44 
(0.54) 
4.00 
(0.51) 
3.25 
(0.38) 
Neutral mood condition mean 
 
2.63 
(0.56) 
2.75 
(0.40) 
3.19 
(0.55) 
1.75 
(0.25) 
     
Pleasantness ratings 
Negative mood condition mean 
 
 
6.38 
(0.58) 
 
5.06 
(0.53) 
 
4.25 
(0.48) 
 
4.75 
(0.45) 
Neutral mood condition mean 
 
6.06 
(0.60) 
4.88 
(0.44) 
5.00 
(0.46) 
6.00 
(0.36) 
     
Study 2 
Anxiety ratings 
    
Negative mood condition mean 
 
5.44 
(0.81) 
4.63 
(0.64) 
3.56 
(0.63) 
5.00 
(0.67) 
Neutral mood condition mean 
 
6.31 
(0.67) 
4.94 
(0.61) 
3.56 
(0.59) 
4.44 
(0.59) 
     
Pleasantness ratings 
Negative mood condition mean 
 
 
3.38 
(0.63) 
 
4.13 
(0.61) 
 
6.69 
(0.64) 
 
4.50 
(0.55) 
Neutral mood condition mean 
 
5.25 
(0.71) 
5.06 
(0.60) 
4.69 
(0.76) 
5.44 
(0.35) 
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Discussion 
The current studies investigated the impact of induced negative mood on motivation to 
perform an instrumental response to gain reward and independently to avoid 
punishment, and, also links to previous work on reward devaluation. The results of the 
present studies have shown that successful Pavlovian training generated differential 
expectations about the probability of the reward/aversive outcome in AX, BX and CX 
trials. These expectancies were maintained in the transfer phase (post-MIP) despite 
these contingencies no longer being in force, which is interesting in itself as previous 
studies have demonstrated a link between serotonin and reduced discrimination between 
expected gains (Rogers, et al., 2003). In our studies for both aversive and rewarding 
outcomes the participants who had undergone negative mood induction maintained their 
expectancies of the outcome as did those in the neutral condition. This may, however, 
demonstrate dissociation between acute tryptophan depletion and experimentally 
induced mood (as in the present study), the effects of which are unclear and would be an 
interesting focus for future study. 
Attention to the stimuli (observing times) in the current studies were shown to be linked 
with uncertainty, according with Pearce & Hall (1980) such that during Pavlovian 
training, observing times were greatest for BX (the uncertain predictor) as has been 
previously demonstrated (Hogarth, Dickinson, et al., 2008). In contrast, during transfer, 
observing times were reversed such that attention to BX was reduced below that for AX 
and CX in accordance with previous data (Trick, et al., 2011), which hypothesised this 
effect might be due to prediction error. It is interesting to note that induced mood did 
not affect observing responses during the transfer stage (post-MIP), indicating 
dissociation between mood and prediction error in contrast to mood and motivation as 
reflected by the number of instrumental responses performed. 
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The number of instrumental responses for each set of compound stimuli in the neutral 
condition increased linearly in accordance with the expectancies/probabilities learned in 
Pavlovian training (AX>BX>CX), thus demonstrating this transfer effect is related to 
explicit prediction of the outcome (e.g., Hogarth, et al., 2007; Trick, et al., 2011, etc). 
This was the case for both aversive and appetitive models (study 2 and study 1 
respectively). This dissociation between attention (observing times being driven by 
uncertainty) and behaviour (instrumental responding driven by prediction) is interesting 
with regard to the present study as observing responses were not affected by the 
manipulations (MIP); however, the transfer effect was altered in the negative mood 
conditions in both paradigms. 
Data in the present studies also demonstrate successful manipulation of mood, such that 
the negative MIP resulted in greater self reported feeling of sadness in both studies, 
accompanied by a reduced feeling of happiness in study 1 when compared to those in 
the neutral condition. Additionally, expectancy ratings were maintained by the aware 
participants into transfer (but with no difference between the two mood groups), prior to 
which the MIP was completed, indicating that the MIP had no effect on contingency 
knowledge and therefore supports the suggestion that the reduction in transfer effect in 
the negative mood condition was driven by a reduced motivation to perform the 
response despite maintaining associated knowledge of the outcome. This is in 
accordance with previous studies, such that those in a negative state may become more 
accurate, but slower at responding (Cools, et al., 2005). In Cools, et al., (2005) the 
effects of acute tryptophan depletion on a reaction time task were tested, and those 
participants who had undergone the serotonin manipulation reduced the speed of their 
responses but increased the accuracy. Volunteers in the control condition demonstrated 
increased speed and lower accuracy on trials predictive of high reinforcement certainty 
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when compared with trials for cues associated with lower reinforcement certainty; this 
coupling was also influenced in the manipulation condition. As discussed the link 
between serotonin and motivation is already well established (Cools, et al., 2005), as is 
the link between serotonin and negative mood. The present work adds to our knowledge 
regarding the processes by which mood effects learning and behavioural processes as 
studies previously have demonstrated a link between serotonin and sensitivity to reward 
reinforcements, in particular punishment (Blair, et al., 2008; Cools, Robinson, et al., 
2008). 
An important caveat should be noted when comparing the current results to previous 
data. The present studies utilised experimentally induced mood achieved via a musical 
and visual mood induction procedure designed to alter state mood, as opposed to other 
studies, which have used acute tryptophan depletion alone or in combination with a 
mood induction procedure. Interestingly, the latter of which would most likely provide 
the most robust results as mood state has been shown to influence the effects of acute 
tryptophan depletion (Robinson, et al., 2009). Irrespective of the mood state procedure 
used, previous findings are similar to the ones presented here (Cools, et al., 2005; Cools, 
Robinson, et al., 2008) that a reduction in response was observed in the negative mood 
condition, but accuracy maintained (as observed with expectancy in the present studies). 
In addition, the present results are in accordance with previous reports (Dayan & Huys, 
2008; Rogers, et al., 2003) such that negative mood does not affect discrimination 
between expected outcomes when they are aversive and may drive a reduction in 
motivation to seek reward/avoid punishment by altering the way in which reward cues 
are processed. An enhancement in punishment prediction following acute tryptophan 
depletion has also been demonstrated previously, but no effect on reward prediction 
(Cools, Robinson, et al., 2008). This dissociation is interesting with regard to the current 
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data as in study 1, where a reward outcome was utilised, the number of instrumental 
responses performed for each set of stimuli to gain the reward was reduced and the PIT 
effect (responses AX>BX>CX) was abolished. However, in study 2 when the stimuli 
were predictive of an aversive outcome the response to avoid this outcome was reduced 
but the PIT effect was maintained. This is also in agreement with certain theories that 
hypothesise serotonin (reduced under tryptophan depletion procedures) is involved in 
punishment prediction, but not reward (Daw, et al., 2002). Negative mood has been 
extensively linked to serotonin (Cools, et al., 2005) and negative mood induction has 
also been shown to increase salivary cortisol (Brown, Sirota, Niaura, & Engebretson, 
1993). The link between serotonin and motivation and impulsivity is well established 
(Cools, et al., 2005) such that a reduction in serotonin is linked to a reduction in 
motivated actions, and can lead to a reduction in reward seeking behaviour. It is 
therefore possible that state negative mood is linked to a decrease in motivation more 
generally and thus motivation is reduced when the outcome is to avoid punishment and 
also to gain reward in the natural environment, but is dissociated from the expectancy 
knowledge of that same reward, and also prediction error. Our results indicate that the 
observed reduction in motivation is driven by an attenuated sensitivity to the reward 
itself, such that the reward is devalued, and not a reduction of the impact of the 
conditioned signals as expectancy was maintained (Rogers, et al., 2003). The reduction 
in motivation to gain reward demonstrated in the present study may provide an insight 
in to treating drug addiction and is also relevant for the link between depression and 
cognitive impairment. The data may also demonstrate a possible link between current 
mood state and reward value. The present findings, although in a non-clinical sample, 
indicate this is likely. 
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Paper 2: Pavlovian-instrumental transfer in humans is sensitive to changes in 
probability and current value of reward 
 
Abstract 
Pavlovian conditioning endows reward-associated stimuli with the ability to modulate 
goal-directed actions for that same reward (Pavlovian-Instrumental transfer; PIT). The 
present study examined in humans the extent to which PIT is affected by changes in the 
value of the outcome. Participants initially learned to discriminate three visual stimuli, 
A, B and C, predicting the occurrence of monetary reward (10 pence) with 90%, 50% or 
10% probability, respectively. Next, the value of the outcome was either devalued (by 
means of a separate High-win or Low-win task) or remained unchanged. Following a 
phase of instrumental training, in which responding yielded 10p with a 50% probability 
on a VI schedule of reinforcement, a transfer test was conducted during which the 
Pavlovian cues were presented non-contingent on instrumental responding. The change 
of reward value affected the rigor of instrumental performance and abolished the PIT 
effect. However, the same changes in outcome value did not affect the expectancy of or 
emotional reactivity to the cues. These data suggest that in Pavlovian learning, apart 
from the nature of outcomes, the value of outcomes is encoded such that changes in 
outcome value prevent transfer of a Pavlovian cue’s incentive properties to alter goal-
directed action. 
Key words: learning, human, devaluation, addiction, attention 
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Introduction 
Like non-human animals, humans readily acquire simple Pavlovian stimulus-outcome 
(S-O) associations when neutral stimuli in the environment are repeatedly paired with 
biologically significant outcomes (e.g., rewards) in the laboratory (Everitt, et al., 2003; 
Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Hogarth & Chase, 2012). Similarly, human subjects will 
acquire simple instrumental action-outcome (A-O) associations when outcomes are 
presented contingent on performance of a simple (operant) response (Dickinson, 2001). 
Though typically studied separately, and psychologically and neurobiologically 
dissociable (Everitt, et al., 2008; Everitt, et al., 2003; Everitt, et al., 2001; Everitt, et al., 
2007; Everitt & Robbins, 2005), it is now well established that S-O and A-O 
associations may interact to control motivated behaviour such that Pavlovian cues can 
modulate instrumental or goal-directed action (Hogarth, et al., 2005). For instance, in 
Pavlovian-Instrumental Transfer (PIT) nominal reward-associated cues can be shown to 
maintain and potentiate on-going instrumental performance when presented non-
response-contingently and in the absence of primary reward. 
Since Estes’ (Gutman & Estes, 1949) first demonstration of PIT, the phenomenon has 
been reproduced in several animal species, including rats (e.g. Colwill & Rescorla, 
1990; Lovibond, 1983, etc), mice (O'Connor, Stephens, & Crombag, 2010) and more 
recently in humans (Bray, et al., 2008; Hogarth, et al., 2007; Talmi, et al., 2008). An 
important focus of these and other investigations has been identifying the underlying 
psychological and neurobiological mechanisms, as well as understanding the conditions 
and variables that determine the magnitude and nature of PIT. For example, we (Trick, 
et al., 2011) recently reported, using a variation of an outcome-selective PIT procedure, 
in which the probabilities of an aversive outcome delivery were varied, that the 
magnitude of transfer is closely linked to outcome prediction (90% > 50% > 10%). 
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Interestingly, this “negative” transfer effect on performance was dissociable from 
attentional bias to the Pavlovian conditioned cues. 
Apart from being a useful procedure to study the basic psychological and 
neurobiological mechanisms by which S-O and A-O based learning interact in the 
laboratory, many “day-to-day” motivated actions are regulated through PIT-like 
mechanisms. Moreover, PIT is thought to play a role in promoting maladaptive 
behaviours including excessive overeating (Galarce, Crombag, & Holland, 2007) or 
addiction to drugs of abuse (Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009; Everitt, et al., 
2001). Thus, environmental cues associated with drug taking (e.g. drug paraphernalia, 
location of consumption etc.) may maintain and promote compulsive drug-seeking and 
trigger relapse through PIT-like processes (Berridge, et al., 2009; Crombag, Bossert, 
Koya, & Shaham, 2008; Everitt, et al., 2001; Glautier, et al., 1994). 
Nonetheless, the precise mechanisms by which Pavlovian and instrumental learning 
processes interact to promote motivated action in general, or drug seeking and taking in 
particular, are very much a subject of debate. One hypothesis states that cue-elicited 
drug seeking is a manifestation of goal-directed action, driven by a mental 
representation of the contingency between response and outcome (Holland, 2007; 
Olmstead, et al., 2001). Alternatively, Tiffany (1990) proposes that addict’s drug taking 
reflects a shift of control from instrumental A-O to habitual stimulus-response (S-R) 
associations (Tiffany, 1990; Tiffany & Drobes, 1990), whereby, once the S-R 
association has been established, the conditioned cue alone is capable of eliciting a 
(conditioned) drug seeking response, in the absence of conscious retrieval of any 
outcome expectancies. 
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A ‘litmus test’ for the existence for such S-R habits is the ‘resistance to devaluation’ 
procedure to demonstrate that changes in outcome value (e.g., by pairing the outcome 
with experimentally-induced, e.g., systemic lithium chloride injections, malaise) are not 
reflected in changes in performance. Conversely, if performance is goal-directed it 
would be expected to decrease or discontinue following outcome devaluation, 
presumably because the reduction in goal-value would render it inadequate to motivate 
behaviour. 
From the animal literature it becomes apparent that transfer effects are typically 
resistant to devaluation (e.g. Holland, 2004; Rescorla, 1994,aetc) and thus that PIT 
performance is not mediated by the expected incentive value of the outcome. Thus, 
Rescorla (1994) notes that Pavlovian cue-activated representations incorporate the 
sensory aspects of the outcome (S-O associations) learned during Pavlovian training to 
activate the response (O-R associations) irrespective of the current value of the 
outcome. 
On the other hand, recent findings from studies on PIT in humans are less consistent. 
Whereas Allman et al, (2010) showed that outcome specific transfer can be modulated 
by altering the current value of the reinforcer, other studies (Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & 
Chase, 2011) showed no effect of devaluation on performance. One obvious account for 
these differences is that these studies differed in the way they ran the PIT and 
devaluation procedure. Allman, et al. (2010) used a scenario-based procedure in which 
participants, during the Pavlovian training phase, learned that companies (presented by 
their logos) were using either Hong Kong or US dollars as their currencies, after which 
they were informed that one of the currencies used had become worthless (devalued). 
Hogarth 2012 (Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011), on the other hand, used as 
conditioned stimuli pictorial representations of the reinforcers (cigarette or chocolate), 
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to which participants had (presumably) been exposed extensively prior to the 
experiment, and used selective satiation to devalue the reinforcers. 
The present experiment used an implicit (between task) reward devaluation procedure 
and a probability-based Pavlovian conditioning procedure [similar to the aversive one 
used by us previously in Trick, et al., (2011)] to examine further the conditions under 
which current reinforcer value can modify PIT. In this procedure Pavlovian cues predict 
reward with different degrees of uncertainty (90%, 50% or 10%) and develop the ability 
to activate performance in accordance with the probability or level of uncertainty by 
which the reinforcer previously occurred. Introduction of such predictive uncertainty 
during Pavlovian conditioning may be a critical determinant of the qualitative nature, 
the underlying neurobiological mechanisms, and the behavioural consequences of 
associative learning (Anselme, Robinson, & Berridge, 2013; Davey & Cleland, 1982; 
Fiorillo, et al., 2003; Linnet et al., 2012) and, we predict, of the sensitivity of 
performance to changes in value of the reward.   
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Seventy-eight healthy subjects (40 females), who were verified as not taking medication 
using a medical health questionnaire, were recruited. Ethical approval was obtained 
from The University of Sussex ethics committee, and the study run in accordance with 
the Declaration of Helsinki. All subjects were required to give written informed consent 
prior to participation and were informed that they could withdraw at any time. At the 
end of the experiment the subjects were fully debriefed and compensated for their time 
with £15 in addition to their earnings in the experiment. Subjects were asked to attend 
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the laboratory on a single occasion and instructed to abstain from alcohol for twelve 
hours, and from anything high in caffeine immediately before, the test session.  
Tasks 
The tasks were presented on a 20” Dell P1130 monitor (Dell Inc, Berkshire, UK) and 
programmed using E-prime v1.1 software (Psychology Software Tools Inc.; Pittsburgh, 
PA). The 4 visual stimuli used (see figure 1) were black patterns displayed on a grey 
background, 10.2cm squared at a resolution of 1280 x 1024.  Text font and size were 
Times New Roman 25pt. Participant responses were collected via a Cherry mini 
keyboard (Pleasant Prairie, WI) with the shift and space keys labelled in green, and the 
top row of numeric keys labelled (1-9) also in green. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Materials used during the computerised task throughout the PIT procedure; 
the four visual stimuli assigned to A, B, C and X in a counterbalanced fashion 
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Procedure 
The procedure was adapted from one previously described (Trick, et al., 2011) and 
consisted of the following phases: 
Pavlovian discrimination training phase: During the initial Pavlovian training phase 
participants received repeated trials during which 1 of 3 different visual compound cues 
were presented (AX, BX or CX) that predicted the occurrence of a reward (gain of 10 
pence) with a 90%, 50% or 10% probability, respectively.  Thus, like (Hogarth, 
Dickinson, Austin, Brown, & Duka, 2008b) the target cues informing the trial outcome 
were presented in compound with a common stimulus X (Wagner, 1969). Attention for 
the concurrently presented cues A, B and C was assessed by measuring the time that 
participants spent observing the stimuli (see below). The 4 images that made up stimuli 
A, B, C and X were counterbalanced across participants. 
Each trial started with a fixation cross appearing in the centre of the screen. Once the 
participant pressed the space bar the fixation cross turned yellow. At this point 
participants pressed and held the shift key, which removed the cross and presented 1 of 
the 3 stimulus pairs, with the individual images located 10.5cm on either side of the 
fixation cross location. The stimulus-pair remained on screen for as long as the shift key 
was pressed, thereby providing a measure of observation time. Once the shift key was 
released and the stimulus-pair vanished, the expectancy question “How likely is the win 
of 10p: 1 = unlikely 5 = don't know 9 = likely”, was displayed in the centre of the 
screen. Participants answered this question by pressing a green number key between 1 
and 9, providing outcome expectancy ratings. Following the outcome expectancy 
response, the screen display turned grey for 5 sec and during the last 4 sec of this period 
the reward outcome was presented.  On trials where the reward outcomes was “You 
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gain 10p”, participants transferred 10p to their “My Money” tin. The Pavlovian training 
phase consisted of 120 trials, arranged in 2 blocks of 60 trials and the trials within each 
block were randomised for type (AX, BX, CX) and stimulus location (left, right of 
fixation cross location), and stimulus location was balanced across trials with and 
without the outcome. Critically, the rewarding outcome occurred in 90% of AX trials 
(18/20), in 50% of BX trials (10/20) and 10% of CX trials (2/20).  
Outcome revaluation phase: Following Pavlovian S-O training, participants underwent 
an outcome-revaluation manipulation akin to the selective satiation procedures used in 
non-human subject devaluation studies (Holland, 2004; Rescorla, 1994a).  To this end, 
participants assigned to the revaluation condition received the following instructions: 
“You will now take a break from the task and play a card game. Each round will begin 
with the presentation of 5 cards. You must choose one of these cards by pressing a 
green number key 1 - 5. Every time you pick a black card you will win £1. You will get 
14 chances to choose a card. At the end you will be told how much you have won in 
total. Press the space bar to begin.”  
Participants were next presented with five cards placed face-down and selected each 
card using a keyboard number key. Participants were pre-determined to win either £2 
(low win) or £12 (high-win) and were given a bag of fourteen £1 coins to transfer the 
winnings to their “My Money” tin. 
Participants assigned to the control or (maintained) condition received the following 
instructions: 
 “You will now take a break from the task and play a card game. Each round will begin 
with the presentation of 5 cards. You must choose one of these cards by pressing a 
green number key 1 - 5. You will get 14 chances to choose a card. See how many black 
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(counterbalanced with red) cards you pick. Press the space bar to begin.” All 
participants were pre-determined to select seven black cards and seven red. 
Instrumental training: Participants were next trained to acquire an instrumental response 
(pressing the keyboard spacebar) during 12 trials of training. To this end, participants 
were asked on each trial to press and hold down the shift key in order to be presented 
with two blank grey squares and to release the shift key in order to give their outcome 
expectancy ratings. Participants were instructed that repeatedly pressing the spacebar 
during the interval following the expectancy question would sometimes lead to a reward 
(earning 10p). The reward outcome was scheduled to occur automatically on 25% of 
trials, irrespective of the subject’s response. A further 25% of rewarded trials were 
possible by making a key press during the variable 1-sec window leading up to the 
scheduled time of the outcome (this one second window occurred at a variable time 
during the interval following the expectancy question and the scheduled time of the 
outcome). Consequently, the maximum rewarded trials could be 50% of all trials (25% 
were always rewarded).  
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer: The transfer test followed the same design as the 
instrumental training phase except that the compound cues established during Pavlovian 
discrimination training (AX, BX, CX) were presented randomly intermixed with the 
blank grey square trials, with equal proportions (16 trials each), over 64 trials. The 
reward outcome was scheduled for 25% of all trials, with a further 25% possible if 
instrumental responding was performed effectively. The outcome contingencies 
available during Pavlovian training were not available during the test for transfer. The 
number of instrumental responses (space bar presses) made during the time window was 
recorded and the window was matched for trials in which the reward was and was not 
scheduled. 
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Evaluative conditioning 
At the end of the transfer test, the affective evaluation of the Pavlovian cues was 
recorded to provide an alternative assay of conditioning. Participants were presented 
with the individual stimuli A, B, C, or X, in random order, and answered the questions 
“How anxious does this picture make you?” and “How pleasant do you find this 
picture?”. Evaluative responses were again recorded on a scale from 1-9 where 1 = not 
at all and 9 = extremely.  
Statistical analysis 
Pavlovian training: Data from the Pavlovian training and transfer phases were analysed 
separately and results from the ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ participants were also analysed 
separately. Expectancy ratings and observation times were analysed using mixed 
ANOVAs with the between-factor revaluation Condition (3 levels; high-win, low-win, 
control) and within-factors Trial (3 level; AX, BX, CX) and Block (2 levels; block 1, 
block 2). Where appropriate, this was followed by Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests 
unless noted otherwise. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used where required. 
Transfer phase: The Pavlovian transfer effects on instrumental performance were 
analysed as above except that the factor Trial had four levels, namely AX, BX, CX, and 
Blank. Additionally, to simplify reporting of the key findings and because no interesting 
effects or interactions were evident, the Block variable was excluded from the analysis 
where appropriate. 
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Results 
Awareness of contingencies; aware and unaware group 
As in our previous studies, a number of participants (30 out of 78) failed to successfully 
acquire the Pavlovian (stimulus-outcome) associations. Thus, each participant’s 
expectancy ratings as a function of trial type (AX, BX and CX) during Pavlovian 
training trials (2nd block, 20 ratings/trial type) were analysed using one-way, within-
subjects ANOVAs. A participant was designated as ‘aware’ if there was a significant 
effect of trial type, and the direction of his/her expectancy ratings was veridical with the 
programmed Pavlovian contingencies (i.e., AX>BX>CX). The awareness criteria 
bisected participants who ranged on a continuum of predictive knowledge, rather than 
participants falling on a step function of predictive knowledge (Lieberman, Sunnucks, 
& Kirk, 1998b). The criteria therefore isolated participants who achieved the greatest 
predictive knowledge as a function of Pavlovian training.  The 48 participants, 
determined to be “aware”, were assigned to the ‘high win’ (n = 16; 8 females), ‘low 
win’ (n = 16; 8 females) or ‘control’ (n = 16; 9 females) conditions. Biographical data 
collected from ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ participants in the 3 experimental conditions are 
shown in table 1; no significant differences were found. 
	   	  
129 
 
Table 1 
Characteristics of the high win, low win and control conditions (BIS; Barratt Impulsivity Scale) 
Characteristic High win Low win Control 
 Aware Aware Aware 
Sex ratio M=8;F=8 M=8;F=8 M=7;F=9 
Years of age (mean) 22.1 (SD=2.4) 21.8 (SD=3.7) 22.4 (SD=3.0) 
Cigarettes smoked per day (mean) 2.4 (SD=5.5) 2.2 (SD=4.1) 1.3 (SD=3.9) 
BDI (mean) 2.8 (SD=3.5) 6.1 (SD=8.5) 3.4 (SD=3.2) 
BIS factor 1 (mean) 15.9 (SD=3.2) 18.1 (SD=5.4) 15.9 (SD=3.0) 
BIS factor 2 (mean) 23.5 (SD=4.1) 23.1 (SD=5.0) 23.7 (SD=3.8) 
BIS factor 3 (mean) 23.5 (SD=4.8) 23.8 (SD=4.9) 22.1 (SD=3.6) 
 Unaware Unaware Unaware 
Sex ratio M=4;F=1 M=7;F=6 M=4;F=8 
Years of age (mean) 21.8 (SD=2.4) 22.9 (SD=3.0) 21.8 (SD=2.9) 
Cigarettes smoked per day (mean) 0 (SD=0) .4 (SD=.7) 2.2 (SD=3.2) 
BDI (mean) 3.2 (SD=3.1) 6.1 (SD=4.8) 9.3 (SD=11.0) 
BIS factor 1 (mean) 15.2 (SD=2.4) 18.6 (SD=4.4) 17.7 (SD=3.7) 
BIS factor 2 (mean) 23 (SD=4.1) 27.0 (SD=5.5) 23.3 (SD=4.6) 
BIS factor 3 (mean) 26.8 (SD=1.5) 26.1 (SD=4.7) 24.3 (SD=4.0) 
Total number of participants 21 (16 Aware) 29 (16 Aware) 28 (16 Aware) 
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The data from the ‘aware’ group were next analysed to confirm the co-occurrence of 
predictive knowledge and conditioned responding during transfer (Hogarth & Duka, 
2006a; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002a). Data from ‘unaware’ participants (n=30) are shown 
tabulated in table 2. 
Table 2 
Data from unaware participants (n=30; 15 females; conditions collapsed) 
 Mean Standard deviation 
Pavlovian Training Phase   
Training Expectancy (1-9) – AX 5.18 1.61 
Training Expectancy (1-9) – BX 5.73 1.34 
Training Expectancy (1-9) – CX 5.31 1.28 
Training Observing times (ms) – AX 1907.68 1001.07 
Training Observing times (ms) – BX 1869.56 971.29 
Training Observing times (ms) – CX 1926.92 995.33 
Transfer Phase   
Transfer Expectancy (1-9) – AX 5.40 1.73 
Transfer Expectancy (1-9) – BX 5.91 1.62 
Transfer Expectancy (1-9) – CX 5.49 1.81 
Transfer Observing times (ms) – AX 1368.84 807.90 
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Transfer Observing times (ms) – BX 1104.88 651.32 
Transfer Observing times (ms) – CX 1480.30 885.69 
Transfer number of responses – AX 10.19 8.21 
Transfer number of responses – BX 10.29 8.04 
Transfer number of responses – CX 10.18 7.75 
Transfer number of responses – Blank 11.20 8.09 
Evaluative conditioning   
Anxiety rating (1-9) – A 2.33 1.63 
Anxiety rating (1-9) – B 3.00 2.17 
Anxiety rating (1-9) – C 3.33 2.34 
Anxiety rating (1-9) – X 2.60 1.83 
Pleasantness rating (1-9) – A 5.80 2.47 
Pleasantness rating (1-9) – B 5.87 1.98 
Pleasantness rating (1-9) – C 4.17 2.55 
Pleasantness rating (1-9) – X 5.50 2.53 
 
Expectancy ratings  
Training phase: As expected, for ‘aware’ participants, the expectancy ratings for the 
monetary outcome (10p) were higher for AX trials compared to BX or CX trials, and 
the lowest expectancy ratings were given for the CX trials (main effect of trial type, 
F(2, 94) = 147.91, partial η2 = .759, p < .001; figure 2a). Unaware participants did not 
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show differential expectancy ratings across trials (F(1.43, 41.54) = 2.29, partial η2 = 
.073, p = .073 (table 2). 
Transfer phase: The aware group’s differential expectancies were maintained into the 
transfer test (a significant main effect of trial type, F(1.73, 81.21) = 32.09, partial η2 = 
.406, p < .001; figure 2b).  The unaware group showed no main effect of trial type, 
F(1.43, 41.44) = 1.39, partial η2 = .046, p = .256. There was no effect of revaluation 
condition on expectancy ratings of aware or unaware subjects during the transfer test. 
	   	   	  
(a) (b) 
Figure 2: Mean expectancy ratings following the presentation of trials AX, BX, CX 
during Pavlovian training (a) and Transfer phase (b) for aware participants. No 
differences were observed between the conditions and the data were therefore collapsed 
generating n=48 per bar graphically represented. Error bars represent standard error 
(SE) of mean. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. 
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type, F(1.64, 76.91) = 19.77, partial η2 = .296, p < .001; figure 3a).  This result 
replicated previous findings by Hogarth et al (2008) and further demonstrates that 
observing time is a sensitive index of the uncertainty of outcome-predictive Pavlovian 
cues. There was no significant trial effect for unaware participants, F(2, 58) = .600, 
partial η2 = .020, p = .552. 
Transfer phase: By contrast, during transfer, BX observing times were shorter 
compared to AX and CX for both ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ participants (effects of trial 
type, F(2, 94) = 17.99, partial η2 = .277, p < .001 and F(1.60, 46.31) = 8.46, partial η2 = 
.226, p = .002, respectively; figure 3b and table 2). There were no significant effects of 
revaluation condition on observing time during the test for transfer for aware or 
unaware subjects. 
   
	   	    (a)     (b)  
Figure 3: Mean observing times (ms) for trials AX, BX, CX during the Pavlovian 
training (a) and the transfer phase (b) for aware participants. No differences were 
observed between the conditions and the data were therefore collapsed generating 
n=48 per bar graphically represented. Error bars represent SE of mean. * = p < 0.05, 
** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. 
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 Instrumental performance 
Transfer phase: The group which had experienced high-wins during the revaluation 
task, showed low number of responses (significant main effect of condition F(2, 45) = 
9.88, p < .001; figure 4). A marginal PIT effect was also found (main effect of trial type 
(F(2.60, 116.78) = 2.72, p = .055). Importantly, an interaction between trial type and 
condition which approached significance (F(6, 135) = 2.08, p = .05) was explained by a 
higher number of responses in the presence of AX trials compared to CX trials in the 
control group but not in either of the revalued groups (figure 4). No significant trial 
effect was found for the unaware participants, F(2.47, 5.49) = 0.394, p = .719; see table 
2. 
 
Figure 4: Mean instrumental responses following presentation of trials AX, BX, CX and 
blank trials during the Transfer phase for aware participants for each condition (n=16 
per condition). Error bars represent SE of mean. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p 
< 0.001. 
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We further explored the transfer effect for each condition (stimulus by condition 
interaction) for trial blocks 1 and 2 separately, as previous studies in our lab 
(unpublished data) typically show small performance decrements (extinction) as 
(transfer) test sessions progress. A significant stimulus by condition interaction effect 
was found for block 1 (F(4.47, 100.50) = 4.03, p = <0.01), explained by a transfer effect 
by participants in the control condition but not the conditions in which the outcomes 
were revalued (figures 5a and b). By contrast, and as expected, there was no significant 
interaction between stimulus and condition during block 2 (F(4.88, 107.45) = 0.518, p = 
.760). 
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(b) 
Figure 5: Mean instrumental responses following presentation of trials AX, BX, CX and 
blank trials during the Transfer phase for aware participants for each condition (n=16 
per condition), and separately for block 1 (a) and block 2 (b). Error bars represent SE 
of mean. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. 
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Emotional conditioning 
Analysis of emotional ratings by ‘aware’ subjects (figures 6 a and b) taken immediately 
following the test for transfer indicated that these subjects rated stimulus A (90% 
predictability) as significantly more pleasant than all other stimuli, including the 
“ubiquitous” stimulus X (figure 6a). Thus, a main effect of stimulus (F(2.57, 118.26) = 
26.26, p < .001) was followed by significant (p < 0.05) post-hoc comparisons. 
Additionally, stimulus C (10% predictability) was rated as less pleasant than either 
stimulus B (50% predictability) or X. Interestingly, also unaware subjects showed a 
preference for stimulus A as supported by a significant effect of stimulus (F(3, 87) = 
4.24, p = .009) and post-hoc analysis (table 2).  
 
(a)     (b)  
Figure 6: Mean emotional ratings for each stimulus - A, B, C and for the common 
stimulus X in the compound. Error bars represent SE of mean. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 
0.01, *** = p < 0.001. 
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Inspection and analysis of the anxiety ratings by aware subjects (figure 6b) revealed 
almost the mirror image of the pleasantness ratings.  Thus, a significant effects of 
stimulus (F(2.34, 106.98) = 9.86, p < .001) indicated that anxiety ratings were inversely 
related to the level of outcome predictability such that stimulus A yielded significantly 
lower anxiety ratings than stimuli B or C; but no difference was seen between stimulus 
A and X.  Finally, there was no effect of stimulus on ratings of anxiety for unaware 
participants (F(3, 87) = 2.01, p = .119; table 2). Finally, no significant effects of 
revaluation condition were seen on pleasantness or anxiety ratings (data not shown). 
 
Discussion 
The present study explored whether simple Pavlovian (S-O) conditioning and transfer of 
a Pavlovian cue’s motivational effects on instrumental (A-O-mediated) performance are 
sensitive to variations in the level of uncertainly of the Pavlovian association and/or the 
value of the outcome at the time of testing.  
Pavlovian conditioning 
As reported by us elsewhere (Austin & Duka, 2010, 2012), the present results show that 
successful Pavlovian training generated differential expectations about the probability 
of the reward outcome in AX, BX and CX trials. Specifically, both during the Pavlovian 
training phase and the transfer test (when these contingencies were no longer 
reinforced), decreases in the predictability of the rewarding outcome from 90%, to 50% 
and 10% produced a greater decline in expectancy rating in subjects deemed ‘aware’ of 
the contingencies. Moreover, as anticipated by e.g., Pearce and Hall’s model of 
associative learning (Pearce & Hall, 1980), attention to the cues (observing times) was 
linked with the level of uncertainty, such that during Pavlovian training, observing 
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times were greatest during BX stimulus trials (the 50% uncertain predictor) compared to 
stimulus trials that were highly predictive of reward (90%) or non-reward (10%) 
(Hogarth, Dickinson, et al., 2008b).  
However, different from the expectancy ratings that show the same pattern during 
conditioning and transfer, observing times were reversed (relative to training) during the 
transfer test such that attention to BX was reduced below the levels during AX and CX 
trials.  These results in fact agree with our previous data (Trick, et al., 2011), suggesting 
that the increase in observing time during BX trials might be related to prediction error. 
That is, while during the AX and CX trials on the test for transfer the contingencies 
changed from 90% or 10%, to 50%, respectively, they remained the same during BX 
trials when training and test contingencies remained at 50%.  
Somewhat unexpected, we found that even participants who were unaware of the 
contingencies based on expectancy ratings, showed an attentional bias to the stimuli in 
the same direction as aware subjects. These findings suggest then that certain 
mechanism(s) (perhaps prediction error) may guide attentional processes implicitly and 
outside of conscious awareness.  
In addition to expectancy ratings and observation time varying as a function of how 
well the cue predicted the presence or absence of reward, subsequent emotional ratings 
of the cues were as expected. Thus, subjects’ pleasantness ratings were highest for 
stimulus A (which predicted reward 90% of the time), lowest for stimulus C (which 
predicted reward 10% of the time i.e., the absence of reward 90% of the time) with 
stimulus B yielding intermediate ratings. Likewise, anxiety ratings followed a similar 
(but mirror-imaged) pattern. Note that the “ubiquitous” stimulus X acquired similar 
140 
 
emotional significance as stimulus B as they both denote a 50% contingency with the 
outcome. 
Performance transfer 
More critically, the present study demonstrates that the current value of reward is 
important for the strength by which a referent cue can increase instrumental 
performance to obtain that same reward. 
In the control condition (i.e., when reward value was maintained), the number of 
instrumental responses during each trial of the transfer test, increased linearly in 
accordance with the expectancies of the outcome learned during Pavlovian 
discrimination training, such that AX>BX>CX, both for instrumental performance 
(responses) and expectancy ratings. Taken together these data support our previous 
findings (Trick, et al., 2011) to demonstrate that the Pavlovian-instrumental transfer 
effect is related to explicit knowledge of the probability/uncertainty of the rewarding 
outcome. 
Moreover, we now demonstrate that when reward was devalued by allowing 
participants to earn a greater (high-win) amount of money reward (relative to the task), 
the instrumental performance was markedly reduced and the transfer effect was 
abolished. Additionally, when subjects were experienced with winning a much lower 
amount, overall instrumental performance was elevated in comparison to either control 
or high-win conditions and the transfer effect was also absent in this condition. Thus it 
seems that when the reward value becomes reduced it can also abolish the differential 
response to cues by leading to an overall increase in behavioural output, perhaps in an 
attempt to increase gains “at any cost” (i.e. even in the presence of the stimulus 
associated with the absence of reward – stimulus C). 
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However, the expectancy ratings with regard to reward outcome in each trial remained 
unchanged across the different revaluation conditions indicating that explicit knowledge 
of the outcome does not influence the behaviour under conditions when the reward 
value has changed. Similarly, attentional processing of the predictive cues seemed also 
to take place irrespective of the current reward value of the outcome. Thus it seems that 
the current value of the reward only modulated the instrumental performance for 
reward. 
Taken together then the results suggest that the transfer performance effect relies on the 
current value of the reward outcome and that this can be dissociated from the 
knowledge of the outcome the referent cues predict and from the attention allocated to 
them (Trick, et al., 2011). These data suggest that the current reward value is a critical 
contributor to reward-seeking behaviour and that the predictive cues under such 
conditions of reward value changes lose the power to motivate behaviour, as shown 
here in the control condition and in previous studies where the current value of the 
reward was not changed (Hogarth, et al., 2009a; Hogarth, et al., 2007). 
Our data contradict those from animal studies previously showing that PIT is immune to 
devaluation manipulations (e.g. Holland, 2004) but are in accordance with some 
previous research in humans using devaluation techniques in PIT (Allman, et al., 2010). 
Perhaps most critically, our findings seem inconsistent with Hogarth & Chase (2011) 
who, like us, used abstract stimuli to train Pavlovian associations with the reinforcer 
outcomes in the lab. However, while we used novel stimuli, Hogarth & Chase (2011) 
used pictures of smoking and chocolate, which have naturally undergone extensive 
Pavlovian training. It is possible that such strong associations with certain outcomes in 
the case of smoking- and chocolate pictures are activating habit-like responses to obtain 
the reinforcer that are more resistant to devaluation manipulations. 
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It is interesting that the attentional processing (observing time) of the stimuli was 
unaffected by the changes in outcome value, whilst remaining sensitive to the 
differences in predictability of the outcomes (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980). 
The dissociation between attentional processing and behavioural performance is in line 
with our previous study showing that blocking attention allocation to conditioned 
stimuli does not influence the instrumental response to receive the reward predicted by 
this stimulus (Hogarth, Dickinson, Janowski, et al., 2008) 
These results provide convergent evidence that the mechanisms underlying attention 
allocation to reward-associated cues are psychologically dissociable from those 
involved in the motivation to seek the reward. Recent findings in rats demonstrate that 
they are neurobiologically separable as well.  Thus, Flagel et al. (2010) using fast-scan 
cyclic voltammetry, studied the pattern of dopamine signalling in the nucleus 
accumbens of rats that developed either sign-tracking or goal-tracking responses in a 
lever-based Pavlovian (‘autoshaping’) task. Whilst dopamine was closely linked with 
the expression of sign-tracking performance, goal-tracking was not. Thus, much in line 
with the present findings, the authors were able to demonstrate a dissociation (at the 
neurobiological level and in the form of dopamine) between the predictive, attention-
grabbing qualities of conditioned, reward-predicting cues, and their ability to incentivise 
performance. In light of our results showing sensitivity of transfer performance, but not 
attentional bias, to manipulations of value, a prediction is that cue-motivated sign-
tracking, but not discriminative goal-tracking performance is dependent on and sensitive 
to dynamic changes in outcome value. 
In conclusion, our findings provide novel insights into the psychological underpinnings 
of motivated performance and specifically, the role of learned Pavlovian (incentive) 
cues in modulating or ‘spurring-on’ instrumental actions in humans. Such insights are 
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not only relevant to understanding ‘every day’ motivation in humans, but also for 
understanding human conditions where, motivational processing goes awry as in the 
case of drug addiction. Though at odds regarding the nature of the underlying 
motivational or emotional states, most contemporary (neuro)psychological theories of 
addiction (e.g. Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Koob & Le Moal, 1997; T. E. Robinson & 
Berridge, 1993, etc) agree and emphasize that Pavlovian associative learning processes 
contribute to the maintenance of drug taking and relapse susceptibility, and therefore 
provide a fruitful target for intervention strategies. The emerging evidence, including 
the present findings, go some way towards making the point that whilst understanding 
the mechanisms that lead to associative memories being formed is of value, additional 
and better understanding of the consequences for behaviour is essential.   
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Paper 3: Does positive mood enhance the incentive salience of conditioned stimuli? 
 
Abstract 
Rationale The association between mood and motivation remains an important question. 
In particular, the effects of positive mood are less well understood and are, in this study, 
examined in a general Pavlovian-to-Instrumental transfer design in the presence of 
aversive outcomes. 
Objective The aim of the present study was to investigate the effects of experimentally 
induced positive mood on the likelihood and vigour of an instrumental response that is 
trained to lead to an avoidance of a predicted aversive outcome. 
Materials and methods Forty-two healthy volunteers took part in the study and split into 
neutral or positive mood induction conditions. A Pavlovian training schedule was used 
in which three compound stimuli AX, BX, CX predicted an outcome of an aversive 
noise on 90%, 50% and 10% of presentations respectively. This was followed by a 
mood induction procedure, a short phase of instrumental training and finally, transfer 
performed under nominal extinction. 
Results Responses recorded by aware participants for both expectancy ratings and 
observation times for AX, BX and CX trials were matched for both experimental groups 
during Pavlovian training (prior to the mood induction procedure). Self-reported mood 
was successfully manipulated and observational patterns and expectancy ratings 
towards the stimuli remained unchanged by the mood condition into the transfer test. 
During the transfer test a significant stimuli by condition interaction was observed (F(3, 
90) = 3.96, η2 = .117, p < .05), such that participants who underwent positive mood 
induction produced differential responses (reduced responses in AX trials and increased 
150 
 
responses during CX trials) to those in the neutral mood condition, reducing the PIT 
effect. 
Conclusions Positive mood state differentially affects observational/attentional and 
motivational responses to predictive Pavlovian stimuli. 
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Introduction 
Through associative learning mechanisms, representations can be formed between 
stimuli in the environment and reward/aversive outcomes (Everitt, et al., 2003; Everitt 
& Robbins, 2005); this is often preceded by an instrumental response (Hogarth, et al., 
2005; Hogarth, Dickinson, Hutton, Elbers, et al., 2006) to gain reward or avoid 
punishment and once a predictive associative relationship is established the stimuli 
become able to influence the instrumental response (Hogarth, et al., 2005). As such the 
stimuli in the environment acquire incentive properties (Everitt & Robbins, 2005), 
attract attention and drive the seeking/avoidance behaviour (Hogarth, et al., 2005). This 
association is often studied utilising Pavlovian-to-Instrumental transfer (PIT) (i.e. 
Allman, et al., 2010; Corbit, Janak, & Balleine, 2007; Hogarth, Dickinson, Hutton, 
Bamborough, et al., 2006; Talmi, et al., 2008; Trick, et al., 2011) as in the present study. 
Both learning and motivational theories attempt to describe the underlying effect of the 
stimuli on seeking behaviour. Learning theories suggest that the presence of the stimuli 
activates mental representations of the outcome and thus drives the behaviour (e.g. 
Hogarth, et al., 2005; Hogarth, Dickinson, Hutton, Bamborough, et al., 2006; Hogarth, 
Dickinson, Hutton, Elbers, et al., 2006, etc); in contrast motivational theories suggest 
the presence of the stimuli increases motivation more generally and thus drives the 
instrumental behaviour (Everitt, et al., 2008). The interaction between mood and 
learning (Finger, et al., 2007), motivation (Cools, et al., 2005) and behaviour (Cools, 
Roberts, et al., 2008) is well established, and previous studies in our laboratory have 
demonstrated an effect of induced negative mood on PIT most likely through these 
mechanisms. The present study was interested in the effect of, the lesser-studied, 
induced state positive mood on motivation and attention. 
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Various studies in which attentional bias for both certain and uncertain stimuli has been 
monitored show that contingency knowledge is required for the stimuli/outcome 
association to be learned (Hogarth, et al., 2005). Expectancy must also be coupled with 
an appetitive emotional response that is indicative of the biological value of the 
outcome (Hogarth & Duka, 2006a). However, it has also been demonstrated that a 
positive attentional bias for the stimulus is not essential for establishment of an 
instrumental response (Hogarth, Dickinson, Janowski, et al., 2008) and thus an 
impulsive aspect could be considered. As negative mood has long been implicated in 
impulsive behaviours (Clark, et al., 2005; L. Clark, et al., 2001; Dayan & Huys, 2008; 
O. Robinson, et al., 2009) it would be interesting to observe the effects of positive mood 
on impulsivity, and therefore the present study aimed to address this. The 
aforementioned studies demonstrate a level of uncertainty in the way in which 
attentional bias is affected by increasing knowledge of the outcome of the predictor 
(Hogarth, Dickinson, et al., 2008a; Hogarth, Dickinson, Janowski, et al., 2008). 
However, the role of expectancy appears more defined and the effect of risk and 
ambiguity may also play a role in learning (Schultz, et al., 2008b). It seems possible that 
expectancy and attentional bias may not be directly linked (Hogarth, Dickinson, et al., 
2008a) and it is possible to demonstrate this dissociation using PIT (Trick, et al., 2011). 
It is interesting to study the effect positive mood may have on this phenomenon, and 
therefore further investigate the link positive mood may have on these associations in 
the naturalistic environment. It does, however, seem clear that it is the expected 
outcome, rather than a mental representation of the outcome that drives the behaviour 
and thus if induced positive mood disrupts expectation of that same outcome the PIT 
effect may also be affected. In certain individuals, altering the value of the outcome has 
limited effect on instrumental behaviour and despite negative outcomes of this 
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behaviour compulsive seeking occurs (Economidou, et al., 2009; Everitt & Robbins, 
2005), it is also possible this may be observed under condition of induced positive 
mood. Ultimately, as PIT is often used to study addiction (Everitt & Robbins, 2005) we 
aim to further understand the effect positive mood may have on such processes and 
investigate the link between positive mood and addiction. 
A Pavlovian training schedule was used in which three compound stimuli AX, BX, CX 
predicted an aversive noise on 90%, 50% and 10% of presentations respectively 
approximating the design of Hogarth, Dickinson, et al (2008). After Pavlovian training 
had been completed a visual (Smith, et al., 2005) and musical mood induction 
procedure [adapted from Robinson, et al., (2009)] was carried out. In the transfer stage 
that followed, under nominal extinction, the ability of the stimuli to elicit the 
instrumental response was determined to study the PIT effect under different mood 
states. In addition, participants were able on each trial, throughout all stages, to view the 
stimuli for an infinite duration as determined by holding down a key; this observation 
time was used as a measure of attention towards each compound. It is anticipated that 
observation time will be proportional to the uncertainty of the stimuli, such that greatest 
attention will be paid to BX compared to the certain compounds AX and CX. In 
contrast, it is believed that the transfer effect will be AX>BX>CX and that this effect 
will be abolished under positive mood state. It is unclear how, or if, positive mood will 
affect observational patterns to stimuli associated with aversive outcomes. 
 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
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Healthy subjects who were taking no medication, as determined by a medical health 
questionnaire were recruited. Ethical approval was obtained from the University of 
Sussex ethics committee and all subjects gave written informed consent prior to 
participation and advised they could withdraw at any time; the study was run in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants were fully debriefed at the 
end of the session and compensated for their time with £15. 
Forty-two subjects (18 males) took part in the study, 8 females and 2 males were 
excluded due to failure to successfully learn stimulus-outcome contingencies. The 
remaining thirty-two subjects, deemed “aware”, were divided into neutral mood (n = 16; 
8 females) and positive mood (n = 16; 8 females) conditions. 
Experimental procedure 
Subjects were asked to attend the laboratory on one occasion. They were instructed to 
abstain from alcohol for twelve hours prior to the testing session. In addition they were 
asked to avoid consuming anything high in caffeine immediately before the test session. 
Participants were informed they would be compensated for their time. 
Materials 
The task was presented on a 20” Dell P1130 monitor (Dell Inc, Berkshire, UK) and 
programmed using E-prime v1.1 software (Psychology Software Tools Inc.; Pittsburgh, 
PA). The 4 visual stimuli used (see figure 1) were black patterns displayed on a grey 
background, 10.2cm squared at a resolution of 1280 x 1024.  Text font and size was 
Times New Roman 25pt. The auditory music (for the mood induction procedure and 
aversive noise) was played through Sennheiser PX200 headphones. Participant 
responses were collected via a Cherry (Pleasant Prairie, WI) mini keyboard throughout 
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with the top row of number keys labelled in green from 1 – 9, and the shift and space 
keys also labelled. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Materials used during the computerised task throughout the PIT procedure; 
the four visual stimuli assigned to A, B, C and X in a counterbalanced fashion 
 
 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was adapted from one previously described in Trick, et al. (2011). 
Pavlovian Training: During initial Pavlovian training four visual stimuli (A, B, C and X; 
figure 1) were combined into three stimulus pairs, which constituted the trials (AX, BX, 
CX) and which predicted the occurrence of an aversive noise with a 90%, 50% or 10% 
probability respectively, approximating the design of Hogarth, Dickinson, et al. (2008). 
The stimuli were presented in compound with the common stimulus X (Wagner, 1969) 
in order to assess selective attention for the concurrently presented stimuli A, B and C, 
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which were informative of the trial outcome. The four visual stimuli shown in figure 1 
were assigned to the role of A, B, C and X in counterbalanced order across participants. 
Each trial started with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen. Once the participant 
pressed the space bar the fixation cross turned yellow. At this point participants pressed 
and held the shift key, which terminated the cross and presented a stimulus pair, with 
the cues 10.5cm either side of the location previously occupied by the fixation cross. 
The stimulus-pair remained on screen as long as the shift key was held and this 
represented the observing time. Once the shift key was released the stimulus-pair 
vanished, and the expectancy question “How likely is the loud noise 1 = unlikely 5 = 
don't know 9 = likely”, was shown in the centre of the screen. Participants answered this 
question by pressing a green number key between 1 and 9 providing outcome 
expectancy ratings and the question disappeared. Following this, the screen displayed 
only the grey background for 5 sec and during the last 4 sec of this time aversive noise 
(40msec 97dB) could occur at any randomly selected millisecond. The training phase 
consisted of 120 trials, arranged in 2 blocks of 60 trials1.  
 
Mood Induction: The procedure was adapted from one previously described (O. 
Robinson, et al., 2009). Participants were presented with 44 (positive or neutral) 
pictures (Smith, et al., 2005), whilst music was played through Sennheiser PX200 
headphones. Participants were instructed to get as deeply as possible into any mood 
                                                
1 Trials within the block were randomised for type (AX, BX, CX) and stimulus location 
(left, right) Critically, the outcome occurred in 90% of AX trials (18/20), in 50% of BX 
trials (10/20) and 10% of CX trials (2/20). Stimulus location was balanced within trials 
with and without the outcome. 
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evoked. Firstly, a blank screen was presented and participants were instructed to press 
the space bar to view the first picture. The picture was displayed in the centre of the 
screen for 12 seconds, immediately followed by a blank screen, and participants were 
asked to look at the picture for as long as it was displayed. When the blank screen was 
displayed again participants pressed the space bar to view the next picture. The music 
played was Serenade No.13 KV 525 G Major: I. Serenade. Allegro by Wolfgang 
Amadeus Mozart for the Positive version of the MIP and for the neutral MIP: The 
Planets, Po. 32: VII. Neptune, the Mystic by Gustav Holst. Prior to and after the MIP, a 
set of Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) were administered, to determine self reported 
mood. Comparison between initial- and post- MIP self reported mood, using VAS, was 
used to determine the mood effects of the MIP and therefore assess the effectiveness of 
the procedure. 
Instrumental training: Participants were then trained to acquire an instrumental response 
(spacebar pressing) in a procedure identical to Pavlovian training apart from the 
following modifications. First, holding down the shift key presented two blank grey 
squares in place of the compounds used in Pavlovian training. Participants were 
instructed that repeatedly pressing the spacebar during the interval following the 
expectancy question would sometimes lead to prevention of the noise. The loud noise 
was scheduled to occur automatically on 25% of trials, and on a further 25%, which 
were avoidable by performing a key press within the 1-sec window leading up to the 
scheduled time of the outcome (thus, participants best strategy was to respond at least 
once per second across the period following expectancy question). Consequently, 25% 
of trials were accompanied by the outcome automatically. There were 8 trials of this 
simple instrumental training. 
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Pavlovian to Instrumental Transfer: The transfer phase followed the design of the 
instrumental phase except that compounds established in Pavlovian training (AX, BX, 
CX) were presented randomly intermixed with blank trials of instrumental training, with 
equal proportions (16 trials each), over 64 trials. The noise outcome was scheduled for 
25% of all trials, with a further 25% possible if instrumental responding was not 
performed effectively (as for instrumental training). Thus the Pavlovian contingencies 
established in training were not in force in the transfer phase. The number of 
instrumental responses (space bar presses), made during the variable time window prior 
to the scheduled time of the noise, were recorded to determine the transfer effect. This 
variable time window was matched for trials in which the outcome (noise) was and was 
not scheduled. 
Evaluative conditioning 
At the end of the task, the affective evaluation of stimuli was recorded to provide an 
alternative assay of conditioning. Participants were presented with the individual stimuli 
A, B, C, and X, in random order, and answered the questions “How anxious does this 
picture make you?” and “How pleasant do you find this picture?” in random order, on a 
scale from 1-9 where 1 = not at all, and 9 = extremely. The affective responses were 
examined in relation to the impact of cues on attention and instrumental performance. 
Statistical analysis 
Data were analysed independently for each study and separately for Pavlovian training 
and transfer sections within each study, and also for aware and unaware participants. 
Initial analysis was performed using a 2x3x2 mixed ANOVA with the between factor 
Condition (2 levels – Positive Mood, Neutral Mood), and within factors Trial (3 levels - 
AX, BX, CX) and Block (2 levels – block 1, block 2) for the variables Expectancy 
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ratings and Observing times. The Block and Condition variables were eventually 
collapsed for Expectancy ratings and Observing times because they showed no 
interesting effects or interactions, to simplify reporting of the key findings. This was 
followed by post-hoc Bonferroni where appropriate unless otherwise stated. 
Analysis of the PIT effect, assessed using number of instrumental responses, was 
analysed as above with the exception of the factor Trial, which now had four levels (4 
levels - AX, BX, CX, Blank) by inclusion of the blank. Other analysis was performed 
using mixed ANOVA followed by Bonferroni post-hoc where appropriate unless 
otherwise stated. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used where required throughout. 
 
Results 
Biographical data were collected from both aware and unaware participants and 
demonstrated no significant differences between conditions. 
Awareness of training contingencies  
In the final half of Pavlovian training (60 trials) each participant produced 20 
expectancy ratings for each of the three trial types; AX, BX and CX.  For each 
participant the three trial types were compared in the second block of trials using a one-
way, within-subjects ANOVA. If there was a significant main effect of trial type, and 
the direction of effect was veridical with the scheduled Pavlovian contingencies (i.e., 
AX>BX>CX) the participant was labelled ‘aware’, otherwise the participant was 
labelled ‘unaware’. The awareness criteria bisected participants who ranged on a 
continuum of predictive knowledge, rather than participants falling on a step function of 
predictive knowledge (Lieberman, et al., 1998a). The awareness criteria therefore 
isolate participants who achieved the greatest predictive knowledge in the training 
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provided. The aware group was analysed independently to confirm the co-occurrence of 
predictive knowledge and conditioned responding (Hogarth & Duka, 2006a; Lovibond 
& Shanks, 2002a), data for unaware participants is shown tabulated (table 1). 
Table 1 
      Data from unaware participants – 
Mean and standard error (SEM)         
(split by induced mood condition) Mean SEM 
Positive 
(n=1) 
Neutral 
(n=9) 
Positive Neutral 
Pavlovian Training Phase       
Training Expectancy (1-9) – AX 7.33 6.43 - 0.31 
Training Expectancy (1-9) – BX 3.13 6.15 - 0.24 
Training Expectancy (1-9) – CX 5.03 4.40 - 0.46 
Training Observing times (ms) - AX 1139.40 3015.24 - 510.73 
Training Observing times (ms) - BX 1359.28 2914.99 - 430.39 
Training Observing times (ms) - CX 1297.57 2801.41 - 418.66 
Transfer Phase     
Transfer Expectancy (1-9) – AX 6.81 5.92 - 0.47 
Transfer Expectancy (1-9) – BX 4.75 6.04 - 0.83 
Transfer Expectancy (1-9) – CX 5.19 4.93 - 0.40 
Transfer Observing times (ms) - AX 586.00 2027.47 - 454.35 
Transfer Observing times (ms) - BX 663.94 1477.47 - 333.62 
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Transfer Observing times (ms) - CX 1023.00 1949.63 - 356.29 
Transfer number of responses – AX 16.19 10.53 - 1.98 
Transfer number of responses – BX 11.69 12.28 - 2.18 
Transfer number of responses – CX 14.06 9.78 - 2.07 
Transfer number of responses - Blank 16.56 14.85 - 1.11 
Evaluative conditioning     
Anxiety rating (1-9) – A 8.00 4.33 - 0.91 
Anxiety rating (1-9) – B 1.00 3.33 - 0.96 
Anxiety rating (1-9) – C 3.00 4.00 - 0.85 
Anxiety rating (1-9) – Blank 1.00 4.56 - 0.78 
Pleasantness rating (1-9) – A 1.00 5.11 - 0.86 
Pleasantness rating (1-9) – B 8.00 5.89 - 1.10 
Pleasantness rating (1-9) – C 4.00 5.56 - 1.00 
Pleasantness rating (1-9) – Blank 9.00 3.11 - 0.48 
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Expectancy ratings  
Figure 2 shows the expectancy ratings for AX, BX and CX trials during training for 
aware participants. Aware participants recorded significantly different ratings for each 
stimulus, F(1.63, 50.63) = 129.40, η2 = .807, p < .001, but the unaware group did not 
(F(1.21, 9.64) = 4.30, η2 = .350, p = .061). These effects were determined by the pre-
selection of aware and unaware groups. These differential expectancies were maintained 
into transfer (shown in figure 2), such that in the aware group, there was a significant 
main effect of trial type, F(2, 62) = 33.66, η2 = .521, p < .001. The unaware group 
showed no main effect of trial type (F(2, 18) = 1.91, η2 = .175, p = .177). These results 
were consistent for all experimental groups and the data for aware participants were 
therefore collapsed. 
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Figure 2: Mean expectancy ratings following the presentation of trials AX, BX, CX 
during (a) Pavlovian training and (b) Transfer phase for aware participants. No 
differences were observed between the conditions and the data were therefore collapsed 
generating n=32 per bar graphically represented. Error bars represent standard error 
(SE) of mean. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. 
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Observing time 
Figures 3a and 3b show observing times (ms) during Pavlovian training and transfer. In 
aware participants, there was a significant main effect of trial type, F(1.62, 50.42) = 
8.51, η2 = .215, p < .005, with observing times being overall longest in BX trials 
compared to AX and CX trials. There was no significant trial effect for unaware 
participants during training (F(2, 18) = .441, η2 = .047, p = .650), or transfer (F(2, 18) = 
1.97, η2 = .180, p = .168). By contrast (for aware participants), during transfer, BX 
observing times were shorter compared to AX and CX and there was a significant main 
effect of trial type for aware participants, F(1.62, 50.10) = 12.42, η2 = .286, p < .001, 
this result is consistent with the results of Hogarth, Dickinson, et al. (2008) and further 
demonstrates that observing time can be used to index the predictive uncertainty of 
stimuli; this pattern was consistent for all experimental groups and the data for aware 
participants were therefore collapsed. 
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Figure 3: Mean observing times (ms) for trials AX, BX, CX during the Pavlovian 
training (a) and the transfer phase (b) for aware participants. No differences were 
observed between the conditions and the data were therefore collapsed generating 
n=32 per bar graphically represented. Error bars represent SE of mean. * = p < 0.05, 
** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. 
 
 
Mood effects of the MIP 
The effects of mood were calculated by determining the difference in response to VAS 
before and after the MIP, for aware participants. There was a significant overall change 
in mood by condition interaction (F(1, 30) = .926, η2 = .030, p < .005). This effect is 
explained by those in the positive condition reporting a greater decrease in sadness 
(mean: -0.50; SEM: 0.27) after the MIP than those in the neutral condition (who 
actually showed a increase – mean: 1.63; SEM: 0.70) (p=0.011) and also generating a 
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greater increase in happiness (mean: 1.00; SEM: 0.52) after the MIP than those in the 
neutral condition (who showed a decrease – mean: -1.06; SEM: 0.52) (p=0.009). 
Transfer effect 
Figure 4 shows the number of key press responses produced in AX, BX, CX and blank 
trials for aware participants respectively for each condition. For aware participants there 
was a significant stimulus effect F(3, 90) = 13.76, η2 = .314, p < .001, indicating a PIT 
effect. There was also a significant stimulus by condition interaction: F(3, 90) = 3.96, η2 
= .117, p < .05, explained by those in the positive mood condition reducing responses in 
AX trials, but increasing responses in CX trials compared to the neutral condition. 
These effects were not observed for the unaware participants, p > .511. 
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Figure 4: Mean instrumental responses following presentation of trials AX, BX, CX and 
blank trials during the Transfer phase for aware participants for each condition (n=16 
per condition). Error bars represent SE of mean. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p 
< 0.001. 
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Evaluative conditioning 
Tables 1 and 2 show the pleasantness and anxiety ratings to stimuli reported at the end 
of the task for unaware and aware participants respectively. For aware participants, 
there was a stimuli by condition interaction for anxiety ratings, F(2, 60) = 3.97, η2 = 
.117, p < .05, on exclusion of the “X”. No significant effects with regard to anxiety 
ratings were recorded for the unaware group (p > .164). No significant effects or 
interactions were observed for pleasantness ratings for either aware (F(3, 93) = 1.42, η2 
= .044, p = .242), or unaware participants (F(3, 27) = 1.15, η2 = .113, p = .349). 
 
 
Table 2 
Mean emotional ratings (SEM)  
made by aware participants 
Measurement                  
Study/Condition 
               Stimuli  
A B C X 
Anxiety ratings     
Positive mood condition mean 
 
3.69 
(0.72) 
4.38 
(0.69) 
3.94 
(0.73) 
3.38 
(0.66) 
Neutral mood condition mean 
 
6.31 
(0.70) 
4.93 
(0.61) 
3.56 
(0.59) 
4.43 
(0.59) 
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Pleasantness ratings 
Positive mood condition mean 
 
 
5.31 
(0.64) 
 
4.56 
(0.54) 
 
3.69 
(0.60) 
 
5.19 
(0.65) 
Neutral mood condition mean 
 
5.25 
(0.71) 
5.06 
(0.59) 
4.69 
(0.76) 
5.44 
(0.35) 
     
 
 
Discussion 
The present study explored whether induced positive mood would disrupt previously 
learnt Pavlovian (S-O) conditioned associations and/or transfer of a Pavlovian cue’s 
motivational effects to instrumental (A-O-mediated) performance. Importantly, a 
positive mood state was successfully induced in participants in the positive mood 
condition as assessed using self-reported VAS. 
Evaluative Conditioning 
As reported previously (Austin & Duka, 2010, 2012), the present results show that 
successful Pavlovian training generated differential expectations about the probability 
of the aversive outcome in AX, BX and CX trials. Specifically, both during the 
Pavlovian training phase and the transfer test (when these contingencies were no longer 
reinforced), decreases in the predictability of the aversive outcome from 90%, to 50% 
and 10% produced a greater decline in expectancy rating in subjects deemed ‘aware’ of 
the contingencies. Additionally, attention to the cues (observing times) was linked with 
the level of uncertainty (Pearce & Hall, 1980), such that during Pavlovian training, 
observing times were greatest during BX stimulus trials (the 50% uncertain predictor) 
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compared to stimulus trials that were highly predictive of the outcome (90%) or not 
(10%). In contrast, during transfer observing times were reversed (relative to training) 
such that attention to BX was reduced below the levels during AX and CX trials. These 
results in fact agree with our previous data (Trick, et al., 2011), suggesting that the 
decrease in observing time during BX trials might be related to prediction error. 
Transfer Performance 
More critically, data from the present study support our previous findings (Trick, et al., 
2011) that the explicit knowledge of the probability/uncertainty of the outcome is 
important for the strength by which a referent cue can increase instrumental 
performance to avoid that same outcome. In the control condition (neutral mood), the 
number of instrumental responses during each trial of the transfer test, increased linearly 
in accordance with the expectancies of the outcome learned during Pavlovian 
discrimination training, such that AX>BX>CX, both for instrumental performance 
(responses) and expectancy ratings. 
Moreover, we now demonstrate that when under state positive mood (induced by a 
musical and visual positive mood induction procedure) the instrumental performance 
was affected and a suppression in the transfer effect observed i.e. when experienced 
with induced positive mood participants did not show the same good discriminative 
response produced by those in the neutral condition. Thus it seems that when the 
participants current mood is manipulated to become positive it can also reduce the 
differential response to cues by leading to an overall increase in behavioural output for 
stimulus C, perhaps in an attempt to avoid the aversive outcome under any circumstance 
(i.e. even in the presence of the stimulus associated with the absence of the aversive 
noise – stimulus C). However, the expectancy ratings with regard to aversive outcome 
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in each trial remained unchanged in all mood conditions indicating that explicit 
knowledge of the outcome does not influence the instrumental behaviour. Similarly, 
attentional processing of the predictive cues seemed also to take place irrespective of 
the current state mood of the participant. Thus it seems that induced mood only 
modulated the instrumental performance. 
Taken together then, the results suggest that the transfer performance effect can be 
modulated by the current mood state of the participant and that this can be dissociated 
from the knowledge of the outcome the referent cues predict and from the attention 
allocated to them, supporting previous findings (Trick, et al., 2011). There are two 
possible explanations for this observation. Firstly, these data could suggest that state 
mood can manipulate the perceived current value of the outcome, as we have previously 
demonstrated that this is a critical contributor to instrumental/seeking behaviour and 
that the predictive cues under such conditions of value changes lose the power to 
motivate behaviour when the value is actually altered (Mathers, Crombag, Steckler, & 
Duka, 2014); additionally this was also the case in previous studies where the current 
value of the reward was not changed (Hogarth, et al., 2009a; Hogarth, et al., 2007). The 
alternative possibility would be that the attenuated PIT effect observed in the positive 
mood condition is driven by an general alteration in motivation, such that the number of 
instrumental responses in CX trials is increased to be more in line with BX and AX 
trials as supported by previous data in negative mood studies whereby induced state 
mood modulated motivation (Mathers, Steckler, & Duka, 2014). Interestingly, the 
aforementioned study on negative mood demonstrated a dissociation between 
punishment and reward prediction, such that the PIT effect was not abolished using a 
punishment outcome as was the case when the outcome was reward. The current data 
provide further support for the latter findings, in that the PIT was not completely 
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abolished albeit reduced. Support for these data comes further from studies, which have 
shown punishment prediction to be resistant to mood changes, whereas reward 
prediction is more susceptible to mood manipulations (Cools, Robinson, et al., 2008; 
Daw, et al., 2002). 
The current study did not aim at separating between a general motivational state that the 
mood manipulation had generated, and the value of the reinforcer. Since responses did 
not increase across all stimuli but specifically for the CX in the positive mood state, we 
could postulate that in the current study the negative value of the CX was changed to 
appear more positive. This may be specific to an aversive procedure as data from an 
appetitive procedure are lacking. However, in a study in which we increased the value 
of the reinforcer in an appetitive paradigm responses were increased across all stimuli 
indicating more a general increase in motivation (Mathers, Crombag, et al., 2014).  
Measurements of attention in the present study remained unaffected by the mood 
manipulation. This was also the case when changes to outcome value were made in a 
previous devaluation study (Mathers, Crombag, et al., 2014) where attention to stimuli 
remained unaffected by the new value given to the outcome. Attention to the stimuli 
remained sensitive to the differences in predictability of the outcomes (Mackintosh, 
1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980) as also observed in the present data.  
The results of the current study therefore provide further evidence that the mechanisms 
underlying attention allocation to outcome-associated cues are psychologically 
dissociable from those involved in the motivation to seek the outcome (reward/aversive 
outcome avoidance), as well as being neurobiologically separable as well (Flagel, et al., 
2010). This is further supported by previous studies (Clark, et al., 2001) which 
apportion the role of mood to be at the neurobiological level. 
171 
 
Our data are also interesting with regard to the concept of “depressive realism” which 
describes that perception of causal control is more accurate in depressive states (Chase, 
Michael, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2009; Chase, et al., 2010). According to this 
theory participants under an induced negative mood state during PIT will acquire the 
new contingencies more quickly (i.e. will extinguish faster) and therefore will not show 
a PIT effect, as the reduced discrimination is actually a more accurate response as the 
outcome contingencies were no longer in force in the transfer test and all stimuli were 
equally predictive of the outcome. From our data we could suggest that positive mood 
may also facilitate extinction as PIT was reduced in this condition compared to the 
neutral mood.    
In conclusion, our findings provide further insights into the effects positive mood has on 
motivated performance and the underpinnings of instrumental actions in humans. This 
is important for our understanding of abnormal behaviours involving motivation, such 
as drug addiction, and may therefore provide a target for intervention strategies. 
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Paper 4: The impact of positive and negative mood on the speed and accuracy of 
acquiring Pavlovian contingencies of stimuli predictive of reward 
 
Abstract 
Rationale Negative mood has long been implicated in learning but there is still some 
debate over the exact mechanisms of this interaction. 
Objective The aim of the present study was to investigate the effects of experimentally 
induced negative and positive mood on a particular example of learning: acquisition of 
Pavlovian contingencies, predictive of a reward, during Pavlovian training, and to 
assess the extent to which state mood may alter speed of learning, emotional responses 
to stimuli predictive of reward and attention to the stimuli. 
Materials and methods Forty nine healthy volunteers underwent negative (n=16), 
neutral (n=16) or positive (n=17) mood induction prior to participating in a Pavlovian 
training paradigm designed to measure learning, attention and emotional responses to 
stimuli. During Pavlovian training participants were trained on a Pavlovian schedule in 
which three visual stimuli, A, B and C, predicted the occurrence of a monetary reward 
(gain of 10p) with 90%, 50% or 10% probability, respectively. 
Results Participants who underwent negative mood induction took longer to acquire 
Pavlovian contingency knowledge than those in either neutral or positive mood 
condition. Mood state also disrupted observation patterns to the stimuli such that 
induced mood reduced overall observation time in BX and CX trials, as well those in a 
negative mood state only showing a increased bias for stimulus C over X. Average pupil 
size in all trial types was increased by positive mood. 
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Conclusions Positive and negative mood state differentially affect emotional and 
observational responses to Pavlovian stimuli predictive of reward, and also impact on 
the rate of acquiring contingency knowledge of the same predictive stimuli. 
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Introduction 
The effects of negative, and positive (Clark, et al., 2001), mood have long been studied, 
as has the effectiveness of mood induction procedures to experimentally induce a 
certain mood and thus manipulate state mood allowing its effects to be explored (e.g. 
Chase, et al., 2010; Gilet, 2008; Robinson, et al., 2009; Robinson & Sahakian, 2009b, 
etc). Previous studies have implicated negative mood in impulsivity (Clark, et al., 
2005), instrumental learning and information processing (Finger, et al., 2007; Merens, 
et al., 2007), motivation (Cools, et al., 2005) as well as emotional and behavioural 
processing (Cools, Roberts, et al., 2008). Mood may, therefore, also have a link with 
addictive processes (Cools, et al., 2005). One theory proposes that mood affects 
motivation (Cools, et al., 2005; Cools, Roberts, et al., 2008; Cools, Robinson, et al., 
2008), which in turn would impact upon addictive processes. Additionally, previous 
studies utilizing Pavlovian to instrumental transfer (PIT) in humans, conducted in our 
hands, demonstrated a reduced motivation to gain reward, and avoid punishment, when 
under induced negative mood (Mathers, Steckler, et al., 2014). PIT is a model that has 
often been used to study addiction (Everitt & Robbins, 2005). It has been widely 
accepted that humans are able to transfer the predictive Pavlovian stimulus-outcome 
relationships to independently learned instrumental responding for that same outcome 
(Balleine & O'Doherty, 2009; Hogarth, Dickinson, Hutton, Bamborough, et al., 2006) 
and it is believed that such a transfer effect is modulated by the predictive strength of 
the stimulus, which, in turn, exerts a motivational influence driving the instrumental 
responding (Everitt & Robbins, 2005). Thus our previous data provide further evidence 
linking negative mood and reduced motivation. Motivation is important for reward 
seeking, and is also required for many normal processes (Robinson & Berridge, 2003) 
but it is also implicated in abnormal processing and driving of undesirable behaviours. 
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During our previous studies we explored the effect of negative, and positive, mood on 
the PIT effect and carried out mood induction after Pavlovian learning had taken place. 
It was interesting to note that Pavlovian contingency knowledge was maintained into 
the transfer stage despite negative mood induction (Mathers, Steckler, et al., 2014), 
which did not agree with other data (Rogers, et al., 2003) which demonstrated a link 
between serotonin and reduced discrimination between expected gains. In order to fully 
understand the effect of mood on motivation, and more broadly Pavlovian learning, it is 
important to reconcile these discrepancies. In light of the differential effects of negative 
mood on reward discrimination we proposed that if mood induction was carried out 
prior to Pavlovian learning, the contingencies would be acquired by those under state 
negative mood but at a different rate than those under positive or neutral induced mood. 
To test this hypothesis this study adopted the use of a musical and visual mood 
induction procedure (MIP) adapted from one previously described (Robinson, et al., 
2009) to induce positive, negative and neutral (control condition) mood states to allow 
the effect of the current state of these moods on learning to be examined. This was 
followed by an extended session of Pavlovian learning in which participants were 
trained on a Pavlovian schedule in which three compound stimuli, AX, BX and CX, 
predicted a reward (gain of 10p) outcome with a probability of 90%, 50% and 10%, 
respectively approximating the design of Hogarth, Dickinson et al. (2008). Throughout 
the Pavlovian learning stage of the study, attention to compounds was assessed by the 
duration for which participants held down an “observing response” key to present these 
compounds (Premack & Collier, 1966), and attention to individual stimuli within the 
compounds was assessed by gaze dwell time measured with an eye tracker. Pupil size 
was also recorded. 
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It is anticipated that attention to the stimuli will accord with the predictive uncertainty 
of the stimuli. Specifically, observing times should be maximal for the partially 
predictive compound BX compared to the reliable predictive and non-predictive 
compounds AX and CX. On top of this, dwell time for the single stimuli in the 
compound as measured with the eye tracker should be greater for the stimulus B 
compared to the concurrent presented common stimulus X, whereas the reliable 
predictive and non-predictive stimuli A and C should show smaller dwell time biases 
relative to the concurrently presented X stimulus. The use of the eye tracker during 
Pavlovian training aims to address theories concerning the role played by attention in 
learning (Dayan, Kakade, & Montague, 2000), decision making (Schultz et al., 2008a), 
and therefore link to drug dependence (Field, Munafo, & Franken, 2009), and the effect 
mood may have on these. 
 
Procedures were approved by the University of Sussex Ethics Committee. Participants 
were informed they were allowed to withdraw at any time. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
49 healthy participants (25 male, 24 female) aged between 18 and 32 years (mean 21.1 
years) were recruited from staff and students at the University of Sussex. All 
participants had 20:20 or 20:30 vision (assessed with the Snellen three-metre visual 
acuity test). All participants were in good health and taking no medication as 
determined by a medical health questionnaire. Subjects were divided into Negative 
Mood Group (N=16; 8 male & 8 female; mean age 20.88 years, S.D. 2.68), Neutral 
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Mood Group (N=16; 8 male & 8 female; mean age 20.69 years, S.D. 2.50) and Positive 
Mood Group (N=17 (9 male & 8 female; mean age 21.6 years, S.D. 3.94). Ethical 
approval was obtained from the University of Sussex ethics committee, and all 
participants gave written informed consent prior to participation. At the end of the 
experimental session participants were debriefed and paid £15. 
Experimental procedure 
Subjects were asked to attend the laboratory on one occasion. Participants were 
instructed to abstain from alcohol for twelve hours prior to the testing session. In 
addition they were asked to avoid consuming anything high in caffeine immediately 
before the test session. Participants were informed they would be compensated for their 
time as well as receiving any money they won on the task. 
Materials 
All procedures were programmed using E-Prime v1.1 software (Psychology Software 
Tools Inc.; Pittsburgh, PA) and presented on a 20” Dell P1130 screen. Each of four 
visual stimuli (see figure 1) were black patterns displayed on a grey background, 
10.2cm squared at a resolution of 1280 x 1024.  Text font and size was Times New 
Roman 25pt. The auditory music (for the mood induction procedure) was played 
through Sennheiser PX200 headphones. Participant responses were collected via a 
Cherry mini keyboard throughout, with the top row of number keys labelled in green 
from 1 – 9, and the shift and space keys also labelled. 
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Figure 1: Materials used during the computerised task throughout the PIT procedure; 
the four visual stimuli assigned to A, B, C and X in a counterbalanced fashion 
 
Participants wore a head mounted Eyelink II eye-tracker (SR-Research Ltd.; Ontario, 
Canada) for the duration of the task. The position of the eye was sampled at a rate of 
500Hz.  A parallel port connection linked the eye-tracker with the E-Prime program.  
Procedure 
Mood Induction Procedure (MIP) 
The procedure was adapted from one previously described in Robinson, et al. (2009). 
Participants were presented with 44 (positive, negative or neutral) pictures (Smith, et 
al., 2005), whilst music was played through Sennheiser PX200 headphones. Participants 
were instructed to get as deeply as possible into any mood evoked. Firstly, a blank 
screen was presented and participants were instructed to press the space bar to view the 
first picture. The picture was displayed in the center of the screen for 12 seconds, 
immediately followed by a blank screen, and participants were asked to look at the 
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picture for as long as it was displayed. When the blank screen was displayed again 
participants pressed the space bar to view the next picture. The music played was 
Adagio in G Minor by Thomas Albinoni for the negative version of the MIP, Serenade 
No.13 KV 525 G Major: I. Serenade. Allegro by Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart for the 
Positive version and for the neutral MIP The Planets, Po. 32: VII. Neptune, the Mystic 
by Gustav Holst. Prior to and after the MIP, a set of Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) 
were administered, to determine self reported mood. Comparison between initial- and 
post- MIP self reported mood, using VAS, was used to determine the mood effects of 
the MIP and therefore assess the effectiveness of the procedure. It is important to note 
that the Beck depression inventory (BDI) was pre-administered and BDI scores (Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) were recorded and the conditions were 
matched for trait depressiveness using the BDI, as vast variances on BDI scores have 
been observed in normal populations (Chase, et al., 2010). 
Pavlovian training 
During initial Pavlovian training four visual stimuli (A, B, C and X; see figure 1) were 
combined into three stimulus pairs, which constituted the trials (AX, BX, CX) and 
which predicted the occurrence of a reward (gain of 10 pence) with a 90%, 50% or 10% 
probability respectively. Throughout the paper the stimuli A, B, and C are named the 
informative stimuli in the pair, whereas stimulus X paired with A, B or C is named the 
uninformative stimulus X(A), X(B) and X(C) in the pair. The four visual stimuli shown 
in figure 1 were assigned to the role of A, B, C and X in counterbalanced order across 
participants. At the start of the task, the participant was instructed that each trial would 
begin with a fixation cross (+) in the centre of the screen and that when they looked at 
the cross directly it would turn yellow. At this point they were able to view two pictures 
by holding down the shift key. Then they were asked how likely they were to receive 
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the reward and to rate the likelihood on a scale of 1 - 9, where 1= unlikely and 9 = 
likely. Participants were instructed to “Press the space bar to begin”. 
During each trial, participants were presented with a black fixation cross in the centre of 
the screen. This allowed the experimenter to calibrate the eye-tracker while the 
participant focused on the cross, and the fixation cross turned yellow once calibration 
was complete. At this point participants pressed and held the shift key, which 
terminated the cross and presented a stimulus pair, with the cues 10.5cm either side of 
the location previously occupied by the fixation cross. The stimulus-pair remained on 
screen as long as the shift key was held and this represented the observing time. Dwell 
time was measured during the time window of the observing time and was calculated 
separately for the informative and uninformative stimulus as a percentage of the 
observing time in each particular trial that gaze was fixated on the stimulus, to generate 
dwell time (%) scores for each stimulus. These scores quantify the percentage in 
fixating the informative stimulus, and to the uninformative stimulus, as a percentage of 
the total observing time for that trial. Once the shift key was released the stimulus-pair 
vanished, and an expectancy question, “How likely is the reward 1 = unlikely 5 = don't 
know 9 = likely”, was shown in the centre of the screen. Participants answered this 
question by pressing a green number key between 1 and 9 providing outcome 
expectancy ratings and the question immediately disappeared. Following this, the screen 
displayed only the grey background for 5 sec and during the last 4 sec of this time “You 
gain 10p” could be displayed on the screen at any randomly selected millisecond; on 
rewarded trials participants transferred 10p to their “My Money” tin. The reward 
occurred in 90% of stimulus pair AX trials, in 50% of BX trials and in 10% of CX 
trials. The stimulus pair displayed in each trial was randomly selected. The training 
phase consisted of 180 trials, arranged in 6 blocks of 30. Pupil size was measured 
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during the time window of the observing time and was calculated separately for the 
informative and uninformative stimulus, as a mean of the pupil size across all fixations 
to that stimulus during that trial. The measurements for the informative stimuli were 
averaged across all trials for that stimuli, by block, to give pupil size scores for each 
informative stimulus. 
Evaluative conditioning 
At the end of the task participants were presented with the individual stimuli A, B, C, 
and X, in random order, and asked “How anxious does this picture make you feel? Press 
a green number key between 1 and 9 to indicate the strength of your feeling 1 = not at 
all anxious 9 = extremely anxious”, and “How pleasant do you find this picture? Press 
a green number key between 1 and 9 to indicate the strength of your feeling 1 = not at 
all pleasant 9 = extremely pleasant”. Anxiety and pleasantness ratings represented the 
emotional response measurements. 
Statistical analysis 
Unless stated otherwise, all analyses were performed using repeated measures ANOVA 
and significant main effects were interpreted using pairwise comparisons, where 
appropriate, with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests unless noted. An error rate of 
p<0.05 was used to define significance. The block variable was collapsed to simplify 
reporting of the key findings where stated. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used 
where required. 
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Results 
Contingency awareness and learning in training 
During each block of Pavlovian training each participant produced 10 expectancy 
ratings for each of the three trial types; AX, BX and CX.  For each participant the three 
trial types were compared using a one-way within-subjects ANOVA. If there was a 
significant main effect of trial type, and the direction of effect was veridical with the 
scheduled Pavlovian contingencies (i.e. AX>BX>CX) the participant was labelled 
‘aware’, otherwise the participant was labelled ‘unaware’. Once 30 consecutive aware 
trials were achieved the participant was labelled aware and the middle trial number of 
these 30 was labelled as the trial number in which they had successfully reached the 
learning criterion (see below). Of the 17 participants assigned to the positive condition 
10 ultimately become aware (5 male, 5 female), of the 16 in the negative condition 10 
participants achieved awareness (5 male, 5 female) and of the 16 in the neutral 
condition 10 participants (4 male, 6 female) were found to eventually become aware. 
Given that human conditioned behaviour is strongly associated with contingency 
knowledge (Hogarth & Duka, 2006b; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002b), we excluded the 
unaware group from the main analyses unless otherwise stated. 
Mood effects of the MIP 
The change in self-reported mood was calculated by determining the difference in 
response to VAS before and after the MIP, reported by participants. There was a 
significant overall change by condition interaction (F(2, 46) = 8.39, p=0.001), explained 
by those in the negative condition reporting a greater increase in sadness after the MIP 
(positive mean: -.076; SEM: 0.45, negative mean: 2.00; SEM: 0.47, neutral mean: -0.44; 
SEM: 0.76) than those in either the positive (p<0.01) or neutral condition (p<0.01); 
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those in the positive condition also reported a greater increase in happiness after the 
MIP (positive mean: 0.35; SEM: 0.40, negative mean: -1.63; SEM: 0.46, neutral mean: -
0.56; SEM: 0.47) than those in the negative condition (p<0.05). 
Learning criterion 
Figure 2 shows the mean trial number in which participants achieved the learning 
criterion in each condition. There was a significant effect of condition on the trial 
number in which participants became aware (F(2, 27) = 3.60, p = .041), such that those 
in the negative condition took longer to reach the learning criterion than those in the 
positive condition (p<.05). 
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Figure 2: Mean trial number in which participants in each condition achieved the 
learning criterion; * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. 
 
Expectancy ratings 
Figures 3a/b/c show the expectancy ratings for AX, BX and CX trials during the 
Pavlovian learning for each condition. To simplify reporting of the results the block 
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variable was collapsed so that blocks 1 and 2 were collapsed (to create block i – figure 
3(a)), blocks 3 and 4 were collapsed (to create block ii – figure 3(b)), and 5 and 6 
collapsed into block iii (figure 3(c)) to match the learning pattern observed over time in 
figure 2 such that block i represented learning for the positive condition, block ii for the 
neutral condition, and block iii for the negative; this allowed for the data to be analysed 
more clearly. There was a significant main effect of trial type (F(2, 54) = 141.51, 
p<.001), this effect was determined by the pre-selection of participants, on the basis that 
they showed significant veridical knowledge over a minimum of thirty consecutive 
trials. A trial type by condition interaction (F(4, 54) = 2.77, p=.036) was also observed, 
as well as a block (time) by trial type interaction (F(4, 108) = 18.65, p<.001) and block 
(time) by trial type by condition interaction (F(8, 108) = 2.12, p=.04). Further analysis 
revealed that within block i those in the positive condition had acquired the greatest 
contingency knowledge such that ratings for all stimuli were different from each other 
(p<0.001), this degree of separation was not observed in the negative or neutral groups 
until block iii. Additionally, in block i those in the negative condition had yet to 
separate AX > BX (p>0.05). Furthermore, those in the negative condition rated CX 
higher than those in the positive condition in block i (p<0.05) and block ii (p<0.05), and 
in block i also rated AX lower than those in the positive condition (p<0.05). These 
comparisons of each condition to each other indicated that differential separation of 
expectancies was present in each condition despite the Pavlovian contingencies being 
the same, and may indicate a reduction in the speed of learning in the negative 
condition, perhaps driven by a lack in motivation, or perhaps represent a reduction in 
confidence to respond in a way that would demonstrate acquiring of contingency 
knowledge. It is worthwhile to note that for each condition the same percentage of 
participants, who completed the experiment, ultimately became aware. 
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Figure 3: Mean expectancy ratings following the presentation of trials AX, BX, CX 
during Pavlovian training in block i (a) block ii (b) and block iii (c); * = p < 0.05, ** = 
p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. Block iii demonstrates discrimination occurring in aware 
participants across all conditions, not fully manifested in block i or ii by those 
participants in the negative and neutral conditions.  
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Observing time  
The block variable was collapsed as above to create the time (collapsed blocks) variable 
with 3 levels (blocks i, ii and iii). Figures 4a, b and c show that observing times during 
Pavlovian training should a trend to be greater for the uncertain BX trials than certain 
predictor and non-predictor trials, AX and CX, once the contingency knowledge had 
become acquired which is consistent with the results of Hogarth, Dickinson, et al. 
(2008), and further demonstrates that observing time can be used to index the predictive 
uncertainty of stimuli. In the present study there was a significant main effect of time 
(F(1.31, 35.27) = 40.86, p<.001) and trial type (F(2, 54) = 9.16, p<.001). A trial type by 
condition interaction also approached significance (F(4, 54) = 2.50, p=.053), such that 
observing time was lower in the positive condition than neutral, in blocks i and ii for 
both BX (p<.05) and CX (p<.05) trials. The same effect was seen in the negative 
condition when compared with the neutral, but limited to block iii (p<.05). 
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Figure 4: Mean observing times (ms) for trials AX, BX, CX during the Pavlovian 
training in block i (a) block ii (b) and block iii (c); * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p 
< 0.001. 
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Dwell time 
Figure 5 shows percentage dwell times scores for the informative (A, B, C) and 
uninformative X stimuli (XA – when paired with stimulus A, XB when paired with 
stimulus B and XC when paired with stimulus C) during Pavlovian training block 6 
(once all aware participants had successfully acquired the outcome contingencies). 
Analysis was performed using a 6 (stimuli – A/B/C/XA/XB/XC) by 3 (condition – 
positive/negative/neutral) ANOVA design. There was a significant main effect of 
stimulus (F(2.84, 76.77) = 5.50, p=.002) for the aware group (on investigating this 
effect values greater than two times the standard deviation of the mean were excluded), 
where stimulus A was selected from the contextual stimulus X (in XA trials) to a greater 
extent than stimulus B (in XB trials) or C (in XC trials) in the positive (A>XA, p<.05) 
and neutral (A>XA, p<.01) conditions; this effect on gaze preference for the 
informative stimuli in A trials was abolished in the negative condition such that 
attention apportioned to A was not greater than to XA (p>.05). There was, however, no 
difference in percentage dwell time between informative Stimuli A, B and C within 
conditions. These results are partially inconsistent with Hogarth, Dickinson, et al. 
(2008) and the discrepancies are difficult to account for. The unaware group showed no 
significant effects or interactions. 
194 
 
D w e ll t im e  (% ) a p p o r t io n e d  to  e a c h  s t im u lu s
d u r in g  b lo c k  6  o f  P a v lo v ia n  tr a in in g
A B C X A X B X C A B C X A X B X C A B C X A X B X C
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
P os itive
N ega tive
N eu tra l
*
* **
S tim u lu s
M
e
a
n
 %
 D
w
e
ll
 T
im
e
 
Figure 5: Mean dwell time as a percentage of total observing time for stimulus A, B, C 
and uninformative X stimulus (XA – when paired with stimulus A, XB when paired with 
stimulus B and XC when paired with stimulus C) during block 6 of the Pavlovian 
training schedule for Negative, Neutral and Positive conditions. Error bars represent 
SE of mean. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. 
 
Pupil size 
Figure 6 shows the average pupil size to informative stimuli by block and split by 
condition. There was a significant main effect of block (F(2.45, 66.20) = 15.40, p<.005) 
and a block by condition interaction (F(4.90, 66.20) = 2.45, p = .043), such that pupil 
size in the positive condition was greater than in the negative condition or neutral 
condition. 
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Figure 6: Mean pupil size (µm) for each informative stimulus – A, B and C. Error bars 
represent SE of mean. 
 
Evaluative conditioning 
Figure 7(a) shows the anxiety ratings to stimuli reported at the end of the task. For 
aware participants there was a significant main effect of stimulus (F(3, 81) = 7.45, 
p<.001), such that stimulus A produced lower ratings of anxiety than stimulus C (p<.01) 
in the Neutral Mood group; this was maintained in the Negative condition, but 
abolished in the Positive condition. This main effect of stimulus was not observed in 
unaware participants (F(3, 48) = 0.36, p=0.779). There was also a significant effect of 
stimulus on ratings of pleasantness in aware (data shown in figure 7(b)) participants 
(F(3, 81) = 21.24, p<.001.), but not in the unaware group (F(3, 48) = 0.92, p=0.438). 
For aware participants, across all conditions, stimulus A produced higher ratings of 
pleasantness than B (p<.05) and also higher ratings that stimulus C (p<.01), and a trend 
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of B > C was also observed. This trend of stimulus B > C was significant in the Positive 
mood condition (p<.05). Furthermore, interestingly, the rating of pleasantness for 
stimulus C was significantly lower in the Positive condition compared to the Negative 
condition (p<.01). 
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Figure 7: Mean emotional ratings for each stimulus - A, B, C and for the common 
stimulus X in the compound. Error bars represent SE of mean. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 
0.01, *** = p < 0.001. 
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Discussion 
The effects of negative mood on learning processes have been extensively investigated 
(e.g. Clark, et al., 2005; Cools, Robinson, et al., 2008; Robinson, et al., 2009; Robinson 
& Sahakian, 2009b, etc) and more specifically the effect of mood on motivation to 
process reward cues (Rogers, et al., 2003; Roiser, et al., 2006) and on learning 
associations between stimuli and rewards (Chase, et al., 2010). The present study aimed 
to investigate further the effects of mood on associative learning by comparing directly 
positive and negative mood. Furthermore the present study examined how mood affects 
attention allocation and emotional reactivity to conditioned stimuli. As predicted, 
participants in the negative mood condition took longer to successfully become aware 
of the Pavlovian contingencies, and a reduced discrimination between expected gains 
has also been demonstrated previously (Rogers, et al., 2003) which may account for the 
delayed learning in the negative mood condition in the present study. 
The prediction that attention to the stimuli would accord with the predictive uncertainty 
such that observing times would be greatest for the partially predictive compound BX 
compared to the reliable compounds AX and CX was not fulfilled. Furthermore, we 
hypothesised that the same pattern would be found in the dwell time data obtained with 
the eye tracker, such that the predictive stimuli in the compound would be gazed at for 
longer than the common X stimulus in BX trials, but not in AX or CX trials. However, 
contrary to our prediction, it was found that the predictive stimuli in the compound was 
gazed at for longer than the common X stimulus in AX trials, albeit only in the neutral 
and positive mood conditions. This effect was abolished in the negative mood 
condition, and replaced by a gaze preference towards the non-predictive stimulus C, 
over the concurrently presented X stimulus, in CX trials. This indicates a bias to the 
appetitive stimulus in the positive and neutral mood conditions but a bias for the 
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aversive stimulus (stimulus C - which may be viewed as a punishment stimulus) in the 
negative mood condition, supporting previous data associating negative mood with 
increased punishment prediction but not reward prediction (Cools, Robinson, et al., 
2008; Rogers, et al., 2003).  
The finding that those under state negative mood took longer to acquire the contingency 
knowledge correlates with previous findings that those in a state of negative mood show 
reduced learning (Chase, et al., 2010). It is worth to note, that their data obtained with 
the state negative mood group were confounded by a high BDI score within this group, 
but this was not the case in our study whereby the state mood conditions were matched 
for the BDI scores. Although a suppressed motivation for learning is the most 
commonly proposed explanation for reduced learning under state negative mood, in our 
study it is possible that reduced learning might have also reflected decreased 
confidence. This is likely as our study required the participants to make explicit 
responses indicative of learning, thus the reduced speed of learning may be driven also 
by a reduction in confidence to provide the correct response. It is known that confidence 
to produce explicit ratings in related measures are found to be decreased in negative 
mood conditions (Allan, et al., 2007). The reduced motivation account is more likely to 
be associated with the delayed learning in the negative mood condition found here, as 
negative mood and reduced motivation have long been linked (Cools, et al., 2005). A 
reason for the reduced motivation in negative mood may be associated with the 
perceived value of the reward being altered due to a state of anhedonia. However, in the 
present study the emotional responses to the stimuli (A, B, C and X) in the negative 
mood condition did not differ from the neutral mood condition as the ratings of 
pleasantness in both groups were higher for the A stimulus than for the C stimulus.  
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An interesting finding in the present study was the presence of an increased pupil size in 
the positive mood condition throughout the associative learning phase when compared 
to the negative and neutral mood conditions. It seems that positive mood creates a 
strong emotional state as links between pupil size and emotion has been recently 
reported (Kashihara, Okanoya, & Kawai, 2013; Kret, Roelofs, Stekelenburg, & de 
Gelder, 2013; Naber, Frassle, Rutishauser, & Einhauser, 2013; Prehn et al., 2013). 
Furthermore recent research has proposed that motivation can act as a driver for visual 
attention and has introduced pupil size as a indirect measure of motivation/effort 
(Wykowska, et al., 2013). In accordance to this proposal a link between action control 
and attentional processes has been hypothesised (Bekkering & Neggers, 2002; 
Wykowska, et al., 2009). Indeed the increased pupil size was accompanied by an 
increased attentional preference for AX trials and may have also driven the faster 
learning in the positive mood group as those under positive mood also acquired 
contingency knowledge earlier in the current study, albeit only in comparison to 
negative mood. These findings taken together also with our previous findings, (Mathers, 
Steckler, et al., 2014) demonstrate a reduced motivation to perform an instrumental 
response in the presence of predictive stimuli to gain reward or avoid punishment 
despite showing awareness of the relevant outcome when under induced state negative 
mood. Hence the present data support the suggestion that those under state negative 
mood are less motivated than those under positive mood to perform an action. 
In summary, the present study reported that participants who underwent negative mood 
induction took longer to acquire Pavlovian contingency knowledge than those in either 
neutral or positive mood condition. Induced mood state also disrupted observation 
patterns to the stimuli such that induced mood reduced overall observation time in BX 
and CX trials, as well those in a negative mood state only showing a increased bias for 
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stimulus C over X. Therefore, positive and negative state mood differentially affect 
emotional and observational responses to Pavlovian stimuli predictive of reward, and 
also impact on the rate of acquiring contingency knowledge of the same predictive 
stimuli. 
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Appendix 
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Appendix 1: Grey-scale visual stimuli used for conditioned stimuli 
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Appendix 2: Profile of Mood States (POMS) questionnaire 
 
Please rate from 0= not at all to 4=extremely, how the different adjectives represent  
your current mood state 
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 0 1 2 3 4 Friendly 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Lonely 
0 1 2 3 4 Tense 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Miserable 
0 1 2 3 4 Happy 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Efficient 
0 1 2 3 4 Angry 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Bitter 
0 1 2 3 4 Worn out 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Pleased 
             0 1 2 3 4 Unhappy 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Alert 
0 1 2 3 4 Confused 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Ready to fight 
0 1 2 3 4 Lively 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Restless 
0 1 2 3 4 Unable to concentrate 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Good-natured 
0 1 2 3 4 Sorry for things done 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Gloomy 
             0 1 2 3 4 Shaky 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Desperate 
0 1 2 3 4 Listless 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Rebellious 
0 1 2 3 4 Overjoyed 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Nervous 
0 1 2 3 4 Peeved 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Helpless 
0 1 2 3 4 Agreeable 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Weary 
             0 1 2 3 4 Sad 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Elated 
0 1 2 3 4 Active 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Forgetful 
0 1 2 3 4 On edge 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Deceived 
0 1 2 3 4 Grouchy 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Full of pep 
0 1 2 3 4 Fatigued 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Warm-hearted 
             0 1 2 3 4 Muddled 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Carefree 
0 1 2 3 4 Blue 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Furious 
0 1 2 3 4 Energetic 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Uncertain about things 
0 1 2 3 4 Spiteful 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Worthless 
0 1 2 3 4 Hopeless 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Anxious 
             0 1 2 3 4 Satisfied 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Vigorous 
0 1 2 3 4 Panicky 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Terrified 
0 1 2 3 4 Helpful 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Good-tempered 
0 1 2 3 4 Unworthy 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Guilty 
0 1 2 3 4 Annoyed 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Bushed 
       
0 1 2 3 4 Bad-tempered 
0 1 2 3 4 Cheerful 
 
0 1 2 3 4 Refreshed 
0 1 2 3 4 Exhausted 
       0 1 2 3 4 Resentful 
       0 1 2 3 4 Forgiving 
 
Month       
 0 1 2 3 4 Discouraged 
       
       
Day       
 0 1 2 3 4 Relaxed 
       0 1 2 3 4 Bewildered 
 
Year       
 0 1 2 3 4 Sluggish 
       0 1 2 3 4 Uneasy 
 
Time       
 0 1 2 3 4 Kindly 
       
       
Initials       
 
207 
 
             
Appendix 3: Drug Use questionnaire 
Substance Ever 
used 
(y/n) 
 
Duration 
of use 
(mths/yrs) 
Time since 
last use  
(days – yrs) 
How often 
used per 
(wk/mo/yr) 
Usual dose 
per session 
      
Marijuana     (joints) 
Cannabis      
Hashish      
      
Stimulants:     (grams) 
Cocaine      
Crack      
Speed      
Ecstasy     (tabs) 
      
Hallucinogens:     (hits) 
Mushrooms      
LSD      
PCP      
Mescaline      
Ketamine      
      
Opiates:     (grams) 
Heroin      
Morphine      
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Barbiturates     (tabs) 
Downers -      
(state type)      
      
Benzodiazepines     (tabs) 
Tranquilizers -      
(state type)      
      
Anti-depressants     (tabs) 
(state type)      
      
Inhalants:     (hits) 
Poppers      
Glue      
      
Other      
(please specify)      
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Appendix 4: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale questionnaire 
Please circle the number which corresponds to the choice 
that best describes you. Try to describe the way you USUALLY 
act and feel, not just how you are feeling right now. 
      1 = rarely/never    2 = occasionally    3 = often    4 = almost always/always 
      
      1 I plan tasks carefully. 1 2 3 4 
2 I do things without thinking. 1 2 3 4 
3 I make up my mind quickly. 1 2 3 4 
4 I am happy-go-lucky. 1 2 3 4 
5 I don't "pay attention". 1 2 3 4 
6 I have "racing" thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
7 I plan trips well ahead of time. 1 2 3 4 
8 I am self-controlled. 1 2 3 4 
9 I concentrate easily. 1 2 3 4 
10 I save regularly. 1 2 3 4 
11 I "squirm" at plays or lectures. 1 2 3 4 
12 I am a careful thinker. 1 2 3 4 
13 I plan for job security. 1 2 3 4 
14 I say things without thinking. 1 2 3 4 
15 I like to think about complex problems. 1 2 3 4 
16 I change jobs. 1 2 3 4 
17 I act "on impulse". 1 2 3 4 
18 I get easily bored when solving thought problems. 1 2 3 4 
19 I act on the spur of the moment. 1 2 3 4 
20 I am a steady thinker. 1 2 3 4 
21 I change residences. 1 2 3 4 
22 I buy things on impulse. 1 2 3 4 
23 I can only think about one problem at a time. 1 2 3 4 
24 I change hobbies. 1 2 3 4 
25 I spend or charge more than I earn. 1 2 3 4 
26 I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking. 1 2 3 4 
27 I am more interested in the present than the future. 1 2 3 4 
28 I am restless at the theatre or lectures. 1 2 3 4 
29 I like puzzles. 1 2 3 4 
30 I am future orientated. 1 2 3 4 
  
210 
 
Appendix 5: Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) questionnaire 
On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read each group of 
statements carefully. Then pick out the one statement which best describes the 
way you have been feeling for the past week, including today. Circle the 
number or underline the statement you choose. Be sure to read all the 
statements in each group before making  your choice. 
 
1. 
    0  I do not feel sad. 
    1  I feel sad. 
    2  I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it. 
    3 I am so sad and unhappy that I can't stand it.  
2. 
    0  I am not particularly discouraged about the future. 
    1  I feel discouraged about the future. 
    2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
    3 I feel the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve.  
3. 
    0 I do not feel like a failure. 
    1  I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
    2  As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures. 
    3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person.  
4. 
    0  I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to. 
    1  I don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
    2  I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore. 
    3  I am dissatisfied or bored with everything.  
5. 
    0  I don't feel particularly guilty. 
    1  I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
    2  I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
    3  I feel guilty all of the time.  
6. 
    0  I don't feel I am being punished. 
    1 I feel I may be punished. 
    2  I expect to be punished. 
    3  I feel I am being punished.  
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7. 
    0  I don't feel disappointed in myself. 
    1  I am disappointed in myself. 
    2  I am disgusted with myself. 
    3  I hate myself.  
8. 
    0  I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else. 
    1  I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
    2  I blame myself all the time for my faults. 
    3  I blame myself for everything bad that happens.  
9. 
    0  I don't have any thoughts of killing myself. 
    1  I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
    2  I would like to kill myself.  
    3  I would kill myself if I had the chance.  
10. 
    0  I don't cry any more than usual. 
    1  I cry more now than I used to. 
    2  I cry all the time now. 
    3  I used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry even though I want to.  
11. 
    0  I am no more irritated by things than I ever was. 
    1  I am slightly more irritated now than usual. 
    2  I am quite annoyed or irritated a good deal of the time. 
    3  I feel irritated all the time.  
12. 
    0  I have not lost interest in other people. 
    1  I am less interested in other people than I used to be. 
    2  I have lost most of my interest in other people. 
    3  I have lost all of my interest in other people.  
13. 
    0  I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
    1  I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
    2  I have greater difficulty in making decisions more than I used to. 
    3  I can't make decisions at all anymore.  
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14. 
    0  I don't feel that I look any worse than I used to. 
    1  I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
    2  I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me 
look unattractive. 
    3  I believe that I look ugly.  
15. 
    0  I can work about as well as before. 
    1  It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something. 
    2  I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
    3 I can't do any work at all.  
16. 
    0  I can sleep as well as usual. 
    1  I don't sleep as well as I used to. 
    2  I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to 
sleep. 
    3  I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to 
 sleep. 
17. 
    0  I don't get more tired than usual. 
    1  I get tired more easily than I used to. 
    2  I get tired from doing almost anything. 
    3  I am too tired to do anything.  
18. 
    0  My appetite is no worse than usual. 
    1  My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
    2  My appetite is much worse now. 
    3 I have no appetite at all anymore.  
19. 
    0  I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately. 
    1  I have lost more than five pounds. 
    2  I have lost more than ten pounds. 
    3  I have lost more than fifteen pounds.  
 I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less:  YES____   NO____ 
20. 
    0  I am no more worried about my health than usual. 
    1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains, or upset  
stomach, or constipation. 
    2  I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to think of much 
else. 
    3 I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot think about 
anything else. 
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21. 
    0  I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
    1  I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
    2  I have almost no interest in sex. 
    3  I have lost interest in sex completely. 
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Appendix 6: Medical Health questionnaire 
Nuffield Hospitals Medical History Questionnaire 
Confidential 
Please complete all sections of this form unless otherwise indicated. 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_____ 
 
Name (Full)............................................................. 
 
Date of Birth................... Sex.......... Height.................... Weight.................... 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_____ 
 
Please underline the appropriate answer where a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ is required. If your answer is ‘Yes’ 
brief details should be given. 
1. Have you suffered from any of the following?  
 Details 
Diabetes Mellitus Yes / No 
 
Epilepsy Yes / No 
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Frequent chest, throat or nose 
infections/diseases Yes / No 
 
Back injury/backache Yes / No 
 
Joint injury Yes / No 
 
Ear infection  Yes / No 
 
Rheumatism or Rheumatic fever Yes / No 
 
Urinary problems or kidney disease Yes / No 
 
Infectious diseases (Mumps, Measles, 
German Measles, Tuberculosis etc.) Yes / No 
 
Hepatitis Yes / No 
 
Heart disease Yes / No 
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High blood pressure, chest pain, 
shortage of breath Yes / No 
 
Anxiety or Depression requiring treatment Yes / No 
 
Nervous breakdown or debility arising 
from overwork Yes / No 
 
Menstrual problems Yes / No 
 
Haemorrhoids Yes / No 
 
Dyspepsia or Peptic Ulcer Yes / No 
 
Hernia Yes / No 
 
Dysentry/Typhoid/Food poisoning Yes / No 
 
Any other stomach disorder Yes / No 
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Varicose veins Yes / No 
 
Migraines or other frequent headaches Yes / No 
 
Hay fever, eczema or other allergies Yes / No 
 
Skin disorders Yes / No 
 
Fainting or giddiness Yes / No 
 
Poor eyesight (even when wearing  
glasses/contact lenses) Yes / No 
 
Please give date when eyesight was 
last tested (approx.) Yes / No 
 
Impaired hearing Yes / No  
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2.  Are you a registered disabled person? Yes / No    If ‘Yes’ what is you registration number and 
   expiry date? 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
3. a) Have you been an in-patient in Yes / No If ‘Yes’ please give details: 
 hospital or consulted your GP during 
 the last five years? 
 
 b) How many days of sickness have  What were the main causes? 
 you had in the last 12 months? 
 
 c) Are you taking any pills, tablets or Yes / No If ‘Yes’ please give details: 
 having injections, receiving any medical  
 or psychiatric treatment or advice or  
 awaiting surgery? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
4. How often do you visit your dentist?  When was your last visit? 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
5. What was the date of your last  Tetanus 
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 immunisation against the following: 
   Tuberculosis 
 
   Polio 
 
   Rubella (German Measles) 
   (Anti-D Gammaglobulin) 
 
   Hepatitis B 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
6. Date of last x-ray  Reason for x-ray 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
7. General state of health; please 
 comment on any aspects not covered 
 above (i.e. accidents, injuries,  
 disorders not mentioned). 
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8. What is your average consumption of  a) alcohol units* per week  
(* A  unit- single  measure of spirit /one glass of wine/ half a pint of beer) 
  b) tobacco per day 
 
 
9. Is there any additional information regarding your health not covered in the above questions? 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
I declare that the answers given to the above questions are true to the best of my knowledge and I 
have not withheld any material facts which may have any bearing as to the state of my health.  
 
  Signature  Date 
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Appendix 7: Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) 
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Appendix 8: Table 1 – Summary of studies investigating the effects of mood 
 
Citation Participants Intervention Measures Results 
(Rogers, et 
al., 2003) 
N = 18 (healthy 
volunteers) 
ATD vs. 
placebo 
- decision 
making 
(gambling) task 
ATD altered 
decision making by 
reducing 
discrimination 
between magnitudes 
of expected gains 
(Cools, et 
al., 2005) 
N = 10 (within 
subject) 
N = 23 
(between 
subject) 
(healthy 
volunteers) 
ATD vs. 
placebo 
- VAS 
- CRRT 
- Stop-signal 
reaction-time 
task 
ATD slowed 
responses in the 
CRRT increasing 
accuracy whilst 
showed no effects on 
the ability to inhibit 
responses or on 
mood. 
(O. 
Robinson, 
et al., 
2009) 
N = 11 (healthy 
volunteers) 
ATD vs. 
placebo 
(Negative vs. 
positive vs. 
neutral mood) 
- CRRT 
- SRET 
 
Mood state 
moderates the role 
serotonin in 
cognitive biases. 
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(O. J. 
Robinson 
& 
Sahakian, 
2009b) 
N = 11 (healthy 
volunteers) 
ATD vs. 
placebo 
(Negative vs. 
positive vs. 
neutral mood) 
- AGNG 
- OTT 
 
Mood induction 
affected “cold” 
(OTT) tasks through 
a top-down 
mechanism, while 
ATD affected “hot” 
(AGNG) tasks 
through a bottom-up 
process. 
 
(Jans, et 
al., 2008) 
N = 24 (12 
male SD rats 
and 12 male 
BN rats – 3 
months of age) 
ATD vs. 
placebo 
(vehicle) 
- anxiety related 
behaviour tests 
(open-field test, 
home cage 
emergence test 
and social 
interaction test) 
- depression 
related 
behaviour test 
(forced swim 
test) 
- cognition test 
SD rats showed 
increased depression 
and anxiety after 
ATD; BN rats did 
not. ATD reduced 
plasma serotonin in 
BN and SD rats but 
reduced 
hippocampal 
serotonin in BN rats 
only. ATD effects 
are strain dependent. 
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(object 
recognition test) 
(Clark, et 
al., 2005) 
N = 41 
(Healthy 
volunteers; 19 
short-short 
transporter 
alleles, 15 
long-long, 7 
short-long) 
ATD vs. 
placebo 
- trait 
impulsivity 
(Barratt 
Impulsivity 
Scale) 
- SST 
No effect of ATD 
against placebo was 
observed on the 
SST. 
(Finger, et 
al., 2007) 
N = 16 
(Healthy 
volunteers) 
ATD vs. 
placebo 
- 5-HTTLPR 
genotyping 
- Passive 
avoidance 
learning task 
- Probabilistic 
response 
reversal task 
Genotype plays a 
role in the effects of 
ATD observed 
during certain 
cognitive and 
emotional tasks. 
(Blair, et 
al., 2008) 
N = 24 
(Healthy 
volunteers) 
ATD vs. 
placebo 
ATD (N=11): 
7 female, 8 
- Differential 
reward/ 
punishment task 
ATD and long-long 
homogenisity 
induced reduced 
sensitivity to 
punishment-based 
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short allele 
carriers. 
Placebo 
(N=13): 6 
female, 7 
short carriers. 
information. 
ATD; acute tryptophan depletion. VAS; visual analogue scale. CRRT; cued-
reinforcement reaction-time task. SRET; self-referent encoding/retrieval task. AGNG; 
affective go/no-go. OTT; one touch tower of london. SD; Sprague Dawley. BN; Brown 
Norway. SST; stop signal task. 5-HTTLPR; serotonin transporter 
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Appendix 9: Mood Induction Procedure Images - Negative mood condition 
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Appendix 10: Mood Induction Procedure Images - Positive mood condition: set 1 
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Appendix 11: Mood Induction Procedure Images - Positive mood condition: set 2 
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Appendix 12: Mood Induction Procedure Images - Neutral mood condition 
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